THE WORLD, CONNECTEDGeopolitical Relationship Atlas
CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS

China and Taiwan

Cross-Strait relations combine a political dispute over Taiwan's status, economic connections and risks to mobility. The positions of Beijing and the Taiwanese authorities are presented with attribution; statistical designations are not used as an atlas decision on sovereignty.

Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07

Political status

Beijing advocates its one-China principle; this is an attributed official position, not an editorial conclusion on the entire dispute.

Trade

Some statistics combine mainland China and Hong Kong; they are not equivalent to a bilateral figure for mainland China alone.

Mobility

Taiwan's MAC warned in September 2026 of risks linked to new entry and exit rules.

Bilateral indicators

Blank cells: data unavailable.

Indicators of the relationship between China and Taiwan
IndicatorValuePeriod
Goods trade191,785.69 M USD2025 · Taiwan MOF
Goods: China to Taiwan91,700.09 M USD2025 · Taiwan MOF
Goods: Taiwan to China100,085.6 M USD2025 · Taiwan MOF
Services trade22,607 M USDOECD–WTO est.2024 · OECD–WTO
Export share: China to Taiwan2.2 %2025 · NBS China
Export share: Taiwan to China15.62 %2025 · Taiwan MOF
Investment stock: China in Taiwan
Investment stock: Taiwan in China
Definitions and sources

Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.

Goods trade
2025 · Ministry of Finance, R.O.C. (Taiwan) · Direct trade with mainland China, Taiwan customs reporting. Excludes Hong Kong and Macao. FOB exports and CIF imports. January–December 2025; the mainland China + Hong Kong aggregate is not used.
Goods: China to Taiwan
2025 · Ministry of Finance, R.O.C. (Taiwan) · Direct trade with mainland China, Taiwan customs reporting. Excludes Hong Kong and Macao. FOB exports and CIF imports. January–December 2025; the mainland China + Hong Kong aggregate is not used.
Goods: Taiwan to China
2025 · Ministry of Finance, R.O.C. (Taiwan) · Direct trade with mainland China, Taiwan customs reporting. Excludes Hong Kong and Macao. FOB exports and CIF imports. January–December 2025; the mainland China + Hong Kong aggregate is not used.
Services trade
2024 · OECD / World Trade Organization · Balanced Trade in Services (BaTIS) · Official OECD–WTO BaTIS estimate: exports and imports of services from the balanced series, in M USD. The source flags the values as imputed (I). It reconciles mirror information and uses modelling to fill gaps; it is not a direct bilateral observation or evidence of specific transactions. It does not affect the geopolitical classification. Methodology: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-balanced-trade-statistics.html
Export share: China to Taiwan
2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Published share, rounded to one decimal place, of Chinese goods exports destined for the partner in calendar year 2025. Chinese reporting; not an import share or the partner’s export share. Hong Kong and Taiwan have separate rows in the source. For China–India, it does not share the fiscal year used in the Indian figures.
Export share: Taiwan to China
2025 · Ministry of Finance, R.O.C. (Taiwan) · Direct trade with mainland China, Taiwan customs reporting. Excludes Hong Kong and Macao. FOB exports and CIF imports. January–December 2025; the mainland China + Hong Kong aggregate is not used.

Country comparison

Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.

Economic and demographic comparison of China and Taiwan
IndicatorChinaTaiwan
Nominal GDP19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB920.05 billion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF
GDP per capita13,861.97 USD2025 · WB39,488.58 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF
GDP growth4.96 %2025 · WB8.7 %IMF est.2025 · IMF
Policy interest rate1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC2 %2024-03-22 · Taiwan CBC
Inflation · annual average0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB1.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF
Inflation · latest year-on-year figure0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China2.04 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · DGBAS
Unemployment4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB3.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF
Budget balance (% of GDP)-7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF-2.1 %IMF est.2025 · IMF
Gross public debt (% of GDP)99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF22.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF
Current account balance (% of GDP)3.77 %2025 · WB17.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF
Population1,406,585,0002025 · WB23,299,000IMF est.2025 · IMF
Area9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO≈ 36,197 km²2024-05 · Taiwan MOFA
Military expenditure
Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Definitions, dates and sources

Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.

Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0

Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.

Nominal GDP
Current USDChina: 2025 · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
GDP per capita
Current USD per personChina: 2025 · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
GDP growth
Annual real change (%)China: 2025 · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Policy interest rate
Central bank instrument (%)China: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.Taiwan: 2024-03-22 · CBC discount rate · Central Bank of the Republic of China (Taiwan) · Effective date of the latest change shown in the official table consulted; not a new decision in 2026.
Inflation · annual average
Average annual change in headline CPI (%)China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedChina: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.Taiwan: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI against the same month of the previous year (%) · Taiwan's Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics · Published: 2026-09-08 · National headline CPI year-on-year, not monthly inflation or an annual average.
Unemployment
% of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionChina: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Taiwan: 2025 · Unemployment according to the IMF WEO; not the ILO modelled estimates series. · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Budget balance
General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Taiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Gross public debt
General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Taiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Current account balance
% of GDPChina: 2025 · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Population
PeopleChina: 2025 · World BankTaiwan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Estimate published by the IMF for the TWN series, distinct from CHN. Snapshot accessed on 7 October 2026; not an observation for 2026.
Area
Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOTaiwan: 2024-05 · Area of Taiwan and its outlying islands given by MOFA; geographic reference from the May 2024 edition. · Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · Published: 2024-05 · Rounded figure published by MOFA. Not a 2026 measurement or an atlas decision on sovereignty.
Military expenditure
Current USD per year; SIPRI series
Military expenditure (% of GDP)
Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship

WTO accession

1 January 2002

Chinese Taipei

Separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu; trade status, not a resolution of political status. [3]

Exports to China and Hong Kong

170,480 M USD

2025

Two-destination aggregate reported by a Taiwanese institutional publication citing the Ministry of Finance. Not entered as mainland China alone. [4]

What they buy and sell

Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.

China to Taiwan

Trade composition unavailable from China to Taiwan
Product or sectorValue / share

Taiwan to China

Trade composition unavailable from Taiwan to China
Product or sectorValue / share

Connections between people

Mobility warnings and continued trade do not by themselves measure relations between populations. [2] [4]

Residents, study and travel

Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.

Travel figures retain each source's coverage. Check the definitions and periods before comparing the two directions.

Indicators of human connections between China and Taiwan
IndicatorValuePeriod / source
Residents from China living in Taiwan
Residents from Taiwan living in China
Study and training: China in Taiwan
Study and training: Taiwan in China
Academic stays: China in Taiwan
Academic stays: Taiwan in China
Travel: China to TaiwanResidence in mainland China; arrivals in Taiwan637,060arrivals2025 · Taiwan tourism
Travel: Taiwan to ChinaTaiwanese nationals; departures with mainland China as the first destination3,237,511trips2025 · Taiwan tourism
What each figure measures

Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.

Travel: China to Taiwan
Arrivals of travellers residing in mainland China; includes traveller categories defined by Taiwanese immigration and foreign nationals residing in China. Does not include Hong Kong or Macao. Not distinct people or necessarily leisure travel. 2025 · Taiwan tourism
Travel: Taiwan to China
Departures of nationals of the Republic of China (Taiwan), classified by first destination. Mainland China is separate from Hong Kong and Macao. Does not count all destinations on an itinerary, foreign residents in Taiwan or distinct people; not an arrivals count published by China. 2025 · Taiwan tourism

Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.

Underlying ties

History, institutions and long-standing issues.

A political dispute requiring attribution of positions

The white paper published by China's State Council in August 2022 maintains that Taiwan is part of China and presents reunification as a central objective. The document attributes some of the tension to the Democratic Progressive Party authorities and external actors. These are statements and objectives of the Chinese Government. Reproducing them does not turn that political or legal interpretation into an independent conclusion of the atlas. [1]

Trade status does not resolve sovereignty

The WTO records Chinese Taipei's accession from 1 January 2002 under the designation of the separate customs territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu. That framework identifies a participant and its trade commitments. It must not be used as evidence of general diplomatic recognition or as a solution to the political dispute. For economic figures, customs territory, destination country and sovereignty are questions that must remain separate. [3]

Recent developments

Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07

Mainland China and Hong Kong are not a single bilateral cell

A Taiwanese institutional publication citing the Ministry of Finance puts exports to China and Hong Kong at 170,480 million USD in 2025, equivalent to 26.6% of total exports. The aggregate helps examine exposure to those markets but includes Hong Kong. It is not placed in the cell for exports to mainland China alone, nor are missing imports added to invent a bilateral trade total. [4]

Taiwanese warnings of September 2026

On 15 September 2026, the Mainland Affairs Council released its assessment of new Chinese entry and exit provisions. The Taiwanese body warned of increased risks to the personal safety and business activity of those travelling to mainland China. The profile presents that warning as the MAC's position. It does not convert the statement into a number of detentions or a quantitative measure of incident frequency. [2]

The scope of this profile

Customs territory status in the WTO does not decide political status. This profile documents cross-Strait relations: it does not add Taiwan to the catalogue of 195 countries or assign it a new bilateral category. [3]

Milestones and consequences

  1. 2002-01-01

    Chinese Taipei in the WTO

    Accession of the separate customs territory to the organisation. [3]

  2. 2022-08-10

    Chinese white paper

    Beijing publishes its account of positions and objectives regarding Taiwan. [1]

  3. 2026-09-15

    MAC warning

    The Taiwanese body assesses risks from new entry and exit rules. [2]

Sources and data

Periods and scope of the figures

A specific profile of cross-Strait relations. Taiwan is not added to the catalogue or map dropdowns. Taiwanese indicators are not filled using Chinese statistics. The mainland China–Hong Kong aggregate is explicitly kept outside the bilateral table. Statistical coverage and the authorities' positions do not constitute an editorial decision on sovereignty.

  1. 2022 white paper on Taiwan

    State Council of China / Xinhua · Institutional source · Document: 2022-08-10 · Accessed: 2026-10-07

  2. Assessment of new entry and exit provisions

    Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-15 · Accessed: 2026-10-07

  3. Chinese Taipei: WTO accession

    World Trade Organization · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07

  4. Taiwan's export results in 2025

    CNA, republished by OCAC; figures attributed to the Ministry of Finance · Reporting or analysis · Accessed: 2026-10-07

Additional sources on products and human connections