United States and North Korea
North Korea's nuclear and missile programme and military ties with Russia are central US concerns. Washington coordinates positions with Japan and South Korea, including cyber activities that, according to these governments, help finance Pyongyang's military programmes.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-08 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-08Bilateral context
On 12 June 2026, officials from the United States, Japan and South Korea held a trilateral meeting on North Korea in Tokyo.
What merchandise trade shows
In 2025, goods trade between the United States and North Korea totalled 0.701 million current USD.
Cooperation and bilateral issues
Participants expressed concern over North Korea's nuclear and missile development and reaffirmed their objective of complete denuclearisation in accordance with Security Council resolutions.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 0.701 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Goods: United States to North Korea | 0.562 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Goods: North Korea to United States | 0.139 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: United States to North Korea | 0.0000258 % | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Export share: North Korea to United States | ||
| Investment stock: United States in North Korea | ||
| Investment stock: North Korea in United States |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; complete calendar year; reporter USA. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Goods: United States to North Korea
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; complete calendar year; reporter USA. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Goods: North Korea to United States
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; complete calendar year; reporter USA. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Export share: United States to North Korea
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Exports to the partner / worldwide exports by the same reporter; same year and coverage.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | United States | North Korea |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 30.77 trillion USD2025 · WB | |
| GDP per capita | 90,026.52 USD2025 · WB | |
| GDP growth | 2.16 %2025 · WB | |
| Policy interest rate | 3.75–4 %2026-09-16 · Fed | |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF | |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 3.4 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · BLS | |
| Unemployment | 4.2 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 3.55 %ILO est.2025 · World Bank |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -6.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 123.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -3.63 %2025 · WB | |
| Population | 341,784,8572025 · WB | 26,571,0362025 · World Bank |
| Area | 9,831,510 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 120,540 km²2023 · World Bank |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDUnited States: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personUnited States: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)United States: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)United States: 2026-09-16 · Federal funds target range · Federal Reserve
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)United States: 2025 · Average annual change in headline CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · WEO estimate; not the year-on-year change for December or August 2026. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedUnited States: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics · Published: 2026-09-11 · Headline year-on-year CPI-U, not seasonally adjusted; not monthly or core inflation.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionUnited States: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.North Korea: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, percentage of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPUnited States: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleUnited States: 2025 · World BankNorth Korea: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceUnited States: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAONorth Korea: 2023 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
United States to North Korea
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
North Korea to United States
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from United States living in North Korea | ||
| Residents from North Korea living in United States | ||
| Study and training: United States in North Korea | ||
| Study and training: North Korea in United States | ||
| Academic stays: United States in North Korea | ||
| Academic stays: North Korea in United States | ||
| Travel: United States to North Korea | ||
| Travel: North Korea to United States |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Bilateral context
On 12 June 2026, officials from the United States, Japan and South Korea held a trilateral meeting on North Korea in Tokyo. David Wilezol represented the State Department, alongside Otsuka Kengo and Kim Sangil. [1]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Review: 2026-10-08
Cooperation and bilateral issues
Participants expressed concern over North Korea's nuclear and missile development and reaffirmed their objective of complete denuclearisation in accordance with Security Council resolutions. They also agreed on coordination regarding military cooperation between Russia and North Korea and malicious cyber activities, including cryptocurrency thefts that they attribute to financing nuclear and ballistic programmes. Japan thanked the United States and South Korea for support on the abductions of Japanese citizens. The source documents three governments' position towards Pyongyang, not bilateral negotiations with North Korean authorities. [1]
What merchandise trade shows
In 2025, merchandise trade between the two countries (United States and North Korea) totalled 0.701 million current USD. Shipments from the first to the second were 0.562 million; those in the opposite direction, 0.139 million. The difference between the two flows was 0.423 million, in favour of United States. This is a goods balance, not the total balance of the economic relationship: it excludes services, income and transfers. Both directions come from a single customs reporter to avoid adding mirror records. [2]
The partner's share of exports
US sales to the partner represented 0.0000258% of its worldwide goods exports in 2025. The share compares the same reporter, year and coverage. It measures export concentration, not the percentage of GDP dependent on this relationship. A partner may be important in a specific sector even if its share of total goods trade is small. [2]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Institutional sources and periods accompany each figure. Annual trade, investment positions, residents and visits are distinct measures. Empty cells do not mean zero. Statements of intent are not presented as project implementation or treaties in force.
- Bilateral relations — USA-PRK
Japan MOFA · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- Bounded matrix; reporter, partner, year, chapter and direction identified in each record
UN Comtrade · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08