United States and Russia
Ukraine, economic sanctions and nuclear arms control dominate the relationship between the United States and Russia. Residual trade coexists with a strategic confrontation that has international consequences.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-06 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 4,359.5 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: United States to Russia | 582.7 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: Russia to United States | 3,776.8 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Services trade | 1,500 M USD | 2025 · USTR |
| Export share: United States to Russia | 0.03 % | 2025 · Census |
| Export share: Russia to United States | ||
| Investment stock: United States in Russia | 7,759 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
| Investment stock: Russia in United States | 3,888 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Goods: United States to Russia
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Goods: Russia to United States
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Services trade
- 2025 · USTR
- Export share: United States to Russia
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Calculated share: U.S. exports to the partner (goods row in this table) / U.S. goods exports to the world. Same Census reporting, year 2025 and millions of USD, not seasonally adjusted. Excludes services.
- Investment stock: United States in Russia
- 2025 · U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) · Direct investment position at historical cost; immediate host economy or country of the foreign parent, not ultimate owner. Statistical estimate, year-end. Not an annual flow, market value or authorisation to operate with sanctioned entities. · Position!G28
- Investment stock: Russia in United States
- 2025 · U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) · Direct investment position at historical cost; immediate host economy or country of the foreign parent, not ultimate owner. Statistical estimate, year-end. Not an annual flow, market value or authorisation to operate with sanctioned entities. · Position!G58
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | United States | Russia |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 30.77 trillion USD2025 · WB | 2.59 trillion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF |
| GDP per capita | 90,026.52 USD2025 · WB | 17,972.12 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF |
| GDP growth | 2.16 %2025 · WB | 1 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 3.75–4 %2026-09-16 · Fed | 14 %2026-09-11 · CBR |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF | 8.72 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 3.4 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · BLS | 6.33 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · CBR |
| Unemployment | 4.2 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 2.13 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -6.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -3.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 123.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 17.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -3.63 %2025 · WB | 1.68 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 341,784,8572025 · WB | 143,997,000IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Area | 9,831,510 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 17,125,190 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
For Russia, GDP, population and GDP per capita are estimates from the same IMF (WEO) dataset for 2025. The per-capita figure published by the IMF is used, rather than a calculation of our own. The earlier World Bank series could not be reconciled and are not mixed with this dataset. Review: 2026-10-07. IMF data terms of use0
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDUnited States: 2025 · World BankRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personUnited States: 2025 · World BankRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP per capita in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)United States: 2025 · World BankRussia: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)United States: 2026-09-16 · Federal funds target range · Federal ReserveRussia: 2026-09-11 · Bank of Russia policy rate · Bank of Russia
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)United States: 2025 · Average annual change in headline CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · WEO estimate; not the year-on-year change for December or August 2026. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07Russia: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedUnited States: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics · Published: 2026-09-11 · Headline year-on-year CPI-U, not seasonally adjusted; not monthly or core inflation.Russia: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Bank of Russia · Published: 2026-09-16 · Year-on-year CPI. The commentary's 6.9% is annualised seasonally adjusted monthly growth and is not used here.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionUnited States: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Russia: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPUnited States: 2025 · World BankRussia: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleUnited States: 2025 · World BankRussia: 2025 · Population from the WEO series; do not mix with a denominator from another source · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceUnited States: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAORussia: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; territorial coverage as defined by the source · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
How trade has changed
Billions of current USD · full calendar years
View chart figures
| Period | Total | United States to Russia | Russia to United States |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 36,026.5 | 6,388.2 | 29,638.3 |
| 2022 | 16,092.5 | 1,655.4 | 14,437.1 |
| 2023 | 5,176.9 | 606.1 | 4,570.8 |
| 2024 | 3,536.1 | 528.3 | 3,007.8 |
| 2025 | 4,359.5 | 582.7 | 3,776.8 |
How investment has changed
Billions of USD · Year-end stock · BEA estimates
View chart figures and sources
| Period | United States in Russia | Russia in United States |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 12,874 | 3,227 |
| 2021 | 12,054 | 4,010 |
| 2022 | 8,135 | 3,753 |
| 2023 | 6,402 | 3,741 |
| 2024 | 6,454 | 3,865 |
| 2025 | 7,759 | 3,888 |
Connections between people
The political crisis also affects academic mobility. The official Fulbright Scholar Program page for Russia states that the programme is temporarily suspended. That suspension concerns a specific programme: it does not establish that all educational or family contacts are nonexistent. IIE / Fulbright Scholar Program
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from United States living in Russia | ||
| Residents from Russia living in United States | ||
| Study and training: United States in Russia | ||
| Study and training: Russia in United StatesInternational students and OPT training | 4,948 | 2024/25 · Open Doors |
| Academic stays: United States in RussiaStudy stays for academic credit | 0 | 2023/24 · Open Doors |
| Academic stays: Russia in United States | ||
| Travel: United States to Russia | ||
| Travel: Russia to United StatesCountry of residence; visits of one or more nights | 92,749arrivalsprovisional | 2025 · NTTO |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Study and training: Russia in United States
- Students of Russian origin at US institutions; includes 891 OPT participants. These are not visas issued or all people of Russian nationality. 2024/25 · Open Doors
- Academic stays: United States in Russia
- An explicit zero published for 2023/24 in Open Doors. The N/A for 2024/25 is not converted to zero. Only reported study stays for academic credit, not all US students present in Russia. 2023/24 · Open Doors
- Travel: Russia to United States
- NTTO Annual!AC193. Arrivals, not unique people; visas and categories covered by the I-94 programme. Mexico incorporates the INEGI estimate. Data are subject to revision, particularly for Canada and Mexico; the air-only row is not used. 2025 · NTTO
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
The economic rupture since 2014 and 2022
The United States imposed sanctions following Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 and expanded restrictions after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The measures affected finance, investment, imports and exports; Russia responded with countermeasures. USTR also documents the withdrawal or reduction of activity of numerous US companies. [5]
Two issues with international implications
The conflict over Ukraine shapes trade, investment and European security; nuclear arms control affects global security. Arms dialogue may be necessary without political reconciliation. Likewise, a trade licence permits a limited activity without resolving differences over Ukraine. [5] [6]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-06
What remains of trade
Goods trade fell from 36 billion dollars in 2021 to 16.1 billion in 2022 and 3.5 billion in 2024, according to the US report on Russia and the WTO. For 2025, USTR's country page estimates 4.4 billion in goods and 5.9 billion when services are included. A recovery from such a small base does not restore the pre-invasion economic relationship. [4] [5]
Sanctions do not prohibit every transaction in the same way. OFAC maintains licences for specific activities; in June 2026 it clarified certain transactions related to civil nuclear energy. For a company, the product, counterparty and authorisation conditions matter, not just the destination country. [1] [2]
Shared nuclear risk
New START limited the strategic nuclear arsenals of both countries. Its expiry on 5 February 2026 left the two largest nuclear powers without that binding framework of limits, according to the UN Secretary-General. Arms control seeks to reduce escalation and miscalculation even between opposing governments. [6]
Financial networks and third countries
On 1 October 2026, the Treasury announced measures against the Russia-linked A7 network for its alleged role in evading sanctions on Iran. The case shows how restrictions reach transnational networks. The allegations belong to the US assessment and do not automatically extend to every Russian company. [3]
Milestones and consequences
- 2014
Sanctions over Crimea
The sanctions following Crimea begin an economic rupture that intensifies with the full-scale invasion of 2022. [5]
- 2022-02
Expansion of restrictions
The new restrictions affect finance, investment and goods; numerous US businesses reduce or abandon operations in Russia. [5]
- 2026-02-05
New START expires
The treaty limiting strategic nuclear arms ends. [6]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
The historical and 2025 figures come from different USTR publications and may incorporate revisions. The Russia–Ukraine war is not presented as a direct bilateral US–Russia war.
- Russian Harmful Foreign Activities Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFAC · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Frequently Asked Questions - Recently Updated | Office of Foreign Assets Control
OFAC · Institutional source · Document: 2026-06-11 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Operation Economic Outcast Takes Unprecedented Action Against Sanctions Evasion Network Used by Iran | U.S. Department of the Treasury
US Department of the Treasury · Institutional source · Document: 2026-10-01 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- US trade with Russia
USTR · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- 2025 report on Russia's WTO commitments
USTR · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Statement on the expiry of New START
United Nations Secretary-General · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-05 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
Additional sources on products and human connections
- IIE / Fulbright Scholar Program
Accessed: 2026-10-06; programme suspended through 2026/27 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.
- USTR
2024 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.