Russia and India
The partnership combines defence cooperation, energy and technological projects with pronounced trade asymmetry. Indian purchases of Russian products far exceed sales in the opposite direction. India simultaneously maintains important relations with the United States and other partners, so its relationship with Russia does not mean automatic agreement on every international decision.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Long-standing cooperation
The strategic-partnership and defence frameworks have institutional continuity.
Unbalanced trade
The Indian profile for 2024/25 reports 63,800 M USD in imports against 4,900 M in exports.
International effects
Purchases of Russian oil also feature in US trade decisions concerning India.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 68,720 M USD | 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS |
| Goods: Russia to India | 63,840 M USD | 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS |
| Goods: India to Russia | 4,880 M USD | 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: Russia to India | ||
| Export share: India to Russia | ||
| Investment stock: Russia in India | ||
| Investment stock: India in Russia |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS · Merchandise trade according to DGCIS, India as reporter; fiscal year April 2024–March 2025, not calendar year 2025. MEA table corroborated by a DGCIS report. Russian exports correspond to imports reported by India. Published amounts rounded to 0.01 billion USD.
- Goods: Russia to India
- 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS · Merchandise trade according to DGCIS, India as reporter; fiscal year April 2024–March 2025, not calendar year 2025. MEA table corroborated by a DGCIS report. Russian exports correspond to imports reported by India. Published amounts rounded to 0.01 billion USD.
- Goods: India to Russia
- 2024/25 (April–March) · India MEA / DGCIS · Merchandise trade according to DGCIS, India as reporter; fiscal year April 2024–March 2025, not calendar year 2025. MEA table corroborated by a DGCIS report. Russian exports correspond to imports reported by India. Published amounts rounded to 0.01 billion USD.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | Russia | India |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 2.59 trillion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 3.96 trillion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 17,972.12 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 2,702.48 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 1 %2025 · WB | 7.57 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 14 %2026-09-11 · CBR | 5.25 %2026-10-06 · RBI |
| Inflation · annual average | 8.72 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 2.4 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 6.33 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · CBR | 4.82 %provisionalprovisionalYear-on-year · Aug. 2026 · MoSPI |
| Unemployment | 2.13 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 4.22 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -3.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -7.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 17.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 84.1 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 1.68 %2025 · WB | -0.42 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 143,997,000IMF est.2025 · IMF | 1,463,865,5252025 · WB |
| Area | 17,125,190 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 3,287,260 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
For Russia, GDP, population and GDP per capita are estimates from the same IMF (WEO) dataset for 2025. The per-capita figure published by the IMF is used, rather than a calculation of our own. The earlier World Bank series could not be reconciled and are not mixed with this dataset. Review: 2026-10-07. IMF data terms of use0
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.India: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP per capita in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.India: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)Russia: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)Russia: 2026-09-11 · Bank of Russia policy rate · Bank of RussiaIndia: 2026-10-06 · RBI policy repo rate · Reserve Bank of India (RBI) · Access date for Current Rates; does not represent a new decision on 6 October. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-06
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)Russia: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World BankIndia: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedRussia: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Bank of Russia · Published: 2026-09-16 · Year-on-year CPI. The commentary's 6.9% is annualised seasonally adjusted monthly growth and is not used here.India: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · MoSPI / Press Information Bureau, Government of India · Published: 2026-09-14 · provisional · Provisional · Combined rural and urban headline CPI, 2024 base; provisional MoSPI figure. Not food or wholesale inflation. Provisional figure or official advance release; subject to revision.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionRussia: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.India: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.India: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.India: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPRussia: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleRussia: 2025 · Population from the WEO series; do not mix with a denominator from another source · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.India: 2025 · World Bank
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceRussia: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; territorial coverage as defined by the source · World Bank · FAOIndia: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
Published bilateral trade
68,700 M USDIndian fiscal year 2024/25
Rounded figures from the Indian embassy; neither a calendar-year total nor a target for 2030. [2]
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
Russia to India
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
India to Russia
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Science, education and cultural contacts form part of the bilateral framework, without an announced objective automatically becoming a participant count. [1] [3]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
Travel figures retain each source's coverage. Check the definitions and periods before comparing the two directions.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from Russia living in India | ||
| Residents from India living in Russia | ||
| Study and training: Russia in India | ||
| Study and training: India in RussiaIndian nationals in tertiary education | 27,000 | 2025-01-01 · India MEA / Rajya Sabha |
| Academic stays: Russia in India | ||
| Academic stays: India in Russia | ||
| Travel: Russia to IndiaForeign tourist arrivals; nationality | 171,453arrivals | 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration |
| Travel: India to RussiaDepartures by Indian nationals; recorded destination | 123,007arrivals | 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Study and training: India in Russia
- Consular estimate published by MEA as of 1 January 2025. Excludes 222 school pupils; the total of 27222 is not used. 2025-01-01 · India MEA / Rajya Sabha
- Travel: Russia to India
- Foreign tourist arrivals in India, classified by nationality, not residence. Excludes tourists of Indian nationality residing abroad. 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration
- Travel: India to Russia
- Departures by Indian nationals to Russia recorded by immigration; not all arrivals in Russia or unique people. 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
The strategic partnership and its channels
India's Ministry of External Affairs dates the strategic-partnership declaration to October 2000 and describes cooperation covering security, the economy, science and political contacts. A 2+2 dialogue between foreign and defence ministers was added in 2021. These channels allow long-term issues to be addressed, but do not prove agreement in every international crisis. The bilateral partnership must be considered alongside India's autonomy in its decisions involving other partners. [1]
Defence, technology and long-term commitments
Defence cooperation forms part of the historical framework documented by India, alongside nuclear and space activities. Equipment, maintenance, training and industrial projects can create lasting institutional relationships. An announcement of cooperation is not a delivered system, a complete technology transfer or a paid contract. The stages of each project matter for understanding dependency and capability, and require their own documents before specific amounts or results can be assigned. [1]
A trade relationship dominated by Indian imports
The Indian embassy reports trade of 68,700 million USD in 2024/25, comprising Indian exports of 4,900 million and imports from Russia of 63,800 million. The difference shows an asymmetry in flows, not the net benefit of all bilateral activities. The document identifies oil and other products among the imports. The period is India's fiscal year; it is not combined with a Russian calendar-year total or investment stocks. [2]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
Diversification is an agenda, not an achieved result
The foreign ministry's 2025 profile describes trade working meetings and sectors of cooperation. Investment or trade targets appearing in bilateral documents are objectives: they should not be entered in a cell as amounts already observed. To verify actual diversification, products, services and completed projects would need to be tracked over several years, separating the effect of oil prices from changes in quantities or trade composition. [3]
Energy connects this pair to other relationships
The US order of February 2026 concerning Indian products includes conditions related to direct or indirect purchases of Russian oil. It is a documented example of how the India–Russia relationship can have trade consequences involving a third country. The order does not establish the volume of oil actually purchased after its publication. Nor does it turn the entire India–Russia partnership into a decision jointly taken by Washington, New Delhi and Moscow. [4]
Milestones and consequences
- 2000-10
Strategic partnership
Declaration structuring new areas of cooperation. [1]
- 2021-12
First 2+2 dialogue
A ministerial channel for foreign affairs and defence is added. [1]
- 2024/25
Asymmetric trade
The Indian embassy publishes exports and imports for the fiscal year. [2]
- 2026-02-06
US trade conditions
Order linking certain measures concerning India to Russian oil. [4]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Trade figures are rounded and refer to India's fiscal year. Trade and investment targets are not observations. Mirror reporting and different fiscal periods are not mixed.
- India–Russia strategic partnership
Ministry of External Affairs of India · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Russia economic profile and relations with India
Embassy of India in Moscow · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- India–Russia relations
Ministry of External Affairs of India · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Order on additional duties on Indian products
White House · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-06 · Accessed: 2026-10-07