Russia and Ukraine
Russia's invasion of Ukraine dominates a relationship transformed by war, occupation and destruction. Understanding it requires attention to territory, civilian protection, prisoners and reconstruction costs, rather than a conventional balance of cooperation.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-28 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Families
Prisoners, missing people and transferred children are humanitarian issues.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | ||
| Goods: Russia to Ukraine | ||
| Goods: Ukraine to Russia | ||
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: Russia to Ukraine | ||
| Export share: Ukraine to Russia | ||
| Investment stock: Russia in Ukraine | ||
| Investment stock: Ukraine in Russia |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | Russia | Ukraine |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 2.59 trillion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 212.93 billion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF |
| GDP per capita | 17,972.12 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 6,499.26 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF |
| GDP growth | 1 %2025 · WB | 1.82 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 14 %2026-09-11 · CBR | 16 %2026-09-17 · NBU / BIS |
| Inflation · annual average | 8.72 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 12.73 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 6.33 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · CBR | 8.1 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · Statistics UA |
| Unemployment | 2.13 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 11.6 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -3.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -23.3 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 17.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 108.7 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 1.68 %2025 · WB | -15 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Population | 143,997,000IMF est.2025 · IMF | 32,762,000IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Area | 17,125,190 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 603,550 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
For Russia and Ukraine, GDP, population and GDP per capita are estimates from the same IMF dataset (WEO) for 2025. The IMF's published per-capita figure is used, not a separate division. The earlier World Bank series did not reconcile and are not mixed with this dataset. Review: 2026-10-07. IMF data terms of use0
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Ukraine: 2025 · Nominal GDP in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP per capita in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Ukraine: 2025 · Nominal GDP per capita in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)Russia: 2025 · World BankUkraine: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)Russia: 2026-09-11 · Bank of Russia policy rate · Bank of RussiaUkraine: 2026-09-17 · National Bank of Ukraine policy rate · National Bank of Ukraine · speech published by the BIS · Published: 2026-09-21 · Decision announcement date; the BIS reproduces the governor's speech. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-06
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)Russia: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World BankUkraine: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedRussia: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Bank of Russia · Published: 2026-09-16 · Year-on-year CPI. The commentary's 6.9% is annualised seasonally adjusted monthly growth and is not used here.Ukraine: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · State Statistics Service of Ukraine · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionRussia: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Ukraine: 2025 · Annual unemployment estimated by IMF WEO, not a contemporaneous labour survey or ILO modelled estimate. · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate for 2025; the war limits the collection of labour observations. Not equivalent to observed unemployment in 2026.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Ukraine: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Ukraine: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPRussia: 2025 · World BankUkraine: 2025 · Current-account balance as % of GDP, IMF WEO. · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · Annual WEO estimate for UKR, 2025; not recalculated using GDP from another source.
- Population
- PeopleRussia: 2025 · Population from the WEO series; do not mix with a denominator from another source · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Ukraine: 2025 · Population from the WEO series; do not mix with a denominator from another source · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceRussia: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; territorial coverage as defined by the source · World Bank · FAOUkraine: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; territorial coverage as defined by the source · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
Recovery and reconstruction
≈588,000 M USDCut-off: 31 December 2025
RDNA5 estimate for the following decade. [5]
Needs compared with GDP
≈3 timesEstimated nominal GDP for 2025
Not annual spending or an agreed compensation amount. [5]
Verified civilian casualties in Ukraine
328 killed; 2,105 injuredSeptember 2026
Minimum figures verified by OHCHR; report published on 16 October 2026. [7]
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
Russia to Ukraine
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Ukraine to Russia
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
The human dimension here is not ordinary tourist exchange: it includes separated families, prisoners and forced displacement. In December 2025, the UN General Assembly demanded the return of Ukrainian children deported or forcibly transferred. ICRC humanitarian channels serve to seek information and family contact, not to demonstrate political reconciliation. [3] [4] United Nations in Ukraine
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from Russia living in Ukraine | ||
| Residents from Ukraine living in Russia | ||
| Study and training: Russia in Ukraine | ||
| Study and training: Ukraine in Russia | ||
| Academic stays: Russia in Ukraine | ||
| Academic stays: Ukraine in Russia | ||
| Travel: Russia to Ukraine | ||
| Travel: Ukraine to Russia |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
From Crimea to the full-scale invasion
Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, an action condemned by the European Union as contrary to international law. In February 2022, it recognised separatist entities in Donetsk and Luhansk before launching the full-scale invasion. These milestones changed the bilateral relationship and prompted an expansion of European sanctions. [6]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Review: 2026-10-28
Violence far from the front line
The OHCHR report published on 16 October verified at least 328 civilians killed and 2,105 injured in Ukraine during September 2026. These are documented minimums for that month, not military casualties or the war’s cumulative toll. The report also documents attacks on electricity and heating infrastructure on 30 September, with power outages. [7]
The UN human rights mission verified at least 372 civilians killed and 2,349 injured in Ukraine during August 2026. Long-range missiles and drones were a major cause of casualties, including in urban areas far from the front line. The tally documents verified minimums and should not be confused with military casualty figures or the full total of people affected. [1]
On 24 September, the same mission described repeated Russian attacks and damage to homes, hospitals, shops and workplaces. The civilian dimension of the war extends beyond territorial control: it disrupts services, employment and living conditions. [2]
Damage and reconstruction: what the figures mean
The joint RDNA5 assessment, published in February 2026, estimated almost 588,000 million dollars in recovery and reconstruction needs over the following decade. The information cut-off is 31 December 2025. The amount is approximately three times Ukraine's estimated nominal GDP for 2025, but it is not a bill already paid or solely the value of destroyed buildings. [5]
The comparison with GDP puts the required effort in context: GDP is annual output, while the needs span several years and sectors. Damage after the cut-off date may change the assessment; rebuilding infrastructure also requires institutions, personnel and security. [5]
Prisoners, missing people and families
The ICRC works as a neutral intermediary to convey information and request access to prisoners. Its 2025 data describe communications between Russian and Ukrainian national offices and families. These channels reduce uncertainty and suffering within the war; they do not represent political rapprochement. [3] [4]
Obligations during hostilities
The ICRC president's visit to Russia in July 2026 addressed protection of civilians and essential infrastructure and sustained access to prisoners. Humanitarian law binds the parties regardless of their positions on the conflict's origins or outcome. The existence of talks does not demonstrate full compliance with those obligations. [3]
Milestones and consequences
- 2014
Annexation of Crimea
A new phase of conflict and European sanctions begins. [6]
- 2022-02-24
Full-scale invasion
The full-scale invasion expands hostilities and transforms civilian protection, displacement and reconstruction needs. [6]
- 2025-12-03
Resolution on Ukrainian children
The General Assembly demands their immediate, safe and unconditional return; the document addresses family separation during the war. United Nations in Ukraine
- 2026-02-23
RDNA5 assessment
The recovery and reconstruction estimate is published. [5]
- 2026-09-24
Report on attacks
The UN describes intensification and civilian damage. [2]
- 2026-10-16
Publication of September’s civilian casualty report
OHCHR publishes the verified minimum figures for September 2026. The report date is later than the period observed. [7]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Reconstruction is a multi-year estimate, not spending already undertaken. Civilian casualties are verified minimums for one month. ICRC activity does not demonstrate full access to all detainees or political normalisation.
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — August 2026 | UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-16 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Russian Attacks Against Ukraine Have Reached a New Level of Intensity, Sowing More Death, Fear and Devastation Across the Country – UN Human Rights Monitors Say | UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine
UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-24 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Russia: ICRC president focuses on respect for international humanitarian law, access to prisoners of war during visit to the Russian Federation | International Committee of the Red Cross
CICR · Institutional source · Document: 2026-07-08 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- UKRAINE DELEGATION
CICR · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Fifth Ukraine damage and needs assessment
World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission and United Nations · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-23 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Extraordinary meeting on the invasion of Ukraine
European Council · Institutional source · Document: 2022-02-24 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict: September 2026
OHCHR · Institutional source · Document: 2026-10-16 · Accessed: 2026-10-28
Additional sources on products and human connections
- United Nations in Ukraine
2025-12-03 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.