China and North Korea
China and North Korea have maintained diplomatic relations since 1949 and a treaty of friendship and mutual assistance signed in 1961. Their political and consular contacts coexist with United Nations sanctions that also bind China as a member state.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-08 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-08What merchandise trade shows
In 2025, goods trade between China and North Korea totalled 2,739.5 million current USD.
Documented trade sectors
Within the selected chapters, mineral fuels and oils stands out in shipments from China to North Korea, at 53.1 million USD in 2025.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 2,739.51 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Goods: China to North Korea | 2,298.41 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Goods: North Korea to China | 441.1 M USD | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: China to North Korea | 0.0609 % | 2025 · Comtrade |
| Export share: North Korea to China | ||
| Investment stock: China in North Korea | ||
| Investment stock: North Korea in China |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; full calendar year; reporter CHN. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Goods: China to North Korea
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; full calendar year; reporter CHN. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Goods: North Korea to China
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Goods; full calendar year; reporter CHN. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF; no addition of mirror declarations. Both directions are identified from the same customs authority.
- Export share: China to North Korea
- 2025 · UN Comtrade · Exports to the partner / worldwide exports by the same reporter; same year and coverage.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | China | North Korea |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB | |
| GDP per capita | 13,861.97 USD2025 · WB | |
| GDP growth | 4.96 %2025 · WB | |
| Policy interest rate | 1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC | |
| Inflation · annual average | 0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China | |
| Unemployment | 4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 3.55 %ILO est.2025 · World Bank |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 3.77 %2025 · WB | |
| Population | 1,406,585,0002025 · WB | 26,571,0362025 · World Bank |
| Area | 9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 120,540 km²2023 · World Bank |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDChina: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personChina: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)China: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)China: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedChina: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionChina: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.North Korea: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, percentage of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPChina: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleChina: 2025 · World BankNorth Korea: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAONorth Korea: 2023 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
China to North Korea
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
| Mineral fuels and oils | 53.1 M USD2025 · Source |
| Meat and edible offal | 38.9 M USD2025 · Source |
| Pharmaceutical products | 26.2 M USD2025 · Source |
| Dairy products, eggs and honey | 11.5 M USD2025 · Source |
| Metal ores | 0.415 M USD2025 · Source |
| Vehicles and components | 0.23 M USD2025 · Source |
| Machinery and mechanical appliances | 0.128 M USD2025 · Source |
| Electrical and electronic equipment | 0.00366 M USD2025 · Source |
North Korea to China
How trade has changed
Billions of current USD · full calendar years
View chart figures
| Period | Total | China to North Korea | North Korea to China |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 301 | 242.9 | 58.1 |
| 2022 | 1,027.7 | 894 | 133.7 |
| 2023 | 2,295 | 2,003.1 | 291.9 |
| 2024 | 2,179.7 | 1,832.8 | 346.9 |
| 2025 | 2,739.5 | 2,298.4 | 441.1 |
Connections between people
The bilateral framework includes a 1953 economic and cultural agreement, 1959 aviation and cultural agreements, and the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed on 11 July 1961. China has a consulate-general in Chongjin; North Korea maintains one in Shenyang and a consular office in Dandong. There are also provincial twinning arrangements and plans for educational, scientific and sporting exchanges. [1] [2] [3]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from China living in North Korea | ||
| Residents from North Korea living in China | ||
| Study and training: China in North Korea | ||
| Study and training: North Korea in China | ||
| Academic stays: China in North Korea | ||
| Academic stays: North Korea in China | ||
| Travel: China to North Korea | ||
| Travel: North Korea to China |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Bilateral context
Relations were established on 6 October 1949. The bilateral framework includes a 1953 economic and cultural agreement, 1959 aviation and cultural agreements, and the treaty of friendship, cooperation and mutual assistance signed on 11 July 1961. [1] [2] [3]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Review: 2026-10-08
Cooperation and bilateral issues
Political contacts were revived through several visits by Kim Jong-un to China in 2018 and 2019 and a visit by Xi Jinping to North Korea in June 2019. Both governments designated 2024 as a friendship year for the seventy-fifth diplomatic anniversary. The Chinese profile records new meetings in 2025 and a visit by Xi in June 2026. China has a consulate-general in Chongjin; North Korea maintains one in Shenyang and a consular office in Dandong. There are also provincial twinning arrangements and plans for educational, scientific and sporting exchanges. [1] [2] [3]
Obligations under United Nations sanctions
The regime overseen by the 1718 Committee includes an arms embargo, restrictions on proliferation materials, asset freezes for designated individuals and entities and sectoral bans on North Korean goods. It also limits oil supplies: the refined products ceiling is 500,000 barrels over twelve-month periods for all suppliers, not an exclusive Chinese quota. The obligations apply to all member states. The panel of experts stopped supporting the committee on 30 April 2024; this does not equate to the committee's disappearance or lifting sanctions. [2]
Humanitarian assistance exemptions
The 1718 Committee allows exemption requests for projects intended for North Korea's civilian population. States, international bodies and nongovernmental organizations may submit applications detailing goods, recipients, routes and financial transactions. Committee authorization does not remove national regulatory and licensing requirements. It is a multilateral mechanism, not an automatic exemption for any Chinese bilateral operation. [3]
What merchandise trade shows
In 2025, merchandise trade between the two countries (China and North Korea) totalled 2,739.5 million current USD. Shipments from the first to the second were 2,298.4 million; those in the opposite direction, 441.1 million. The difference between the two flows was 1,857.3 million, in favour of China. This is a goods balance, not the total balance of the economic relationship: it excludes services, income and transfers. Both directions come from a single customs reporter to avoid adding mirror records. [4]
The partner's share of exports
Sales from China to the partner represented 0.0609% of its worldwide goods exports in 2025. The share compares the same reporter, year and coverage. It measures export concentration, not the percentage of GDP dependent on this relationship. A partner may be important in a specific sector even if its share of total goods trade is small. [4]
Five years of trade trends
The consistent series shows 301 million USD in 2021 and 2,739.5 million in 2025. The change between the two endpoints was +810.3 % in current dollars. The highest annual value in the period was recorded in 2025, at 2,739.5 million. The chart allows the two directions to be compared to see whether they moved together or differently. The change combines quantities, prices and exchange rates; it is not automatically attributed to a treaty, a visit or a political decision. The same reporter is retained and missing years are not interpolated. [5]
Documented trade sectors
Within the selected chapters, mineral fuels and oils stands out in shipments from China to North Korea, at 53.1 million USD in 2025. Within the selected chapters, metal ores stands out in shipments from North Korea to China, at 48.8 million USD in 2025. The table compares eight selected chapters with the same coverage as the trade total. It is not a complete list or proof that the first item in this selection is the leading product across the entire relationship. A chapter groups numerous goods: machinery and components, for example, do not describe a single business transaction. [6]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Institutional sources and periods accompany each figure. Annual trade, investment positions, residents and visits are distinct measures. Empty cells do not mean zero. Statements of intent are not presented as project implementation or treaties in force.
- China and North Korea — official bilateral profile
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- 1718 Committee: sanctions measures and mandate
United Nations Security Council · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- 1718 Committee: humanitarian exemption requests
United Nations Security Council · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- Bounded matrix; reporter, partner, year, chapter and direction identified in each record
UN Comtrade · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- Trade series 2021–2025
UN Comtrade · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
- Bounded matrix; reporter, partner, year, chapter and direction identified in each record
UN Comtrade · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-08
Additional sources on products and human connections
- UN Comtrade
2026-10-08 · Accessed: 2026-10-08 · Bounded matrix; reporter, partner, year, chapter and direction identified in each record.