China and Japan
China and Japan are connected through trade, investment and social contacts, but have disputes over maritime and security issues. The memory of war also remains present in their diplomacy and in specific cooperation projects.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-28 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Social contacts
Tourism, education and culture have their own bilateral agenda.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 2,305,300 M CNY | 2025 · NBS China |
| Goods: China to Japan | 1,126,100 M CNY | 2025 · NBS China |
| Goods: Japan to China | 1,179,200 M CNY | 2025 · NBS China |
| Services trade | 43,192 M USDOECD–WTO est. | 2024 · OECD–WTO |
| Export share: China to Japan | 4.2 % | 2025 · NBS China |
| Export share: Japan to China | 17.6 % | 2024 · Japan MOFA |
| Investment stock: China in Japan | 0.48 trillion JPY | end of 2025 · BoJ / MOF |
| Investment stock: Japan in China | 19.44 trillion JPY | end of 2025 · BoJ / MOF |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Goods trade reported by China for calendar year 2025; NBS reproduces customs data. Original amounts in hundreds of millions of yuan are expressed in millions of CNY by multiplying by 100, without conversion to dollars. They are not combined with the partner's reporting or with fiscal years. Figures rounded by the source.
- Goods: China to Japan
- 2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Goods trade reported by China for calendar year 2025; NBS reproduces customs data. Original amounts in hundreds of millions of yuan are expressed in millions of CNY by multiplying by 100, without conversion to dollars. They are not combined with the partner's reporting or with fiscal years. Figures rounded by the source.
- Goods: Japan to China
- 2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Goods trade reported by China for calendar year 2025; NBS reproduces customs data. Original amounts in hundreds of millions of yuan are expressed in millions of CNY by multiplying by 100, without conversion to dollars. They are not combined with the partner's reporting or with fiscal years. Figures rounded by the source.
- Services trade
- 2024 · OECD / World Trade Organization · Balanced Trade in Services (BaTIS) · Official OECD–WTO BaTIS estimate: exports and imports of services from the balanced series, in M USD. The source flags the values as imputed (I). It reconciles mirror information and uses modelling to fill gaps; it is not a direct bilateral observation or evidence of specific transactions. It does not affect the geopolitical classification. Methodology: https://www.oecd.org/en/data/datasets/oecd-balanced-trade-statistics.html
- Export share: China to Japan
- 2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Published share, rounded to one decimal place, of Chinese goods exports destined for the partner in calendar year 2025. Chinese reporting; not an import share or the partner’s export share. Hong Kong and Taiwan have separate rows in the source. For China–India, it does not share the fiscal year used in the Indian figures.
- Export share: Japan to China
- 2024 · Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- Investment stock: China in Japan
- end of 2025 · Bank of Japan / Ministry of Finance of Japan · Direct investment position on a directional basis, by immediate counterparty; Japanese reporting. Includes equity and intragroup debt. This is not an annual flow, approved investment or the series by ultimate owner. Unit conversion: 10,000 units of 100 million yen = one trillion yen.
- Investment stock: Japan in China
- end of 2025 · Bank of Japan / Ministry of Finance of Japan · Direct investment position on a directional basis, by immediate counterparty; Japanese reporting. Includes equity and intragroup debt. This is not an annual flow, approved investment or the series by ultimate owner. Unit conversion: 10,000 units of 100 million yen = one trillion yen.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | China | Japan |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB | 4.44 trillion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 13,861.97 USD2025 · WB | 35,951.05 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 4.96 %2025 · WB | 1.19 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC | 1.25 %2026-09-24 · BoJ |
| Inflation · annual average | 0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 3.17 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China | 1.9 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · Statistics JP |
| Unemployment | 4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 2.45 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -1.1 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 206.5 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 3.77 %2025 · WB | 4.86 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 1,406,585,0002025 · WB | 123,366,7342025 · WB |
| Area | 9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 377,969 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDChina: 2025 · World BankJapan: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personChina: 2025 · World BankJapan: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)China: 2025 · World BankJapan: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)China: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.Japan: 2026-09-24 · Approximate target for the uncollateralised overnight rate · Bank of Japan
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World BankJapan: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedChina: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.Japan: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Statistics Bureau of Japan · Published: 2026-09-18 · National headline CPI, 2025 base; includes fresh food and energy. The measure excluding fresh food (1.7%) and the preliminary Tokyo release are not used.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionChina: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Japan: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Japan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Japan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPChina: 2025 · World BankJapan: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleChina: 2025 · World BankJapan: 2025 · World Bank
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOJapan: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; source's territorial coverage · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
China to Japan
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
| Telecommunications equipment | |
| Computer equipment | |
| Clothing |
Japan to China
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
| Semiconductor manufacturing equipment | |
| Semiconductors and electronic components | |
| Plastics |
Connections between people
The December 2024 cultural dialogue addressed youth exchanges, education, tourism and sport. Japan announced measures to ease tourist visas for Chinese citizens, while both sides sought to facilitate visits. These are commitments and announcements from that meeting, not visitor numbers or a guarantee of current entry requirements. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from China living in Japan | ||
| Residents from Japan living in ChinaJapanese nationality; consular survey of residents | 92,928 | 1 October 2025 · Japan MOFA |
| Study and training: China in JapanStudents from China; student residence status | 131,097 | 1 May 2025 · JASSO |
| Study and training: Japan in China | ||
| Academic stays: China in Japan | ||
| Academic stays: Japan in ChinaStudy stays by students enrolled at Japanese institutions | 3,615 | April 2024–March 2025 · JASSO |
| Travel: China to JapanChinese nationality; arrivals in Japan, not permanent residents | 9,095,931arrivals | 2025 · JNTO |
| Travel: Japan to China |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Residents from Japan living in China
- MOFA consular count/estimate of Japanese residents in China; not people born in Japan or visitors. It retains the survey's coverage and residence criterion, which differ from Japan's register of foreign nationals. 1 October 2025 · Japan MOFA
- Study and training: China in Japan
- JASSO count of students with student status in Japan; includes higher education, vocational training, university preparation and Japanese-language institutions. It is not equivalent to the UOE tertiary-education count and does not include OPT training. 1 May 2025 · JASSO
- Academic stays: Japan in China
- Japanese students who began an educational or research stay in China during the reporting year; home institutions report participation. Includes agreements and other programmes with different durations, not a stock of enrolments throughout the year in China. April 2024–March 2025 · JASSO
- Travel: China to Japan
- JNTO count by nationality, not country of residence. Hong Kong and Taiwan are published separately. Excludes permanent residents in Japan and includes transit, stopovers and cruise visitors within JNTO's coverage. It is not a count of unique people. 2025 · JNTO
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Normalisation and the memory of war
Diplomatic normalisation was formalised on 29 September 1972; the Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed in 1978. That framework allowed exchanges to expand without erasing the legacy of war. The destruction of chemical weapons abandoned by Japan in China shows how a historical problem can require operational cooperation over decades. [6] [4]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Review: 2026-10-28
A network of trade and investment
The Japanese economic overview published in April 2025 puts goods trade in 2024 at 44.2 trillion yen, approximately 292,600 million dollars. China accounted for 20.2% of Japan's goods trade and was its largest partner. This exposure combines sales to a large market with supplies for businesses and consumers. [5]
Japan exports manufacturing equipment, semiconductors and other electronic components to China; it imports telecommunications equipment, computers and clothing. The same publication puts the flow of Japanese direct investment in China at 511,600 million yen in 2024. An annual flow is not the accumulated investment stock or the total value of Japanese businesses there. [5]
Islands, resources and delimitation
The Senkaku Islands, called Diaoyu by China, are a focus of dispute. Japan records the presence of Chinese vessels and lodges diplomatic protests. Another issue is resource development in the East China Sea: in July 2026 Tokyo protested over a new Chinese structure and recalled that the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf have not been delimited. [1] [2]
Fukushima and international verification
The discharge of treated water from Fukushima sparked a controversy with trade and diplomatic repercussions. In September 2026, Japan reported a sampling mission involving Chinese, Korean and Swiss laboratories within the IAEA framework. Joint participation allows technical information to be cross-checked; it does not by itself replace national decisions on imports. [3]
Abandoned chemical weapons
China and Japan hosted a visit by OPCW representatives to destruction facilities in Jilin between late August and early September 2026. The project addresses material abandoned during the war and serves a security and historical-remediation purpose. It is distinct from contemporary maritime disputes. [4]
Export controls and security
On 21 October 2026, China’s foreign ministry confirmed that it was applying export controls to Japan and justified them on security grounds. This is the Chinese government’s position. The statement does not identify the date the controls took effect or detail the products affected; nor does it independently establish an actual shortage in Japan. [7]
Milestones and consequences
- 1972-09-29
Diplomatic normalisation
Normalisation establishes the diplomatic framework of the contemporary relationship; the 1978 treaty consolidates it. [6]
- 1978
Treaty of Peace and Friendship
The bilateral framework is consolidated. [6]
- 2024-12-25
Cultural and people-to-people dialogue
The meeting agrees to promote exchanges and facilitate visits; the social agenda continues despite security disagreements. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
- 2026-07-31
Japanese maritime protest
Dispute over resource development. [1]
- 2026-09-11
- 2026-10-21
Chinese position on export controls
The foreign ministry confirms controls on Japan; this is the date of the statement, not a verified start date for the measures. [7]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
JPY means Japanese yen; the Spanish ‘billón’ means one million million, or one trillion in English. The economic publication is from April 2025 and its figures refer to 2024. The maritime descriptions are attributed to Japan, not to a judicial ruling on sovereignty.
- New Movement by China Concerning Unilateral Development of Natural Resources in the East China Sea | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Document: 2026-07-31 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Trends in China Coast Guard and Other Vessels in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands, and Japan's Response | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Document: 2026-08-04 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Additional Measures under the IAEA Framework Related to the Discharge of ALPS Treated Water into the Sea (Results) | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-11 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- THE VISIT OF THE OPCW EXECUTIVE COUNCIL DELEGATION TO THE ABANDONED CHEMICAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION SITES | Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-11 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Japan–China economic overview, April 2025
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- History of Japan–China diplomatic normalisation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Chinese foreign ministry press conference, 21 October 2026
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Document: 2026-10-21 · Accessed: 2026-10-28
Additional sources on products and human connections
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
2024-12-25 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan
2024 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.