China and Vietnam
Neighbourhood, industrial connections and contacts between governments closely link the countries. Land and rail cooperation coexist with differences in the South China Sea. A large trading relationship does not eliminate that dispute, nor does the dispute alone describe all everyday exchanges.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Neighbourhood and land connections
The 2000 bilateral statement provides background on the handling of the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin.
Supply chains and trade
The April 2025 statement combines an economic agenda, trade access and connectivity.
An ASEAN–China framework for 2026–2030
The new regional plan includes transport, the economy and sectoral cooperation over a five-year horizon.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 296,640.09 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: China to Vietnam | 198,629.48 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: Vietnam to China | 98,010.62 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: China to Vietnam | ||
| Export share: Vietnam to China | ||
| Investment stock: China in Vietnam | ||
| Investment stock: Vietnam in China |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
- Goods: China to Vietnam
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
- Goods: Vietnam to China
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
Some annual indicators refer to different years. Check the period beside each value before comparing them.
| Indicator | China | Vietnam |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB | 514.7 billion USD2025 · World Bank |
| GDP per capita | 13,861.97 USD2025 · WB | 5,065.99 USD2025 · World Bank |
| GDP growth | 4.96 %2025 · WB | 8.02 %2025 · World Bank |
| Policy interest rate | 1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC | |
| Inflation · annual average | 0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 3.31 %Annual average · 2025 · World Bank |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China | |
| Unemployment | 4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 1.52 %ILO est.2025 · World Bank |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -2.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 30.3 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 3.77 %2025 · WB | 6.33 %2024 · World Bank |
| Population | 1,406,585,0002025 · WB | 101,598,5272025 · World Bank |
| Area | 9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 331,338 km²2023 · World Bank |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDChina: 2025 · World BankVietnam: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personChina: 2025 · World BankVietnam: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)China: 2025 · World BankVietnam: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)China: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World BankVietnam: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedChina: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionChina: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Vietnam: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, percentage of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Vietnam: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO general-government estimate. Retains the source’s fiscal year when it differs from the calendar year.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Vietnam: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO general-government estimate. Retains the source’s fiscal year when it differs from the calendar year.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPChina: 2025 · World BankVietnam: 2024 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Population
- PeopleChina: 2025 · World BankVietnam: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOVietnam: 2023 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; observation period, not download date.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
China to Vietnam
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Vietnam to China
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
The border and people-to-people exchanges connect communities, alongside industrial chains and official contacts. [1]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from China living in Vietnam | ||
| Residents from Vietnam living in China | ||
| Study and training: China in Vietnam | ||
| Study and training: Vietnam in China | ||
| Academic stays: China in Vietnam | ||
| Academic stays: Vietnam in China | ||
| Travel: China to Vietnam | ||
| Travel: Vietnam to China |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Neighbourhood and land connections
The 2000 bilateral statement provides background on the handling of the land border and the Gulf of Tonkin. The border, crossings and transport are specific institutions and spaces in the relationship. Goods can move along land routes as well as through ports. That proximity also requires coordination on controls and procedures; a border agreement made at one point does not automatically resolve every maritime issue or subsequent logistical difficulty. [2]
Supply chains and trade
The April 2025 statement combines an economic agenda, trade access and connectivity. Companies may sell final goods or incorporate inputs from the neighbouring country, so trade does not necessarily amount to competition between two finished products. The UN Comtrade figures accompanying this profile use a single reporter and retain year and currency. Chinese exports and Vietnamese imports are not added as though they were two separate flows. [1]
Land cooperation and the maritime dispute are not the same
The April document addresses management of differences and maritime cooperation. Maintaining dialogue on the Gulf of Tonkin or maritime security does not establish a resolution of all South China Sea claims. Institutions and geographic areas matter. The profile separates those issues from land crossings and avoids inferring an absence of tensions from an increase in trade. [1] [2]
Railways as a connectivity agenda
The 2025 statement mentions railway connections, including the Lao Cai–Hanoi–Haiphong route. Improving a route can change costs and port access, but an announcement or diplomatic priority is not equivalent to opening the entire infrastructure. Assessing actual capacity requires construction phases and operational data. It is presented here as a documented connectivity agenda, separate from goods actually recorded during the year. [1]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
An ASEAN–China framework for 2026–2030
The new regional plan includes transport, the economy and sectoral cooperation over a five-year horizon. Vietnam participates in that framework as an ASEAN member, not just as China's neighbour. The instrument provides an agenda for addressing shared interests and differences; it does not mean every bilateral project is an ASEAN decision or that the programme has already produced all intended results. [3]
What recorded goods show
In 2025, recorded goods trade was 296,640.09 million USD. Shipments from China to Vietnam were 198,629.48 million USD, and those in the opposite direction were 98,010.62 million USD. A single reporter is used for both directions. The difference between those flows describes that source's goods balance, not the entire economic balance: services, subsidiary activity and investment have independent measures. [4]
Milestones and consequences
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Each figure retains its period, currency, definition and source. Blank cells are not zero. Policy documents are distinguished from statistical results, and projects under way from announcements.
- Joint statement of April 2025
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Document: 2025-04-15 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Bilateral statement of 2000
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- ASEAN–China plan 2026–2030
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Document: 2025-08 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Annual TOTAL X/M; reporter=156; partners=276,250,360,704,608,586,682; 2025; 12 returned records
UN Comtrade / CHN · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07