United States and China
The United States and China combine enormous economic exchanges with competition for influence and technology. Taiwan and trade rules are central points of friction; negotiations aim to contain those disagreements without resolving them all.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-06 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 414,629.7 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: United States to China | 105,977.8 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: China to United States | 308,651.9 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Services trade | 80,000 M USD | 2025 · USTR |
| Export share: United States to China | 4.86 % | 2025 · Census |
| Export share: China to United States | 11.1 % | 2025 · NBS China |
| Investment stock: United States in China | 120,547 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
| Investment stock: China in United States | 19,009 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Goods: United States to China
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Goods: China to United States
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Full calendar year; goods; nominal USD; not seasonally adjusted. U.S. reporting. The total is calculated by adding exports and imports. Revisions may differ from rounding in other sources.
- Services trade
- 2025 · USTR
- Export share: United States to China
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Calculated share: U.S. exports to the partner (goods row in this table) / U.S. goods exports to the world. Same Census reporting, year 2025 and millions of USD, not seasonally adjusted. Excludes services.
- Export share: China to United States
- 2025 · National Bureau of Statistics of China / General Administration of Customs · Published share, rounded to one decimal place, of Chinese goods exports destined for the partner in calendar year 2025. Chinese reporting; not an import share or the partner’s export share. Hong Kong and Taiwan have separate rows in the source. For China–India, it does not share the fiscal year used in the Indian figures.
- Investment stock: United States in China
- 2025 · U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) · Direct investment position at historical cost; immediate host economy or country of the foreign parent, not ultimate owner. Statistical estimate, year-end. Not an annual flow, market value or authorisation to operate with sanctioned entities. · Position!G203
- Investment stock: China in United States
- 2025 · U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) · Direct investment position at historical cost; immediate host economy or country of the foreign parent, not ultimate owner. Statistical estimate, year-end. Not an annual flow, market value or authorisation to operate with sanctioned entities. · Position!G199
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | United States | China |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 30.77 trillion USD2025 · WB | 19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 90,026.52 USD2025 · WB | 13,861.97 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 2.16 %2025 · WB | 4.96 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 3.75–4 %2026-09-16 · Fed | 1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF | 0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 3.4 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · BLS | 0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China |
| Unemployment | 4.2 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -6.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 123.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -3.63 %2025 · WB | 3.77 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 341,784,8572025 · WB | 1,406,585,0002025 · WB |
| Area | 9,831,510 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDUnited States: 2025 · World BankChina: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personUnited States: 2025 · World BankChina: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)United States: 2025 · World BankChina: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)United States: 2026-09-16 · Federal funds target range · Federal ReserveChina: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)United States: 2025 · Average annual change in headline CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · WEO estimate; not the year-on-year change for December or August 2026. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedUnited States: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics · Published: 2026-09-11 · Headline year-on-year CPI-U, not seasonally adjusted; not monthly or core inflation.China: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionUnited States: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.China: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPUnited States: 2025 · World BankChina: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleUnited States: 2025 · World BankChina: 2025 · World Bank
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceUnited States: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
United States to China
China to United States
How trade has changed
Billions of current USD · full calendar years
View chart figures
| Period | Total | United States to China | China to United States |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2021 | 655,685.7 | 151,439.4 | 504,246.3 |
| 2022 | 690,256.1 | 153,987.4 | 536,268.7 |
| 2023 | 574,860.8 | 147,626.5 | 427,234.3 |
| 2024 | 583,591.1 | 143,271.7 | 440,319.4 |
| 2025 | 414,629.7 | 105,977.8 | 308,651.9 |
How investment has changed
Billions of USD · Year-end stock · BEA estimates
View chart figures and sources
| Period | United States in China | China in United States |
|---|---|---|
| 2020 | 116,508 | 36,738 |
| 2021 | 116,003 | 31,831 |
| 2022 | 116,314 | 31,023 |
| 2023 | 116,454 | 30,926 |
| 2024 | 112,018 | 32,355 |
| 2025 | 120,547 | 19,009 |
Connections between people
Education is a connection distinct from trade or affinity between governments. Open Doors records students of Chinese origin in the United States and U.S. students’ academic stays in China. These are different populations and periods, not two symmetrical measures of residence. IIE / Open Doors 2025
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. residents in China | ||
| Chinese residents in the United States | ||
| Study and training: United States in China | ||
| Study and training: China in United StatesIncludes OPT training | 265,919 | 2024/25 · Open Doors |
| Academic stays: United States in ChinaAcademic credit | 1,749 | 2023/24 · Open Doors |
| Academic stays: China in United States | ||
| Travel: United States to China | ||
| Travel: China to United StatesCountry of residence; visits of one or more nights | 1,562,458arrivalsprovisional | 2025 · NTTO |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Study and training: China in United States
- Includes participants in Optional Practical Training (OPT); Open Doors total, not the number of visas issued. 2024/25 · Open Doors
- Academic stays: United States in China
- Study abroad carrying academic credit; not the total number of resident U.S. citizens. 2023/24 · Open Doors
- Travel: China to United States
- NTTO Annual!AC62. Arrivals, not unique individuals; visas and modes covered by the I-94 programme. Mexico includes the INEGI estimate. Data subject to revision, particularly for Canada and Mexico; the air-only row is not used. 2025 · NTTO
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
From diplomatic normalisation to competition
The United States recognised the People’s Republic of China and established diplomatic relations with it on 1 January 1979. At the same time, it ended recognition of the Republic of China as the government of China. That decision explains a fundamental feature: Washington maintains diplomatic relations with Beijing and a separate, unofficial relationship with Taiwan. [5] [7]
Taiwan: defence and sovereignty
The U.S. framework for unofficial ties with Taiwan includes equipment and services for its defence. Beijing considers those sales interference in its internal affairs and a threat to its sovereignty interests. The clash between these positions makes arms transactions diplomatic and strategic matters, not merely commercial ones. [3] [7]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-06
Large-scale trade, but declining
USTR estimates that goods and services trade reached 494,600 million dollars in 2025, 25.1% less than in 2024. Goods accounted for 414,600 million and services for 80,000 million. The United States bought far more goods from China than it sold to it, but recorded a surplus in services: these are different activities and balances. [4]
These flows continue to connect businesses and consumers despite the decline. A trade deficit measures the difference between exports and imports; it does not mean a state incurs an accounting loss of that amount, nor does it capture all the benefits and costs of trade. [4]
Semiconductors and artificial intelligence
U.S. controls on certain advanced chips form part of technological competition. BIS links them to preventing military and intelligence uses. A May 2025 statement includes AI model training activities that may require authorisation. This is not a blanket prohibition on all technology or all sales to China. [6]
What they are negotiating
The bilateral trade board established in 2026 focuses on non-sensitive products. In September, USTR announced recommendations covering 30,000 million dollars in trade on each side that could receive better tariff treatment. Agriculture, medical devices and consumer goods feature on this agenda: they offer room for practical agreements while security and technology remain subject to different rules. [1] [2]
Milestones and consequences
- 1972-02
Nixon’s visit and rapprochement
The visit opens a phase of rapprochement preceding diplomatic relations in 1979. Department of State, Office of the Historian
- 1979-01-01
Diplomatic relations
Washington establishes diplomatic relations with Beijing and changes its official recognition of China’s government; ties with Taiwan follow a different framework. [5]
- 2025-05-13
Controls on AI training
BIS publishes a statement on activities requiring authorisation. [6]
- 2026-09-27
Trade recommendations
The bilateral board proposes improvements for non-sensitive products. [1]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
The figures are estimates for 2025. The archived document on Taiwan explains the historical framework, not decisions made in 2026. September’s tariff recommendations are not reductions already implemented.
- Ambassador Greer Issues a Statement on Announcement of Recommendations from the U.S.-China Board of Trade | United States Trade Representative
USTR · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-27 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- USTR Seeks Public Comment on the Scope and Operation of a Mechanism to Promote Balanced and Reciprocal Trade with China | United States Trade Representative
USTR · Institutional source · Document: 2026-06-02 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Chinese Consul General in Auckland Chen Shijie Publishes a Signed Article on New Zealand Herald: U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan:Playing with Fire Will GetItself Burned_Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Document: 2026-01-13 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- U.S. trade with China: goods and services
USTR · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Recognition and diplomatic relations with China
Department of State — Office of the Historian · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Controls on advanced chips used to train AI
BIS · Institutional source · Document: 2025-05-13 · Accessed: 2026-10-06
- Historical framework for U.S. relations with Taiwan
Department of State — 2021–2025 archive · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-06
Additional sources on products and human connections
- IIE / Open Doors 2025
2024/25; U.S. study-abroad stays 2023/24 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.
- Department of State, Office of the Historian
1972-02 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.
- International Trade Administration
2024 · Accessed: 2026-10-06.