United States and India
The United States and India cooperate on technology, defence and Indo-Pacific affairs while negotiating access to their markets. India maintains other strategic ties, including its relationship with Russia. Trade, professional mobility and education connect the two countries, but cooperation does not imply a mutual defence alliance or agreement on every international issue.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Partnership, not mutual defence
Strategic cooperation has several channels and does not make India a U.S. treaty ally.
Negotiated trade
The February 2026 framework contains commitments and conditions for an interim agreement.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 149,130.6 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: United States to India | 45,354.3 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: India to United States | 103,776.3 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Services trade | 90,400 M USDUSTR est. | 2025 · USTR |
| Export share: United States to India | ||
| Export share: India to United States | ||
| Investment stock: United States in India | 68,651 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
| Investment stock: India in United States | 6,194 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Goods: United States to India
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Goods: India to United States
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Services trade
- 2025 · USTR · Estimate published by USTR; the published total is retained and may differ from the sum of rounded components.
- Investment stock: United States in India
- 2025 · BEA · Year-end 2025 position at historical cost, by immediate counterpart. Published numerical zero is retained; confidentiality (D) and (*) are not converted to zero. Stock is not equivalent to new investment or authorisation under sanctions.
- Investment stock: India in United States
- 2025 · BEA · Year-end 2025 position at historical cost, by immediate counterpart. Published numerical zero is retained; confidentiality (D) and (*) are not converted to zero. Stock is not equivalent to new investment or authorisation under sanctions.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | United States | India |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 30.77 trillion USD2025 · WB | 3.96 trillion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 90,026.52 USD2025 · WB | 2,702.48 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 2.16 %2025 · WB | 7.57 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 3.75–4 %2026-09-16 · Fed | 5.25 %2026-10-06 · RBI |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF | 2.4 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 3.4 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · BLS | 4.82 %provisionalprovisionalYear-on-year · Aug. 2026 · MoSPI |
| Unemployment | 4.2 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 4.22 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -6.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -7.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 123.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 84.1 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -3.63 %2025 · WB | -0.42 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 341,784,8572025 · WB | 1,463,865,5252025 · WB |
| Area | 9,831,510 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 3,287,260 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDUnited States: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personUnited States: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)United States: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)United States: 2026-09-16 · Federal funds target range · Federal ReserveIndia: 2026-10-06 · RBI policy repo rate · Reserve Bank of India (RBI) · Access date for Current Rates; does not represent a new decision on 6 October. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-06
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)United States: 2025 · Average annual change in headline CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · WEO estimate; not the year-on-year change for December or August 2026. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07India: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedUnited States: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics · Published: 2026-09-11 · Headline year-on-year CPI-U, not seasonally adjusted; not monthly or core inflation.India: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · MoSPI / Press Information Bureau, Government of India · Published: 2026-09-14 · provisional · Provisional · Combined rural and urban headline CPI, 2024 base; provisional MoSPI figure. Not food or wholesale inflation. Provisional figure or official advance release; subject to revision.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionUnited States: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.India: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.India: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.India: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPUnited States: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleUnited States: 2025 · World BankIndia: 2025 · World Bank
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceUnited States: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOIndia: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
Announced trade framework
6 February 2026Joint statement
The negotiated framework is distinguished from the final agreement and its implementation. [2]
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
United States to India
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
India to United States
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Education, work and family ties are a distinct dimension of the partnership, separate from military and tariff decisions. [1]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
Travel figures retain each source's coverage. Check the definitions and periods before comparing the two directions.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. residents in India | ||
| Indian residents in the United States | ||
| Study and training: United States in India | ||
| Study and training: India in United StatesInternational students; includes OPT | 363,019 | 2024/25 · IIE / Open Doors |
| Academic stays: United States in IndiaStudy abroad carrying academic credit | 1,578 | 2023/24 · IIE / Open Doors |
| Academic stays: India in United States | ||
| Travel: United States to IndiaForeign tourist arrivals; nationality | 1,841,772arrivals | 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration |
| Travel: India to United StatesCountry of residence; at least one night in the United States | 2,060,726arrivals | 2025 · NTTO / U.S. Commerce |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Study and training: India in United States
- Open Doors total: undergraduate, graduate and non-degree programmes, and OPT training. Not the number of visas issued. 2024/25 · IIE / Open Doors
- Academic stays: United States in India
- Students at U.S. institutions undertaking an academic stay in the destination country; reference period 2023/24, not 2024/25. Iran explicitly publishes zero; N/A is not treated as zero. 2023/24 · IIE / Open Doors
- Travel: United States to India
- Foreign tourist arrivals in India, classified by nationality, not residence. Excludes tourists of Indian nationality residing abroad. 2025 · Ministry of Tourism India / Bureau of Immigration
- Travel: India to United States
- Arrivals of international visitors residing in the stated country, with eligible visa categories and an overnight stay. Not citizens by nationality, unique individuals or visas issued. 2025 · NTTO / U.S. Commerce
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
A partnership with several centres of decision-making
The Indian foreign ministry’s profile describes a comprehensive global strategic partnership that includes dialogue between leaders and participation in the Quad. This format brings together India, the United States, Japan and Australia; it should not be equated with a collective defence treaty. Bilateral ties have their own security and economic channels, but India retains independent decisions over its foreign relations. Cooperation on one issue does not automatically demonstrate agreement on another. [1]
Defence, technology and supply chains
The partnership covers technology and security matters as well as high-level political contacts. The February 2026 trade statement covers sectors such as textiles, machinery, chemicals, generic medicines, precious stones and aircraft components. This links negotiations to specific industrial activities, not just an aggregate trade target. Some measures depend on concluding the interim agreement; the announced framework reveals the negotiating agenda but does not establish full implementation. [1] [2]
Education, work and personal connections
Connections between people occupy a central place in India’s official description of the relationship. Education and professional activity connect families and institutions with both markets. Figures for enrolled students, training, permits issued and residents are not interchangeable. A change in mobility conditions can affect these connections without implying a breakdown in defence cooperation or diplomatic contacts. [1]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
What the February trade framework contains
The statement of 6 February 2026 announces a framework for an interim agreement, linked to broader trade negotiations. It includes commitments on industrial goods, agricultural products and market access, with actions subject to concluding the agreement. It should be read as the document and commitments of that date, not as verification of every rate applied to each product in October 2026. [2]
Purchases of Russian oil as a bilateral issue
A U.S. order of 6 February provided for removal, from 7 February, of the additional 25% duty associated with certain Indian imports, and envisaged action if India resumed direct or indirect purchases of Russian oil. The order shows how policy towards Russia can influence U.S.–India trade. On its own, it does not establish the actual volume of oil purchases or replace import statistics. [3]
Milestones and consequences
- 2024-09-21
Quad summit
The Indian profile records Modi’s participation in the Wilmington meeting. [1]
- 2026-02-06
Interim agreement framework
The two countries publish commitments for trade negotiations. [2]
- 2026-02-07
Change to an additional duty
Effective date stated in the U.S. order on certain Indian products. [3]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
February’s commitments are presented with their date, without assuming they have all been implemented. India is not treated as a member of a mutual defence alliance. Missing mobility data remain blank.
- India–US bilateral relations
Ministry of External Affairs of India · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- United States–India joint statement
White House · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-06 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Order on additional duties on Indian products
White House · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-06 · Accessed: 2026-10-07