Russia and Türkiye
Energy, projects and diplomatic dialogue coexist with differing strategic interests. The Black Sea and the straits regime give Türkiye a role of its own. The relationship has gone through crises and rebuilding without turning into agreement on every regional conflict.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07A relationship capable of weathering crises
The Turkish profile records the rebuilding of dialogue from the second half of 2016, following a bilateral crisis.
Gas and nuclear infrastructure
The Turkish foreign ministry places energy and projects such as Akkuyu and TurkStream among the economic pillars.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 49,098.07 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: Russia to Türkiye | 42,373.07 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: Türkiye to Russia | 6,725 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: Russia to Türkiye | ||
| Export share: Türkiye to Russia | ||
| Investment stock: Russia in Türkiye | ||
| Investment stock: Türkiye in Russia |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / 792 · Goods, full year; UN Comtrade reporter 792, partner 643. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF according to the source. No addition of mirror reports; direction adapted to the order of the profile.
- Goods: Russia to Türkiye
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / 792 · Goods, full year; UN Comtrade reporter 792, partner 643. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF according to the source. No addition of mirror reports; direction adapted to the order of the profile.
- Goods: Türkiye to Russia
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / 792 · Goods, full year; UN Comtrade reporter 792, partner 643. Exports normally FOB and imports CIF according to the source. No addition of mirror reports; direction adapted to the order of the profile.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
Some annual indicators refer to different years. Check the period beside each value before comparing them.
Year-on-year inflation: different periods or frequencies; the two figures are not directly comparable.
| Indicator | Russia | Türkiye |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 2.59 trillion USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 1.6 trillion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 17,972.12 USDIMF est.2025 · IMF | 18,599.44 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 1 %2025 · WB | 3.6 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 14 %2026-09-11 · CBR | 37 %2026-09-10 · TCMB |
| Inflation · annual average | 8.72 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 34.88 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 6.33 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · CBR | 29.73 %Headline CPI · 2026-09 · year-on-year · TCMB / TURKSTAT |
| Unemployment | 2.13 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 8.52 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -3.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -2.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 17.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 23.5 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 1.68 %2025 · WB | -0.77 %2024 · WB |
| Population | 143,997,000IMF est.2025 · IMF | 85,878,5562025 · WB |
| Area | 17,125,190 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 785,350 km²2023 · WB |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
For Russia, GDP, population and GDP per capita are estimates from the same IMF (WEO) dataset for 2025. The per-capita figure published by the IMF is used, rather than a calculation of our own. The earlier World Bank series could not be reconciled and are not mixed with this dataset. Review: 2026-10-07. IMF data terms of use0
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Türkiye: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personRussia: 2025 · Nominal GDP per capita in current USD · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Türkiye: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)Russia: 2025 · World BankTürkiye: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)Russia: 2026-09-11 · Bank of Russia policy rate · Bank of RussiaTürkiye: 2026-09-10 · One-week repo auction rate · TCMB · Official central-bank decision; not a commercial lending rate or a bill yield.
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)Russia: 2025 · Annual average change in CPI (%) · World BankTürkiye: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedRussia: 2026-08 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Bank of Russia · Published: 2026-09-16 · Year-on-year CPI. The commentary's 6.9% is annualised seasonally adjusted monthly growth and is not used here.Türkiye: 2026-09 · National headline CPI, change from the same month of the previous year · TCMB / TURKSTAT · Official monthly data. Not mixed with the annual average. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionRussia: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Türkiye: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, % of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Türkiye: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)Russia: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Türkiye: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPRussia: 2025 · World BankTürkiye: 2024 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Population
- PeopleRussia: 2025 · Population from the WEO series; do not mix with a denominator from another source · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · IMF estimate (WEO). GDP, GDP per capita and population for this country come from the same WEO query for 2025; no separate GDP-per-capita figure has been calculated.Türkiye: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceRussia: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; territorial coverage as defined by the source · World Bank · FAOTürkiye: 2023 · World Bank / FAO · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
Russia to Türkiye
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Türkiye to Russia
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Economic activity and travel take place within a relationship with its own negotiation channels and strategic differences. [2]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from Russia living in Türkiye | ||
| Residents from Türkiye living in Russia | ||
| Study and training: Russia in Türkiye | ||
| Study and training: Türkiye in Russia | ||
| Academic stays: Russia in Türkiye | ||
| Academic stays: Türkiye in Russia | ||
| Travel: Russia to Türkiye | ||
| Travel: Türkiye to Russia |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
A relationship capable of weathering crises
The Turkish profile records the rebuilding of dialogue from the second half of 2016, following a bilateral crisis. Its mechanisms address economic and regional matters without requiring identical interests. Maintaining meetings and projects does not mean agreement on every foreign policy. In this relationship it is especially useful to examine each issue: negotiations in one conflict can coexist with energy cooperation and disagreements in another setting. [1]
Gas and nuclear infrastructure
The Turkish foreign ministry places energy and projects such as Akkuyu and TurkStream among the economic pillars. A gas pipeline and a nuclear power plant have different contracts, construction phases, maintenance and security requirements. A project's existence does not by itself establish full operation as of the access date. This profile does not turn planned schedules into verified opening dates or use construction costs as direct investment stock. [1]
Why the Turkish Straits matter
The 1936 Montreux Convention regulates passage through the straits. The official Turkish explanation distinguishes freedom of merchant navigation from conditions applying to other ship categories. That framework matters for access to the Black Sea and its security. It is not an improvised decision for each bilateral meeting, nor can it be summarised as unlimited passage for any military ship in any circumstances. [3]
Diplomacy on the Black Sea and the Middle East
The joint conference of June 2026 records Fidan and Lavrov's agenda on regional issues. Their statements identify official positions and matters under negotiation, not establish that the two governments have resolved every difference. Black Sea navigation and security affect third countries; the bilateral relationship matters through those channels too, even when trade statistics do not measure its entire strategic dimension. [2]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
The June 2026 contacts
The ministers' appearance on 16 June documents continued dialogue. A statement of intent, a specific agreement and its subsequent implementation must be distinguished. Reading this relationship requires separating underlying energy ties, the straits' legal regime and current contacts on conflicts. That combination offers more information than attributing the position seen in a single crisis to the entire relationship. [2]
What recorded goods show
In 2025, recorded goods trade was 49,098.07 million USD. Shipments from Russia to Türkiye were 42,373.07 million USD, and those in the opposite direction were 6,725 million USD. A single reporter is used for both directions. The difference between those flows describes that source's goods balance, not the entire economic balance: services, subsidiary activity and investment have independent measures. [4]
Milestones and consequences
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Each figure retains its period, currency, definition and source. Blank cells are not zero. Policy documents are distinguished from statistical results, and projects under way from announcements.
- Relations between Türkiye and the Russian Federation
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Fidan and Lavrov conference
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye · Institutional source · Document: 2026-06-16 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Note on the Turkish Straits
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Türkiye · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- 2025 TOTAL X/M; reporter=792; partner=643; 72 returned records; France statistical code 251, not ISO numeric 250
UN Comtrade / 792 · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07