Saudi Arabia and Iran
The restoration of diplomatic relations in 2023 opened channels between two central Gulf actors, but did not eliminate their regional differences. Saudi statements from 2026 document a new crisis and measures against Iranian mission personnel. Maintaining communication and supporting negotiations should not be confused with an absence of rivalry or a complete restoration of trust.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Diplomatic channel
The 2023 Beijing agreement provided for restoring relations and reopening embassies.
Sovereignty and security
Non-interference was part of the agreement; the accusations of 2026 show its practical relevance.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | ||
| Goods: Saudi Arabia to Iran | ||
| Goods: Iran to Saudi Arabia | ||
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: Saudi Arabia to Iran | ||
| Export share: Iran to Saudi Arabia | ||
| Investment stock: Saudi Arabia in Iran | ||
| Investment stock: Iran in Saudi Arabia |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | Saudi Arabia | Iran |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 1.28 trillion USD2025 · WB | 362.68 billion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 34,536.66 USD2025 · WB | 3,924.38 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 4.5 %2025 · WB | -2.83 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 4.5 %2026-09-16 · SAMA | |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.08 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 42.17 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 1.8 %Headline CPI · 2026-08 · year-on-year · SAMA / GASTAT | |
| Unemployment | 3.04 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 8.3 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -5.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -5.7 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 31.7 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 37.3 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -2.56 %2025 · WB | 0.6 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Population | 36,973,5552025 · WB | 92,417,6812025 · WB |
| Area | 2,149,690 km²2023 · WB | 1,745,150 km²2023 · WB |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDSaudi Arabia: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personSaudi Arabia: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)Saudi Arabia: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)Saudi Arabia: 2026-09-16 · Repo rate; not reverse repo (4.00%) · SAMA · Official central-bank decision; not a commercial lending rate or a bill yield.
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)Saudi Arabia: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedSaudi Arabia: 2026-08 · Year-on-year inflation; official SAMA / GASTAT indicator · SAMA / GASTAT · August 2026 indicator verified in SAMA's indexed version. The dynamic homepage does not expose the value in HTML without JavaScript; publication date unavailable. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionSaudi Arabia: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, % of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, % of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)Saudi Arabia: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.Iran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)Saudi Arabia: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.Iran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPSaudi Arabia: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate. The annual reference may follow Iran's fiscal calendar.
- Population
- PeopleSaudi Arabia: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query. Extrapolated assuming the same growth rate as the previous year.Iran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceSaudi Arabia: 2023 · World Bank / FAO · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.Iran: 2023 · World Bank / FAO · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
Beijing agreement
10 March 2023Joint statement
Restoration of relations, respect for sovereignty and non-interference. [1]
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
Saudi Arabia to Iran
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Iran to Saudi Arabia
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Diplomatic and consular representation can continue even during crises; relations between populations are not inferred from their governments' statements. [2] [3]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from Saudi Arabia living in Iran | ||
| Residents from Iran living in Saudi Arabia | ||
| Study and training: Saudi Arabia in Iran | ||
| Study and training: Iran in Saudi Arabia | ||
| Academic stays: Saudi Arabia in Iran | ||
| Academic stays: Iran in Saudi Arabia | ||
| Travel: Saudi Arabia to Iran | ||
| Travel: Iran to Saudi Arabia |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Rivalry and the need for communication
Saudi Arabia and Iran are important Gulf actors with security interests extending into other countries in the region. The 2023 Beijing declaration placed respect for sovereignty and non-interference at the centre of their rapprochement. Those commitments help explain which issues the governments consider sensitive. Opening channels does not imply an alliance or require differences over regional actors and conflicts to disappear. [1]
What the 2023 agreement changed
The declaration of 10 March 2023 provided for restoring diplomatic relations and reopening embassies and missions within two months. In December, the trilateral committee with China recorded the reopening of embassies and contacts between ministers. The initial commitment is thus distinguished from subsequent implementation. The earlier security and cooperation agreements mentioned in the text are working frameworks, not a measure of uniform trust between societies. [1] [2]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
Open embassies do not mean every rivalry has been resolved
The trilateral committee's statement of December 2023 describes diplomatic progress and official visits. That follow-up establishes that normalisation went beyond an announcement. However, an embassy can remain open while another dimension of the relationship deteriorates. Representation, consular administration and communication should not be interpreted as guarantees of military cooperation or proof that the governments share interests in every regional setting. [2]
Measures against Iranian personnel in 2026
A Saudi statement issued in March 2026 declared the Iranian military attaché, his deputy and three mission members personae non gratae and ordered their departure. The institution linked the measure to attacks it attributed to Iran. This article records the decision and the Saudi attribution without turning the statement into an independent inventory of every attack. Expelling specific personnel does not automatically mean the complete closure of an embassy either. [3]
Support for a negotiated way forward in June
On 15 June 2026, the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs welcomed the announced agreement between the United States and Iran to end military operations and begin detailed negotiations. This statement reflects Saudi interest in reducing regional risks following a period of escalation. It does not by itself establish complete bilateral reconciliation or fulfilment of every commitment. Subsequent developments must be followed through dated facts and documents, not by extrapolating from the normalisation of 2023. [4]
Milestones and consequences
- 2023-03-10
Beijing agreement
Commitment to restore diplomatic relations and reopen missions. [1]
- 2023-12-15
Trilateral follow-up
The committee records the reopening of embassies and ministerial contacts. [2]
- 2026-03
Saudi diplomatic measures
Order for specific Iranian mission personnel to depart. [3]
- 2026-06-15
Support for negotiations
Riyadh welcomes the announced agreement between Washington and Tehran. [4]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Accusations are attributed to those making them. The decision concerning mission personnel is not equated with a complete diplomatic rupture. The article distinguishes the rapprochement of 2023 from the crisis of 2026.
- Beijing trilateral declaration
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs / joint statement · Institutional source · Document: 2023-03-10 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- First meeting of the trilateral committee
China's Ministry of Foreign Affairs / joint statement · Institutional source · Document: 2023-12-16 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Iranian mission personnel declared persona non grata
Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saudi Press Agency · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Saudi Arabia welcomes the US–Iran agreement
Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs / Saudi Press Agency · Institutional source · Document: 2026-06-15 · Accessed: 2026-10-07