China and Pakistan
Infrastructure, security cooperation and political contacts make the relationship an extensive strategic partnership. The economic corridor and land connectivity are central issues. Protection of personnel and projects, construction schedules and vocational training form part of its practical dimension.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07A partnership with follow-up mechanisms
The May 2026 statement commemorates 75 years of diplomatic relations and mentions the 2025–2029 action plan.
Roads and a port in the economic corridor
The document proposes advancing the CPEC corridor and mentions the Karakoram Highway, Khunjerab Pass and the potential of Gwadar Port.
Protection of people and projects
The Pakistani and Chinese statement includes counterterrorism cooperation and specific measures to protect Chinese personnel, institutions and projects in Pakistan.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 25,248.37 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: China to Pakistan | 22,400.59 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Goods: Pakistan to China | 2,847.78 M USD | 2025 · UN Comtrade |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: China to Pakistan | ||
| Export share: Pakistan to China | ||
| Investment stock: China in Pakistan | ||
| Investment stock: Pakistan in China |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
- Goods: China to Pakistan
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
- Goods: Pakistan to China
- 2025 · UN Comtrade / CHN · Goods, CHN reporter, UN Comtrade TOTAL aggregate, full year. The reporter's valuation and coverage are retained: imports normally CIF and exports FOB; no addition of mirror reports.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
Year-on-year inflation: different periods or frequencies; the two figures are not directly comparable.
| Indicator | China | Pakistan |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 19.5 trillion USD2025 · WB | 407.31 billion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 13,861.97 USD2025 · WB | 1,595.91 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 4.96 %2025 · WB | 3.7 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 1.4 %2026-09-24 · PBoC | 11.5 %2026-09-14 · SBP |
| Inflation · annual average | 0.06 %Annual average · 2025 · WB | 3.55 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 0.8 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · NBS China | 10.3 %Year-on-year · Sept. 2026 · PBS |
| Unemployment | 4.62 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 5.42 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -7.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -5.4 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 99.2 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 72.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | 3.77 %2025 · WB | -0.11 %2025 · WB |
| Population | 1,406,585,0002025 · WB | 255,219,5542025 · WB |
| Area | 9,562,910 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 796,100 km²2023 · BM / FAO |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDChina: 2025 · World BankPakistan: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personChina: 2025 · World BankPakistan: 2025 · World Bank
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)China: 2025 · World BankPakistan: 2025 · World Bank
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)China: 2026-09-24 · PBoC: 7-day reverse repo · People’s Bank of China · Published: 2026-09-24 · Rate of the official operation consulted, not the mortgage LPR or the PSL lending rate. Subsequent operations with zero volume are not converted into a 0% interest rate.Pakistan: 2026-09-14 · State Bank of Pakistan policy rate · State Bank of Pakistan
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)China: 2025 · Average annual CPI change (%) · World BankPakistan: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedChina: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · National Bureau of Statistics of China · Published: 2026-09-09 · National headline year-on-year CPI, not monthly inflation or an annual average.Pakistan: 2026-09 · Change in headline CPI from the same month of the previous year (%) · Pakistan Bureau of Statistics · Published: 2026-10-01 · National headline CPI published rounded to one decimal place; not the quarterly average, Sensitive Price Indicator (SPI) or Wholesale Price Index (WPI).
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionChina: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Pakistan: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Pakistan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)China: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Pakistan: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPChina: 2025 · World BankPakistan: 2025 · World Bank
- Population
- PeopleChina: 2025 · World BankPakistan: 2025 · World Bank
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceChina: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOPakistan: 2023 · Total area, including inland waters; source's territorial coverage · World Bank · FAO
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
China to Pakistan
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Pakistan to China
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Vocational training and academic projects have their own measures; a completed programme is distinguished from future places offered. [1] [2]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from China living in Pakistan | ||
| Residents from Pakistan living in China | ||
| Study and training: China in Pakistan | ||
| Study and training: Pakistan in China | ||
| Academic stays: China in Pakistan | ||
| Academic stays: Pakistan in China | ||
| Travel: China to Pakistan | ||
| Travel: Pakistan to China |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
A partnership with follow-up mechanisms
The May 2026 statement commemorates 75 years of diplomatic relations and mentions the 2025–2029 action plan. It includes January's seventh foreign ministers' strategic dialogue and parliamentary and presidential contacts. The partnership therefore has several follow-up channels. Its political designation is not a substitute for examining the terms of a particular loan, contract or security instrument. [1] [2]
Roads and a port in the economic corridor
The document proposes advancing the CPEC corridor and mentions the Karakoram Highway, Khunjerab Pass and the potential of Gwadar Port. These are elements of land and maritime connectivity with their own phases. Infrastructure can facilitate market access while also requiring financing, maintenance and security. The announcement of a section or expansion is not presented as evidence that construction is fully completed. [1]
The productive agenda goes beyond construction
The statement includes industrial parks, textiles, household appliances, mining, energy exploration and market access for Pakistani agricultural products. The agenda shows interest in productive activity alongside infrastructure. It does not provide an implemented value for each sector. Goods indicators remain separate from commitments and projects, and the total value of a corridor is not used as though it were a direct investment position in one year. [1]
Agricultural training and new programmes
The governments reported completion of a training programme in China for 1,000 young Pakistani agricultural technicians. They also mentioned 3,000 training places for 2025–2029 and training for Pakistani astronauts. The first figure is a reported result; the others are programmes or plans. None is equivalent to the total number of Pakistani university students enrolled in China, so it is not placed in that common cell. [1] [2]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
Protection of people and projects
The Pakistani and Chinese statement includes counterterrorism cooperation and specific measures to protect Chinese personnel, institutions and projects in Pakistan. This dimension explains why security and the economy are addressed together. The diplomatic wording expresses a priority and a commitment to action, not proof that every risk has disappeared. Nor is it interpreted as an automatic military intervention clause for any conflict involving the other party. [2]
What recorded goods show
In 2025, recorded goods trade was 25,248.37 million USD. Shipments from China to Pakistan were 22,400.59 million USD, and those in the opposite direction were 2,847.78 million USD. A single reporter is used for both directions. The difference between those flows describes that source's goods balance, not the entire economic balance: services, subsidiary activity and investment have independent measures. [4]
Milestones and consequences
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
Each figure retains its period, currency, definition and source. Blank cells are not zero. Policy documents are distinguished from statistical results, and projects under way from announcements.
- Joint statement on the 75th anniversary
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · Institutional source · Document: 2026-05-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Joint statement of May 2026
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan · Institutional source · Document: 2026-05-26 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Gwadar projects
Official CPEC Secretariat / Pakistan · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Annual TOTAL X/M; reporter=156; partners=276,250,360,704,608,586,682; 2025; 12 returned records
UN Comtrade / CHN · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07