United States and Iran
The absence of direct diplomatic relations coexists with representation and negotiation channels. In 2026, military attacks were followed by an announcement of a ceasefire agreement, while US sanctions measures continued. The relationship affects regional security, navigation and possibilities for economic activity, and cannot be explained solely through bilateral trade.
Analysis reviewed: 2026-10-07 · Indicators updated: 2026-10-07Escalation and negotiation
The UN statements distinguish the February attacks from the agreement announced in June.
Bilateral indicators
Blank cells: data unavailable.
| Indicator | Value | Period |
|---|---|---|
| Goods trade | 60.1 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: United States to Iran | 58.7 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Goods: Iran to United States | 1.4 M USD | 2025 · Census |
| Services trade | ||
| Export share: United States to Iran | ||
| Export share: Iran to United States | ||
| Investment stock: United States in Iran | 0 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
| Investment stock: Iran in United States | 1 M USDBEA est. | 2025 · BEA |
Definitions and sources
Trade adds both directions. Shares refer to the country’s total goods exports; investment is an accumulated stock, not an annual flow. Every figure retains the currency and period of its source. BEA positions are historical-cost estimates based on the immediate counterpart, not market values or investment by ultimate owner. ‘More than’ indicates a lower bound, not an exact amount. A recorded stock does not establish new activity or authorisation to operate under sanctions.
- Goods trade
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Goods: United States to Iran
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Goods: Iran to United States
- 2025 · U.S. Census Bureau · Goods for January–December 2025, millions of current USD, based on U.S. reporting. Excludes services and affiliate sales. Recorded amounts do not establish the absence of restrictions or general authorisation to operate.
- Investment stock: United States in Iran
- 2025 · BEA · Year-end 2025 position at historical cost, by immediate counterpart. Published numerical zero is retained; confidentiality (D) and (*) are not converted to zero. Stock is not equivalent to new investment or authorisation under sanctions.
- Investment stock: Iran in United States
- 2025 · BEA · Year-end 2025 position at historical cost, by immediate counterpart. Published numerical zero is retained; confidentiality (D) and (*) are not converted to zero. Stock is not equivalent to new investment or authorisation under sanctions.
Country comparison
Period and source beside each figure · est. = estimate by the stated institution.
| Indicator | United States | Iran |
|---|---|---|
| Nominal GDP | 30.77 trillion USD2025 · WB | 362.68 billion USD2025 · WB |
| GDP per capita | 90,026.52 USD2025 · WB | 3,924.38 USD2025 · WB |
| GDP growth | 2.16 %2025 · WB | -2.83 %2025 · WB |
| Policy interest rate | 3.75–4 %2026-09-16 · Fed | |
| Inflation · annual average | 2.7 %IMF est.Annual average · 2025 · IMF | 42.17 %Annual average · 2025 · WB |
| Inflation · latest year-on-year figure | 3.4 %Year-on-year · Aug. 2026 · BLS | |
| Unemployment | 4.2 %ILO est.2025 · WB | 8.3 %ILO est.2025 · WB |
| Budget balance (% of GDP) | -6.8 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | -5.7 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Gross public debt (% of GDP) | 123.9 %IMF est.2025 · IMF | 37.3 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Current account balance (% of GDP) | -3.63 %2025 · WB | 0.6 %IMF est.2025 · IMF |
| Population | 341,784,8572025 · WB | 92,417,6812025 · WB |
| Area | 9,831,510 km²2023 · BM / FAO | 1,745,150 km²2023 · WB |
| Military expenditure | ||
| Military expenditure (% of GDP) |
Definitions, dates and sources
Blank cells are not zero. Average annual inflation and the latest year-on-year figure appear in separate rows: they are not the same measure. Every annual indicator retains its reference year; when the years differ, the figures are identified as not directly comparable. When a figure is unavailable from the World Bank, an annual IMF estimate is used and identified as such. The latest year-on-year figure is the latest official release verified as of 7 October 2026. This includes advance releases marked as provisional. Mexico may have a fortnightly figure before the full month is published; it is not automatically compared with a monthly figure. The publication date is retained in each source’s details; it does not replace the observation period or the annual average. Policy rates carry their own dates and represent different instruments. Spain and France share the ECB rate. Balances are positive for surpluses and negative for deficits. The IMF may use fiscal years; unemployment retains each source’s definition (ILO estimates, IMF WEO or PCBS), as stated in the details. For Palestine, debt and the fiscal balance cover central government and retain the PCBS definition; they are not presented as consolidated general government. These are economic magnitudes, not measures of relationship quality.
Area retains each source’s territorial coverage; it does not determine sovereignty or effective control. Canada uses an archived national geographic reference. Military expenditure retains the 2024 SIPRI sample distributed by the World Bank: the amount and percentage of GDP use that same definition, which differs from NATO’s. It is not an approved budget or a 2026 figure. Information from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Military expenditure database · Terms of use0
Indicators reviewed: 2026-10-07. Each source retains its original access date; this review does not turn all the data into 2026 observations. Figures may be revised.
- Nominal GDP
- Current USDUnited States: 2025 · World BankIran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP per capita
- Current USD per personUnited States: 2025 · World BankIran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- GDP growth
- Annual real change (%)United States: 2025 · World BankIran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Policy interest rate
- Central bank instrument (%)United States: 2026-09-16 · Federal funds target range · Federal Reserve
- Inflation · annual average
- Average annual change in headline CPI (%)United States: 2025 · Average annual change in headline CPI (%) · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est. · WEO estimate; not the year-on-year change for December or August 2026. · Alternative official source; verified 2026-10-07Iran: 2025 · Annual average change in the CPI (%) · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Inflation · latest year-on-year figure
- Headline CPI relative to the same period of the previous year (%); monthly or fortnightly frequency statedUnited States: 2026-08 · Headline CPI change relative to the same month of the previous year (%) · U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics · Published: 2026-09-11 · Headline year-on-year CPI-U, not seasonally adjusted; not monthly or core inflation.
- Unemployment
- % of the labour force; definition used by the stated institutionUnited States: 2025 · World Bank · ILO est.Iran: 2025 · ILO modelled estimate, % of the labour force · World Bank · ILO est. · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Budget balance
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Iran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Gross public debt
- General government (% of GDP)United States: 2025 · IMF — World Economic Outlook · IMF est.Iran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate, not a monthly observation. Retains the country's fiscal year where it differs from the calendar year.
- Current account balance
- % of GDPUnited States: 2025 · World BankIran: 2025 · IMF · IMF est. · IMF WEO estimate. The annual reference may follow Iran's fiscal calendar.
- Population
- PeopleUnited States: 2025 · World BankIran: 2025 · World Bank · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Area
- Total area in km²; territorial coverage of the sourceUnited States: 2023 · Total area including inland waters; territorial coverage of the source · World Bank · FAOIran: 2023 · World Bank / FAO · Official World Bank series; latest verified period available for this series in the 2023–2025 query.
- Military expenditure
- Current USD per year; SIPRI series
- Military expenditure (% of GDP)
- Percentage of GDP; SIPRI definition, not NATO’s definition
Other data specific to this relationship
Protecting power
SwitzerlandSince 21 May 1980
Representation of US interests in Iran, not restoration of diplomatic relations. [1]
What they buy and sell
Documented selection, not an exhaustive list. Cells without a figure do not mean zero value; some products are identified without a verified amount.
United States to Iran
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Iran to United States
| Product or sector | Value / share |
|---|---|
Connections between people
Consular representation addresses a human dimension that remains relevant even when the governments do not maintain direct diplomatic relations. [1]
Residents, study and travel
Blank cells: data unavailable. Each measure retains its definition and period.
| Indicator | Value | Period / source |
|---|---|---|
| Residents from United States living in Iran | ||
| Residents from Iran living in United States | ||
| Study and training: United States in Iran | ||
| Study and training: Iran in United StatesInternational students; includes OPT | 12,656 | 2024/25 · IIE / Open Doors |
| Academic stays: United States in IranStudy abroad carrying academic credit | 0 | 2023/24 · IIE / Open Doors |
| Academic stays: Iran in United States | ||
| Travel: United States to Iran | ||
| Travel: Iran to United StatesCountry of residence; at least one night in the United States | 8,577arrivals | 2025 · NTTO / U.S. Commerce |
What each figure measures
Residents are counted by nationality and the coverage of the stated register, not as people born in the other country or as new arrivals in one year. PERE includes dual nationals and people born outside Spain. Study with OPT and stays carrying academic credit are different measures. Travel may include several visits by the same person; FRONTUR arrivals require an overnight stay, whereas the Canadian survey includes day visits. These figures are neither added together nor automatically compared across directions.
- Study and training: Iran in United States
- Open Doors total: undergraduate, graduate and non-degree programmes, and OPT training. Not the number of visas issued. 2024/25 · IIE / Open Doors
- Academic stays: United States in Iran
- Students at U.S. institutions undertaking an academic stay in the destination country; reference period 2023/24, not 2024/25. Iran explicitly publishes zero; N/A is not treated as zero. 2023/24 · IIE / Open Doors
- Travel: Iran to United States
- Arrivals of international visitors residing in the stated country, with eligible visa categories and an overnight stay. Not citizens by nationality, unique individuals or visas issued. 2025 · NTTO / U.S. Commerce
Mobility data added or reviewed: 2026-10-07. Reference periods may be earlier.
Underlying ties
History, institutions and long-standing issues.
Consular representation without diplomatic normalisation
The Foreign Interests Section of the Swiss embassy in Tehran explains that Switzerland has acted as the United States' protecting power since 21 May 1980. This mechanism addresses certain interests and consular matters in the absence of direct diplomatic or consular relations. It is not equivalent to a US embassy in Iran or evidence that relations have been restored. A communication channel can remain open even during serious confrontations. [1]
A relationship with effects beyond the two countries
The UN Secretary-General described the 2026 escalation as a risk to regional peace and stability. Retaliation and navigation problems affect other States and logistics chains that are not direct trade between the United States and Iran. A small bilateral figure therefore does not justify concluding that the relationship lacks economic or strategic importance for the rest of the world. [2] [3]
Recent developments
Recent developments and latest available data · Reviewed: 2026-10-07
The attacks documented in February 2026
In his 28 February statement, the Secretary-General condemned the use of force by the United States and Israel against Iran and the subsequent Iranian response in the region. He called for an end to hostilities and a return to negotiations. This is a dated institutional reference on that day's escalation; it does not provide a complete casualty toll, all targets attacked or an assessment of every subsequent incident. [2]
The June announcement must not be confused with ongoing verification
On 14 June, the UN Secretary-General's Office welcomed the announcement of an agreement between the United States and Iran providing for an immediate and permanent ceasefire, reopening of the Strait of Hormuz and a negotiation framework. The document establishes a new diplomatic phase. It does not by itself verify continued compliance with every condition or justify describing any subsequent incident as though that agreement had not been announced. [3]
The September measures on military procurement
On 29 September 2026, the US Treasury announced sanctions against ten individuals and entities that, according to its investigations, participated in Iranian military procurement networks. The profile attributes those allegations to the institution making them. The action documents specific restrictions and continued economic confrontation after the June announcement; it does not mean that every transaction with any Iranian citizen is subject to the same regime or constitute legal advice. [4]
Milestones and consequences
- 1980-05-21
Swiss representation
Start of the protecting-power mandate for US interests. [1]
- 2026-02-28
Military escalation
UN statement of condemnation and call for an end to hostilities. [2]
- 2026-06-14
Agreement announced
The UN welcomes the announcement of a ceasefire and negotiation framework. [3]
- 2026-09-29
New sanctions
The Treasury announces measures against military procurement networks. [4]
Sources and data
Periods and scope of the figures
The statements on attacks and the ceasefire have their own dates and scopes. Sanctions allegations are attributed to the Treasury. Missing data are not interpreted as zero trade or mobility.
- Foreign Interests Section in Tehran
Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs · Institutional source · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Secretary-General's statement on Iran
United Nations / Secretary-General's Office · Institutional source · Document: 2026-02-28 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Statement on the announcement of an agreement between the United States and Iran
United Nations / Secretary-General's Office · Institutional source · Document: 2026-06-14 · Accessed: 2026-10-07
- Operation Economic Outcast: military procurement networks
US Department of the Treasury · Institutional source · Document: 2026-09-29 · Accessed: 2026-10-07