Russia → United States
This score represents Russia's relationship toward United States. The reverse direction is calculated separately and shown alongside it.
SIX-COMPONENT MODEL
Current component scores
Component values run from −100 to +100 and are combined with the published weights.
2 documented factors produce the -90 security assessment.
Why this score?
- -40U.S. and NATO pressure identified as a security threatBaseline rule · 2015
Russia's national security strategy identifies U.S. military systems, NATO expansion and political-military pressure as threats to Russian security.
- -50War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
2 documented factors produce the -55 diplomacy assessment.
Why this score?
- -15Russian strategy documents sustained U.S. pressureBaseline rule · 2015
The official strategy describes political, economic, military and information pressure by the United States and its allies.
- -40War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
4 documented factors produce the -90 economic assessment.
Why this score?
- -40U.S. sectoral sanctions constrain RussiaBaseline rule · 2015
U.S. sanctions created continuing financial and sectoral restrictions from Russia's directional perspective.
- +20Bilateral trade thresholdBaseline rule · 2015
Reported trade activates the absolute methodology route using the latest observation available for this year.
- -50War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
- -20Annual methodology 1.1 recalculationAnnual recalculation · 2026
The current component replaces the 2015 quantitative threshold or time-bounded structural package with the evidence applicable in the selected year.
3 documented factors produce the -100 alignment assessment.
Why this score?
- -50Opposing visions of the European security orderBaseline rule · 2015
Russia's strategy documents direct opposition to U.S. containment policy, NATO expansion and missile-defence deployments.
- -30United Nations voting alignmentBaseline rule · 2015
A rolling three-year comparison of UN General Assembly votes activates the alignment threshold.
- -35War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
The displayed value is limited to the model’s −100 to +100 component range.
1 documented factor produce the -25 disputes assessment.
Why this score?
- -25War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
Coverage gap: The 2015 strategic confrontation involved third-country security questions rather than a bilateral territorial claim covered by the frozen Disputes rules.
1 documented factor produce the -12 societal assessment.
Why this score?
- -12War and Western support produce systemic confrontationActive event · 2022
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
Coverage gap: The reviewed 2015 official records did not activate a frozen v1 societal rule.
-32 in 2015 → -74 in 2026
The change is generated from sourced events and frozen scoring rules, not retrospective editorial adjustment.
7 points
Russia → United States and United States → Russia remain independent assessments.
View the reverse direction →ACTIVE EVIDENCE
Events affecting the current score
War and Western support produce systemic confrontation
Russia's official address frames the United States and NATO as the central external security confrontation as the invasion begins.
This analytical score is not an objective fact, endorsement or prediction. Confidence reflects evidence coverage, while incomplete or unavailable observations remain explicit. Differences below 5 points are treated as practical ties rather than a meaningful ranking.
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