How countries relate to each other

Cooperation

Spain and Algeria

Energy supply, recovered trade and political dialogue in 2026 underpin Algeria cooperation. Western Sahara differences persist, but 2022 crisis restrictions are not automatically presumed current. The summit announced for October is not treated as held.

Sources

Europa Press — restoration of dialogue and trade · 2026-03-26

Strained relationship

Spain and Russia

The war in Ukraine and European sanctions dominate the political position.

Sources

Council of the EU

Cooperation

Spain and Ukraine

Spanish support against the Russian invasion is an important foundation for cooperation.

Cooperation

Spain and Japan

Economic and diplomatic cooperation predominates without a central bilateral rivalry.

Insufficient information

Spain and Yemen

Available bilateral information cannot substantiate an overall relationship description. Missing information does not mean neutrality, especially where a country has different actors and authorities.

Mixed relationship

United States and Canada

Defence cooperation and economic integration are deep, but coexist with a trade crisis, suspended negotiations and countermeasures. Strategic collaboration and trade tension jointly define relations.

Sources

Finance Canada · 2026-08-25

Global Affairs Canada

Reuters via MarketScreener · 2026-08-23

Close cooperation

United States and United Kingdom

Military, intelligence and diplomatic cooperation maintains an extensive strategic relationship.

Sources

OTAN · 2024-03-11

Cooperation

United States and France

Security cooperation and diplomatic contacts remain important. Trade tensions and strategic differences hinder fully aligned collaboration without displacing its cooperative foundation.

Sources

France Diplomatie · 2026-09-15

Euronews · 2026-09-16

Cooperation

United States and Germany

Military and economic cooperation remains substantial and defence dialogue continues. US reductions in military presence and cancellation of a deployment cause friction, not a cooperation rupture.

Sources

German Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-09

ARD / Tagesschau · 2026-09-16

Military support and political cooperation are central to the relationship.

Sources

Close cooperation

China and Pakistan

Security collaboration and economic projects provide an extensive strategic foundation.

Cooperation

China and North Korea

Historical ties and economic support sustain the relationship despite diverging interests.

Strained relationship

China and Japan

Security and political disputes coexist with strong economic ties.

Strained relationship

China and India

The border dispute and strategic competition weigh on economic collaboration.

Strained relationship

China and Philippines

Maritime incidents and disputes predominate in the political relationship.

Sources

Council of the EU · 2026-07-11

Mixed relationship

China and Vietnam

Political and economic ties coexist with maritime disputes and strategic caution.

Mixed relationship

China and South Korea

Economic relations are broad, but security and alignment tensions exist.

Mixed relationship

China and Australia

Economic ties and diplomatic dialogue continue while security incidents and disagreements create tension. Neither dimension alone describes the relationship as a whole.

Sources

Australian DFAT

Australian Defence · 2025-10-20

Australian Defence · 2026-09-17

ABC News Australia · 2025-10-22

Mixed relationship

China and Germany

Economic cooperation coexists with industrial competition and political differences.

Sources

European Council · 2025-07-24

Mixed relationship

China and France

Dialogue and trade coexist with economic and strategic disagreements.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Indonesia

Economic ties and regional dialogue sustain cooperation.

Cooperation

China and Nepal

Economic projects and political dialogue favour collaboration.

Close cooperation

Russia and Belarus

Security and economic integration sustain an extensive strategic relationship.

Cooperation

Russia and North Korea

Implemented military support and political coordination sustain cooperative relations. Defence intensity alone does not imply equally broad collaboration in every area.

Sources

Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-12

AP · 2026-09-28

38 North

Congressional Research Service, archived copy · 2026-09-18

Cooperation

Russia and Iran

Strategic and economic cooperation is significant, but interests are not identical.

Cooperation

Russia and India

Defence and energy ties sustain cooperation alongside Indian autonomy.

Mixed relationship

Russia and Türkiye

Economic collaboration coexists with competition and differences over regional conflicts.

Strained relationship

Russia and Germany

The war in Ukraine and economic restrictions have profoundly damaged the relationship.

Sources

Council of the EU

Strained relationship

Russia’s invasion and current direct hostilities dominate the relationship. War prevents the relationship being described as normal diplomatic or trade relations.

Sources

Council of the EU

Close cooperation

Norway and Sweden

Nordic ties and economic and security collaboration are extensive.

Close cooperation

Denmark and Finland

Nordic and European cooperation accompanies political and security ties.

Cooperation

Poland and Ukraine

Security support coexists with economic and historical differences.

Strained relationship

Greece and Türkiye

Maritime and security disputes weigh on relations despite the shared alliance and dialogue.

Sources

OTAN · 2024-03-11

Cooperation

Armenia and Azerbaijan

Direct dialogue, trade and transit exchanges point to cooperative post-conflict normalisation. Rapprochement remains fragile, not an alliance or fully consolidated peace.

Sources

Armenian Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-24

Armenian Prime Minister · 2026-09-25

United Kingdom and Ireland

Social and economic ties coexist with sensitive issues concerning Northern Ireland.

Council on Foreign Relations

Cooperation

Italy and Greece

European integration and economic cooperation favour collaboration.

Strained relationship

India and Pakistan

The ceasefire limits hostilities, but water, sovereignty and security disputes maintain distrust-dominated relations. One military incident alone does not prove open war has resumed.

Sources

Reuters via MarketScreener · 2026-09-16

Akashvani / Indian public radio · 2026-09-16

Cooperation

India and Nepal

Connectivity collaboration and coordination mechanisms sustain cooperation. Border protests create friction without having eliminated these practical collaboration channels.

Sources

Embassy of India in Kathmandu · 2026-06-06

Indian Embassy in Nepal

India's Press Information Bureau · 2026-08-21

The Kathmandu Post · 2026-05-03

Close cooperation

Diplomatic rupture and regional disputes predominate.

Strained relationship

Ethiopia and Eritrea

Expulsions and recent embassy closure show major diplomatic deterioration. Security suspicions worsen distrust; Ethiopian internal fighting alone is not interstate war.

Sources

AP · 2026-10-01

UN Secretary-General · 2026-09-23

Ethiopian government communication · 2026-10-01

Reuters via Investing · 2026-10-02

Strained relationship

Egypt and Ethiopia

The controversy over Nile waters weighs on diplomatic relations.

Mixed relationship

Saudi Arabia and Iran

Regional rivalry coexists with diplomatic channels and normalisation efforts.

Mixed relationship

Israel and Egypt

The peace treaty and security coordination coexist with political tensions.

Institutional source: www.mfa.gov.tm

Confrontation

Israel and Palestine

Occupation, violence and conflict over rights and territory dominate.

The ministerial dialogue of September 2026 maintains an agenda of collaboration and mutual diplomatic support. Cooperation is assessed as moderate in scope, without equating these contacts with formal recognition of the Taliban government or a security pact.

Sources

Contacts between Afghan and Turkmen authorities in 2026 maintain an agenda covering trade, transit and energy, including work on TAPI. Practical cooperation between governments predominates; this does not assert that the pipeline is fully operational or that these contacts imply formal diplomatic recognition.

Sources

Institutional source: mfa.gov.tm

Insufficient information

Algeria and Jamaica

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Jamaica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Algeria and Jordan

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Jordan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Algeria and Kazakhstan

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Kazakhstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Algeria and Kenya

Official dialogue documents political contacts and willingness to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Algeria and Niger

The return of ambassadors and the February 2026 presidential visit revive cooperation after diplomatic friction. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The November 2025 meetings continue political and regional dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Algeria and Tonga

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Tonga is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Algeria and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Algeria and Tunisia

Ministerial contacts maintain an agenda of collaboration between neighbouring countries. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Algeria and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Algeria and Tuvalu

The bilateral information gathered on Algeria and Tuvalu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Algeria and Uganda

Bilateral dialogue seeks to strengthen cooperation and political coordination. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Algeria and Uruguay

The ministerial meeting maintains dialogue and examines new areas of collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Andorra and Equatorial Guinea

The memorandum signed in January 2026 between their financial intelligence units establishes cooperation against money laundering and terrorist financing. This is a specific technical link, not a broad political alliance or proof of effective exchange in every case.

Sources

The January 2025 ministerial visit strengthened bilateral dialogue and the exchange of experience on European integration. An agenda of intergovernmental cooperation predominates, without equating each country's different ties with the European Union or turning contact into a close alliance.

Sources

Planned Andorran funding for a WHO health project in Mauritania in 2025–2026 provides a concrete foundation for development cooperation. The budget commitment is distinguished from clinical outcomes, and a close political relationship is not assumed.

Sources

Government of Andorra

Insufficient information

Andorra and Micronesia

The bilateral information gathered on Andorra and Micronesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Andorra and Monaco

The bilateral tax convention appears in consolidated Monegasque legislation in force in September 2026 and establishes collaboration against double taxation and fraud. It provides a concrete foundation for economic cooperation; the assessment does not imply a close alliance or identical positions on every issue.

Sources

The bilateral memorandum of friendship and cooperation provides a framework for understanding, accompanied by joint contacts on their ties with the European Union. Diplomatic collaboration predominates; the European agreement treats each state as a separate party and does not demonstrate full bilateral integration.

Sources

The common market provides trade commitments between the countries. In 2025 they were also included in a working group on maritime transport and regional procedures. This framework supports cooperation without presuming all proposals implemented or equating it with a close alliance.

Sources

CARICOM Secretariat

Cooperation

Antigua & Barbuda and Belize

Shared trade and professional mobility rules continue developing in 2026. Cooperation rests on these economic commitments, not regional affiliation alone; it implies neither universal freedom of residence nor political agreement on every issue.

Sources

Close cooperation

Antigua & Barbuda and St. Lucia

Sources

Close cooperation

Antigua & Barbuda and St. Vincent & Grenadines

Sources

Trade and professional-mobility obligations are complemented by documented 2026 diplomatic coordination. Institutional cooperation predominates, without inferring large exchange volumes or a bilateral strategic partnership.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Bosnia & Herzegovina is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Botswana

The consultation agreement on matters of common interest provides a bilateral collaboration framework with Botswana. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Cyprus

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Cyprus is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Czechia

Presidential meetings and the 2026 business forum continue collaboration with Czechia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Argentina and Denmark

Bilateral consultations address trade, defence and air transport in a collaborative agenda with Denmark. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Djibouti

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Argentina and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Dominican Republic

Political consultations in 2024 maintain dialogue and work on cooperation agreements with the Dominican Republic. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Congo - Kinshasa

Diplomatic contacts with Jordan maintain an agenda to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Kazakhstan

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Kazakhstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Kenya

Business and official contacts in 2025 maintain a trade agenda with Kenya. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Kuwait

Dialogue with Kuwait maintains an economic agenda to develop trade and investment. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Argentina and Kyrgyzstan

The bilateral information gathered on Argentina and Kyrgyzstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Argentina and Laos

The economic and trade agreement in force provides a concrete collaboration framework with Laos. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Trade and political contacts provide a foundation for collaboration with Romania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Argentina and Rwanda

Recent agreements and contacts in 2025 with Rwanda address agriculture, transport and technical collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

Australia and Lebanon

Australia's Lebanese community provides enduring human ties alongside positive diplomatic relations. Cooperation does not mean Lebanon's crisis has been resolved or that the governments agree on everything.

Sources

The tax information exchange agreement provides concrete institutional collaboration between Australia and Monaco. Its scope is moderate and not presented as a broad strategic alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Australia and Mongolia

Contacts with Australia contribute to Mongolia’s trade and development partner diversification. Economic and institutional cooperation does not provide a military guarantee against its neighbours.

Sources

Cooperation

Australia and Montenegro

Direct aid initiatives and Montenegrin community ties accompany cooperative diplomatic relations with Australia. The foundation is limited and does not imply a broad security alliance.

Sources

Australia continues to support Pakistan's population through regional and global programmes and maintains institutional collaboration. Its bilateral development programme ended in 2019–2020; it is not presented as bilateral aid that remains active.

Sources

Cooperation

Australia and Palau

Australia helps finance Palau submarine connectivity with other partners. This concrete development cooperation does not mean financing construction proves all infrastructure completed.

Sources

Australian development cooperation and long-standing bilateral collaboration sustain Philippines ties. Relations are positive and sustained without assuming every regional difference is resolved.

Sources

Insufficient information

Australia and Poland

The bilateral information gathered on Australia and Poland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Australia and Portugal

Tax and triangular development cooperation agreements give substance to Australia–Portugal relations. They are collaboration instruments, not proof every planned project is implemented.

Sources

Close cooperation

Australia and Singapore

Australia and Singapore sustain defence, trade, innovation and education collaboration with regular high-level meetings. The expanded partnership organises next steps; not all are counted as achieved results.

Sources

Insufficient information

Australia and Slovakia

The bilateral information gathered on Australia and Slovakia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Australia and Slovenia

Community ties and growing trade accompany positive Australia–Slovenia relations. This is societal and economic cooperation, not a bilateral defence guarantee.

Sources

Cooperation

Australia and Solomon Islands

The June 2026 dialogue and bilateral development plan sustain Australia–Solomon Islands collaboration. Elevation intent proves neither every implemented commitment nor absence of strategic differences.

Sources

Insufficient information

Australia and Somalia

The bilateral information gathered on Australia and Somalia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Australia and South Africa

South Africa is Australia's main investment partner in Africa according to its regional profile. Economic ties support moderate cooperation, without proving political alignment or a security alliance on their own.

Sources

Swiss investment in Australia is an important economic relationship component. Collaboration is assessed as cooperative without attributing a military alliance or absolute diplomatic agreement.

Sources

Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Australia and United Arab Emirates

The bilateral information gathered on Australia and United Arab Emirates is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

The 2021 bilateral partnership and documented business contacts provide an economic and political cooperation framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral profile describes positive political contacts and business presence without equating investment with an alliance. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Austria and Maldives

Development cooperation and bilateral contacts maintain a relationship documented as collaborative. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Austrian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Guyana Department of Public Information

Strained relationship

Austria and Myanmar (Burma)

Sources

Government of The Bahamas — Bahamas Trade Info

Institutional source: rbdf.gov.bs

Cooperation

Bahamas and Haiti

The July 2026 programme trains Haitian police in cargo and container security with Bahamian authorities participating. It documents intergovernmental cooperation; gang actions are not attributed to Haiti, nor are migration or regional security difficulties erased.

Sources

Military training exchanges and bilateral contacts document institutional collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The shared mobility regime facilitates residence, work and access to certain public services among participating countries. This practical cooperation goes beyond protocol. It is not generalised to all CARICOM or interpreted as a political or military alliance.

Sources

Institutional source: pressroomopm.gov.dm

Institutional source: bac.gov.bb

Institutional source: lnta.gov.lr

Sources

The embassy closed, but official communication clarifies that political, economic and consular ties continue from Panama. Closure is not presented as a rupture. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Belize and Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Belize and Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Belize and Guinea-Bissau

The bilateral information gathered on Belize and Guinea-Bissau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Belize and Guyana

The February 2026 memoranda open bilateral frameworks for security, education, tourism and the economy. The documented agenda is cooperative; agreed commitments and mechanisms are distinguished from effective results, without turning the announcement’s breadth into a close alliance.

Sources

Institutional source: dpi.gov.gy

Honduran Ministry of Finance

Insufficient information

Belize and Haiti

The bilateral information gathered on Belize and Haiti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Belize and Honduras

Regional fiscal modernisation coexists with the Sapodilla/Zapotillos sovereignty dispute still before international courts in 2026. Mixed relations: litigation is neither war nor an obstacle to technical cooperation.

Sources

Government of Belize

Saint Kitts and Nevis Information Service

Institutional source: pressroomopm.gov.dm

Cooperation

Belize and St. Lucia

Shared trade commitments and active coordination provide an economic basis. Institutional cooperation attributes neither an unverified specific summit agreement nor complete integration.

Sources

CARICOM Secretariat

Cooperation

Belize and St. Vincent & Grenadines

Sources

Documented economic-access commitments and diplomatic channels support cooperation between Belize and Suriname. This is a moderate conclusion: it does not imply a strategic alliance or that all trade barriers have disappeared.

Sources

Trade commitments and active diplomatic channels provide a cooperative foundation between Belize and Trinidad and Tobago. Different regional positions are not automatically bilateral hostility; barrier-free economic integration is not presumed either.

Sources

Mediation institutions' collaboration produced training and experience transfer on complaint digitisation in September 2026. This is concrete administrative cooperation, not general alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Benin and Grenada

Benin and Grenada signed a political and diplomatic consultation memorandum in January 2025. It supports emerging cooperation, without turning the meeting's cultural and trade aspirations into proven results.

Sources

September 2026 official-passport visa exemption facilitates administrative rapprochement. Documented cooperation is limited diplomacy, not general freedom of movement or strategic partnership.

Sources

Madagascar Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Bosnia & Herzegovina and Brunei

Diplomatic contacts in 2025 examine educational and intercultural collaboration with Brunei; its documented scope remains limited. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The September 2026 ministerial meeting confirms political dialogue and bilateral collaboration with Jordan. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Contacts in 2025 review bilateral collaboration and international coordination with Guinea-Bissau; it is not equated with Guinea. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The first binational commission in 2026 creates a political mechanism to develop collaboration with Lesotho. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Botswana

Insufficient information

Botswana and Liberia

The bilateral information gathered on Botswana and Liberia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Botswana and Liechtenstein

The bilateral information gathered on Botswana and Liechtenstein is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Botswana and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Botswana and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Botswana and Malawi

The July 2025 political dialogue is supported by a joint permanent commission and bilateral collaboration with Malawi. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

February 2025 contacts maintain collaboration between neighbours and examine areas to develop it with Namibia. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Armenia

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Armenia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Australia

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Australia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Belarus

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Belarus is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Belgium

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Belgium is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Belize

Documented cooperation with Belize in disaster and fire prevention provides a practical precedent, not a new project in 2026. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Benin

The official visit and agricultural collaboration work with Benin document sectoral cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Cambodia

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Cambodia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Cameroon

The agreement with Cameroon to improve sustainable cocoa production establishes agricultural collaboration without confusing signature with results already achieved. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Canada

Bilateral dialogue on energy and mining supports a cooperative agenda with Canada; the memorandum being prepared is not presented as signed or implemented. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Cape Verde

Agreements and technical collaboration coordinated by the Brazilian agency provide a practical foundation for ties with Cabo Verde. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Central African Republic

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Central African Republic is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Ratification of the technical cooperation agreement with Comoros provides a bilateral framework without treating all planned programmes as completed. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Costa Rica

Costa Rica’s bilateral profile documents a technical and institutional collaboration agenda; the pending trade proposal is not presented as a treaty in force. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Djibouti

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Dominican Republic

Bilateral negotiations on technical programmes with the Dominican Republic show institutional collaboration without presenting planned initiatives as completed works. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Brazil and Greece

Diplomatic collaboration mechanisms and institutional ties with Greece support cooperation of limited scope. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Grenada

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Grenada is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Guatemala

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Guatemala is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Hungary is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Iceland

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Iceland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Indonesia

Bilateral work with Indonesia on energy and mining provides sectoral cooperation without treating expansion commitments as completed projects. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Iran

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Iran is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Brazil and Israel

Trade and cooperation agreements retain bilateral ties alongside deep Brazilian objections to Israeli actions in Palestinian territories and Lebanon. This combination supports relations with cooperation and tensions, neither an alliance nor a total rupture.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Italy

Technical exchanges on cotton with specialists from Mali support practical agricultural cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Myanmar (Burma)

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Myanmar (Burma) is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Namibia

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Nigeria

Economic, scientific and defence agreements with Nigeria provide a framework for collaboration; this pair is not confused with Niger. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Political consultations with Palestinian institutions document diplomatic and societal collaboration without identifying Palestine with an armed group. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Panama

Cooperation

Brazil and Romania

The memorandum on food and energy technical collaboration with Romania provides a sectoral framework without treating all its objectives as achieved. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Work with Singapore on innovation and small businesses provides institutional collaboration beyond trade. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and South Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and South Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Sri Lanka

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Sri Lanka is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Suriname

Programmes with Suriname on health, social protection and the Amazon provide technical and development collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Sweden

The defence product and technology exchange protocol with Sweden provides concrete sectoral cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Togo

Twinning and exchanges between Cachoeira and Aného provide local cultural collaboration with Togo. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Brazil and Tonga

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Tonga is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Brazil and Tunisia

The bilateral information gathered on Brazil and Tunisia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Brazil and Türkiye

The partnership framework with Türkiye provides political and sectoral collaboration channels without the title automatically determining maximum closeness. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Brazil and Zimbabwe

The agricultural technical mission in Zimbabwe provides knowledge transfer and cotton collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

Bulgaria and Andorra

The bilateral profile identifies a political channel of collaboration with Andorra and a willingness to develop the agenda in areas of shared interest; its scope remains limited. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Bulgaria and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Bulgaria and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Bulgaria and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Bulgaria and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Bulgaria and Armenia

March 2026 contacts discuss economic cooperation, connectivity and Armenian reforms. Collaboration predominates, but proposed strategic-partnership elevation is not proof of formalisation.

Sources

Cooperation

Bulgaria and Azerbaijan

May 2026 dialogue rests on energy and trade cooperation and political-contact mechanisms. Collaboration supports cooperation assessment, without treating planned investments or visits as achieved results.

Sources

Bulgaria and Croatia

The bilateral information gathered on Bulgaria and Paraguay is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Bulgaria and Qatar

Ministerial contacts in 2026 address political and economic dialogue and connectivity projects, distinguishing held meetings from a summit still planned. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Burundian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Bulgaria and Congo - Brazzaville

Bilateral contacts examine educational, economic and tourism collaboration with the Republic of the Congo; this country is distinguished from the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Embassy of Burundi in Algeria

Insufficient information

Burkina Faso and Marshall Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Burkina Faso and Marshall Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Burkina Faso and Mauritania

June 2026 official contact seeks stronger consultations, security and governmental cooperation. Moderate cooperation does not assume a regional organisation reactivated or diplomatic exchange a defence treaty.

Sources

Burundi and Comoros

Shared trade preference instruments provide an economic basis for cooperation. The assessment is institutional and moderate: this alone establishes neither intensive bilateral trade nor removal of every barrier. Comoros is not confused with Burundi’s other partners.

Sources

Embassy of Burundi in Algiers

Cooperation

Burundi and Djibouti

Ministerial and diplomatic contacts followed up in April 2026 rest on shared economic commitments. Institutional cooperation is not a courtesy visit as new agreement or absence of trade barriers.

Sources

Embassy of Burundi in Paris

Trade commitments and shared customs mechanisms underpin institutional economic cooperation. Mediation in Madagascar led by a former Burundian president is not presented as a bilateral mission of Burundi’s current government or evidence of complete political affinity.

Sources

National Assembly of Burundi

Cooperation

Burundi and Malawi

Trade preferences and facilitation provide moderate economic cooperation. An ambassador's regional accreditation alone establishes neither bilateral investment nor absence of trade obstacles.

Sources

Parliamentary adoption of framework-agreement ratification in October 2025 and ministerial follow-up show organised cooperation intent. The legal framework does not establish funding or execution of all planned projects.

Sources

Burundian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Shared trade-access commitments sustain institutional cooperation. Parliamentary-meeting attendance does not establish close alliance or people mobility equal to goods mobility.

Sources

Insufficient information

Burundi and Sierra Leone

The bilateral information gathered on Burundi and Sierra Leone is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Burundi and Solomon Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Burundi and Solomon Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Burundi and Somalia

Coordination on stabilising Somalia documented in July 2026 provides a cooperative foundation between the authorities. Burundi’s participation in consultations does not alone establish a specific number of deployed troops or the continuity of every historical contingent.

Sources

Leaders' joint Great Lakes mediation work, with meetings in 2025 and January 2026, shows effective diplomatic cooperation. It seeks regional de-escalation, not bilateral military alliance.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Bhutan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Bolivia

Development aid and indigenous affairs, climate and education collaboration sustain Canada–Bolivia ties. Trade complements these programmes without a full political alliance being inferred.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Bosnia & Herzegovina is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Botswana

Canada's cooperation with Botswana includes military training and Commonwealth institutional ties. Collaboration is moderate; historical programmes are not therefore assumed active in every field today.

Sources

Canada's profile highlights trade, bilingualism and regional security as Cameroon relationship pillars. These support cooperation assessment, without assuming the country's internal political difficulties are resolved.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Cape Verde

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Cape Verde is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Central African Republic

Canadian support for UN stabilisation mission activities provides concrete Central African Republic ties. Institutional and humanitarian collaboration is not endorsement of all government policies.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Chad

International assistance gives substance to Canada–Chad ties. Canada also calls for political inclusion and respect for rights; cooperation can coexist with those demands without a close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Chile

Canada and Chile use bilateral environmental, development and defence instruments. Cooperation predominates without a mutual security guarantee or political unanimity.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Colombia

Trade and mobility combine with Canadian support for justice and peacebuilding in Colombia. Human-rights dialogue is part of this collaboration and is not omitted from the assessment.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Comoros

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Comoros is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Costa Rica

The free trade treaty and supplementary labour and environmental agreements accompany open Canada–Costa Rica political dialogue. The foundation is cooperative and diversified, not a military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Croatia

Canada describes positive Croatia relations reinforced by defence collaboration and CETA. The combination sustains cooperation, without assigning highest closeness solely through common institutions.

Sources

Canadian investment in the Dominican Republic and education-exchange scholarships support cooperation. Economic relevance is not proof of military alliance or approval of all domestic policy.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Congo - Kinshasa

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Congo - Kinshasa is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Ecuador

Trade and educational exchanges support Canada–Ecuador collaboration. They also share gender-responsive trade policy initiatives; agreements in these areas do not imply diplomatic unanimity.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Egypt

Canada and Egypt collaborate in development, education and regional stability alongside trade and human ties. Multifaceted cooperation does not mean agreement on every Middle Eastern issue.

Sources

Fisher-community resilience support and stronger Canadian diplomatic presence give substance to Fiji ties. Climate and development collaboration matters more than mere shared Commonwealth membership.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Finland

Investment and science, technology and innovation projects sustain Canada–Finland collaboration. CETA complements ties; institutional membership is not automatic maximum closeness.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Guinea-Bissau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Guyana

Canada–Caribbean climate resilience, agriculture and energy initiatives include Guyana. This cooperation supports the category without every financing announcement counted as an implemented project.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Haiti

Canada mobilises international support for Haitian security, governance and development responses. Cooperation does not mean Haiti's crisis is bilateral conflict with Canada or has been resolved.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Honduras

Trade and institutional channels sustain Canada–Honduras relations. Documented cooperation is moderate; trade is not a guarantee of full governmental affinity.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Jamaica

Canada’s large Jamaican community and defence and security cooperation sustain diverse ties. Documented collaboration is not interpreted as diplomatic unanimity or an automatic military guarantee.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Jordan

International assistance and the bilateral defence cooperation framework make Jordan a significant Canadian partner in the Middle East. This favours collaboration, without implying agreement on every regional issue.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Kazakhstan

Agricultural exchanges, farming technology and institutional dialogue sustain Canada–Kazakhstan ties. Economic cooperation does not equate to general security or foreign policy alignment.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Kenya

Canada–Kenya bilateral consultations address trade, regular migration, development and climate. These mechanisms give substance to cooperative relations without treating every discussed proposal as an implemented agreement.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Kuwait

The formalised bilateral consultation mechanism between Canada and Kuwait enables coordination on shared interests. It is assessed as institutional cooperation, not a military alliance or a guarantee of future investment.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Kyrgyzstan

Canadian financing for local organisations provides concrete cooperation with Kyrgyzstan. The relationship has limited scope; civil-society assistance is not presented as unconditional support for its government.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Laos

Insufficient information

Canada and Mauritius

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Mauritius is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Mexico

Extensive trade and investment sustain Canada–Mexico relations alongside bilateral cooperation initiatives. Economic integration is a cooperative foundation, not automatically the highest degree of political closeness.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Micronesia

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Micronesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Moldova

Canada and Moldova have strengthened political, security and economic contacts since Russia’s Ukraine invasion. Stronger dialogue supports cooperation without a bilateral military guarantee.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Nigeria

Trade and border and migration technical assistance give Canada–Nigeria substance. Sectoral cooperation predominates in the official profile without all foreign policy affinity.

Sources

Strained relationship

Canada and North Korea

Canadian policy limits official contact with North Korea to security, rights, assistance and consular matters. Disagreements over weapons and rights dominate relations, without proving an ongoing bilateral war.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and North Macedonia

Canada supports reforms and North Macedonia's European integration, alongside economic and defence cooperation. Collaboration is positive, but shared NATO membership alone does not elevate it to the highest level.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Canada and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Canada and Paraguay

Human rights and peacekeeping dialogue sustain Canada–Paraguay cooperation. Financing initiatives are sectoral instruments, not a general strategic alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Peru

Canada–Peru relations combine free trade, inclusive growth, climate and regional collaboration. These areas support cooperation without erasing possible political differences or implying mutual defence.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Philippines

Bilateral consultations let Canada and the Philippines coordinate priorities and review shared projects. Diplomatic and economic collaboration favours ties, without all dialogue objectives implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Poland

Canada and Poland collaborate in defence and Ukraine support, with a high-level bilateral mechanism created in 2025. This is significant cooperation; future objectives are not completed results.

Sources

High-level contacts in 2025 and 2026 reflect economic and security Canada–Saudi Arabia rapprochement. An old diplomatic crisis is not retained as current description, nor is rights agreement inferred.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Senegal

Institutional cooperation and capacity-focused Canadian military training sustain ties with Senegal. Development and security support does not constitute a mutual defence guarantee.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Serbia

Canada maintains trade cooperation and military training with Serbia while promoting reforms and normalisation with Kosovo. Diplomatic differences do not eliminate these collaboration areas.

Sources

Canadian equality and climate projects provide concrete collaboration with the Solomon Islands. Trade is small; development cooperation is distinguished from an extensive strategic partnership.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Somalia

Canada restored Somali federal-government relations and develops reinforced bilateral cooperation. Assistance and dialogue imply neither resolved Somali crisis nor Canada–Somalia conflict.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and South Africa

Bilateral consultations and cultural collaboration, including audiovisual co-production, sustain Canada–South Africa ties. The diverse agenda supports cooperation without requiring agreement on every international issue.

Sources

Close cooperation

Canada and South Korea

Canada–South Korea combines trade, technology, human ties and intelligence, exercises and defence work. Broad collaboration supports strong closeness without claiming NATO-identical mutual defence.

Sources

Canada and Tonga share fisheries management interests and positive institutional dialogue. Limited sectoral cooperation is not a large economic or military partnership.

Sources

Cooperation

Canada and Trinidad & Tobago

Canada–Trinidad and Tobago ties cover trade, security, education and community connections. Collaboration predominates in a diverse agenda without requiring agreement on all foreign policy.

Sources

Insufficient information

Canada and Tunisia

Strained relationship

Canada and Zimbabwe

Canadian arms restrictions and sanctions condition relations with Zimbabwe. Diplomatic contacts do not eliminate those measures, which are distinguished from direct military hostilities between the countries.

Sources

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

The February 2026 joint maritime surveillance and illegal fishing operation provides effective cooperation. Practical cooperation is recognised without making a multi-participant operation permanent mutual defence or presuming every maritime challenge resolved.

Sources

May 2026 defence contacts address training, technical exchanges and maritime security. Practical government cooperation predominates, not a close military alliance. Separately, the 2026 tax review states the tax information exchange treaty is not yet in force.

Sources

Government of Cabo Verde

Insufficient information

Cape Verde and Seychelles

The bilateral information gathered on Cape Verde and Seychelles is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Cape Verde and Sierra Leone

The dialogue in August 2025 identified cooperation in the digital economy and trade, alongside shared regional priorities. Diplomatic and economic cooperation predominates, without presenting interest in developing those sectors as investments or projects already implemented.

Sources

Central African Republic and Congo - Brazzaville

Economic coordination and shared monetary rules remain a cooperative foundation in 2026. This pair concerns Congo-Brazzaville, not the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the latter's scientific Central African agreements are not attributed here.

Sources

Chad and Gambia

June 2026 dialogue highlights water technical cooperation and authority contacts. Collaboration is moderate; a forum invitation is not completed attendance or military commitment.

Sources

Sudan News Agency (SUNA)

Prime Minister of Canada · 2026-01-16

New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

China and New Zealand

Trade and April 2026 diplomatic consultations underpin cooperation. Security differences and interference allegations persist with differing interpretations. They do not eliminate bilateral work or alone make all relations adversarial.

Sources

Embassy of China

Cooperation

China and Singapore

Trade, joint projects and May 2026 dialogue underpin broad cooperation. Singapore retains independent foreign policy and multiple partners. China cooperation is not general alignment against the United States, nor announced future meetings already held.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Thailand

Economic agenda and diplomatic dialogue underpin cooperation. Work in 2026 includes bilateral contacts and regional stability coordination. New project commitments are not completed construction, nor cooperation Thailand relinquishing other partners.

Sources

Close cooperation

China and Cambodia

Trade and investment combine with political coordination and sustained defence cooperation. The joint foreign and defence ministerial dialogue in April 2026 confirms channels. Multisector cooperation supports close relations without all announced projects implemented.

Sources

Close cooperation

China and Laos

Rail links, energy and trade combine with political coordination and defence cooperation. Military dialogue in 2026 confirms government continuity. Multisector closeness does not mean financial dependence removes Laos’s own interests.

The joint refinery, oil exchanges and agricultural and infrastructure cooperation form a practical foundation with Chad. Trade remains recorded in 2025. Political changes and regional conflicts require context but do not alone establish a bilateral dispute with China.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Comoros

Chinese water supply, road and public building projects form part of cooperation with Comoros. Diplomatic channels maintain ties. These works are described as completed precedents, without presenting new aid promises as investments already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Congo - Kinshasa

Mining investment, trade and investment agreements significantly connect China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Economic cooperation coexists with security risks and debates over benefits. These risks do not amount to confrontation between the two governments.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Djibouti

China’s logistics base in Djibouti, transit trade and medical cooperation underpin an important relationship. The base’s activity is documented in 2026. Its presence does not imply that Djibouti has an exclusive alliance with China or shares all its positions.

Trade exchanges, university training and a Chinese medical team present in Liberia give substance to the relationship. Its foreign minister’s visit in 2026 maintains dialogue. Earlier changes in diplomatic recognition are not treated as a current crisis.

Sources

Insufficient information

Oil activity and health cooperation underpin relations with Niger. Operating-condition disagreements prompted renegotiation, not a general rupture. New protocols in 2026 show rapprochement, although complete implementation is not presumed.

Federal government dialogue and economic exchanges underpin Somalia cooperation. Security conflicts limit activities but do not alone imply bilateral enmity. Assessment distinguishes recognised authorities from armed groups and diverse populations.

Sources

Cooperation

Trade, agricultural cooperation and scientific exchanges with Bulgaria have practical substance. China also included a Bulgarian company in its July 2026 export controls. This specific restriction prevents describing the relationship as cooperation without significant tensions.

Sources

Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-07-24

Cooperation

China and Croatia

The Pelješac bridge and Korlat solar plant, connected to the grid in 2026, provide concrete results of cooperation with Croatia. Trade and official contacts complement these projects. They do not establish a military alliance or complete political integration.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Cyprus

Trade, investment agreements and education underpin Cyprus cooperation through its own bilateral mechanisms. EU membership provides context but does not automatically attribute every China–EU institutional dispute to Cyprus.

Sources

Mixed relationship

China and Czechia

Restored ministerial dialogue and economic ties favour cooperation with Czechia. However, Chinese July 2026 controls include Tatra Trucks. Diplomatic rapprochement coexists with an effective restriction; improvement statements are not full normalisation.

Cooperation

China and Latvia

Economic mechanisms and trade maintain cooperation with Latvia. This implies neither strategic closeness nor removal of political disagreements. Tax agreements are part of bilateral history, not new initiatives in the current period.

Sources

Strained relationship

China and Lithuania

The dispute over Taiwan’s representation and restrictions targeting Lithuanian entities constrain ties. Attempts to restore contacts do not mean completed normalisation. Diplomatic and trade tension exists, but no direct armed hostilities between China and Lithuania.

Sources

Lrytas — information on the Lithuanian minister's position

Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-07-24

Cooperation

China and Luxembourg

Financial activity and the Zhengzhou–Luxembourg freight connection provide important practical ties. Trade remains recorded in 2026. Business and monetary cooperation is not interpreted as a security alliance or absolute political agreement.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Malta

The bilateral economic mechanism meeting in January 2026 and diplomatic contacts underpin cooperation with Malta. Concrete working channels exist. New project commitments are not treated as fulfilled, nor does cooperation amount to a general political alliance.

Sources

Chinese Ministry of Commerce

Cooperation

Trade and consultation mechanisms underpin important Netherlands ties. Semiconductor technology controls and Chinese restrictions on a Dutch entity create effective tension. Dialogue does not remove measures, which also do not mean a general economic rupture.

Sources

Chinese Ministry of Commerce · 2026-07-24

Government of Switzerland

Mixed relationship

China and Poland

Strategic dialogue in June 2026 maintains political and economic channels with Poland. July Chinese restrictions also target Polish entities including Vigo Photonics. Cooperation and restrictions coexist; diplomatic continuity is not absence of tensions.

Sources

China and Switzerland

Trade and scientific and financial contacts underpin cooperation with Switzerland. Political consultations in 2026 maintain the relationship. Concluding negotiations to update a treaty is not presented as its entry into force, nor does it eliminate political differences.

Sources

Strained relationship

China and Ukraine

Ukrainian sanctions on Chinese firms linked to support for Russia’s military sector show significant tension in 2026. China retains diplomatic contacts, but war affects trust. Supply allegations retain Kyiv attribution; no direct China–Ukraine war is asserted.

Sources

Trade and recognised Yemeni authority contacts maintain cooperation limited by war. China’s embassy operates from Riyadh and some offices are closed. The government is not equated with Houthis, nor absence of bilateral war sufficient for close relations.

Sources

Cooperation

China and Vatican City

Bishop appointments and ordinations in 2026 under the provisional agreement show specific Holy See cooperation. No full diplomatic relations does not erase this work. The category is limited cooperation, not complete religious freedom or ecclesiastical agreement.

Sources

Vatican News

Insufficient information

China and Bhutan

Border negotiations in 2026 maintain China–Bhutan dialogue, but the border remains central. Talks establish neither broad cooperation nor current hostility alone. No positive or negative category is assigned without fuller evidence.

Sources

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China · 2026-04-01

Insufficient information

China and Andorra

Available information on China and Andorra does not provide a sufficient basis to distinguish the current intensity of their cooperation or disagreements. Diplomatic contacts alone are not enough to assess the whole relationship. This absence of classification does not mean neutrality or a negative relationship.

Insufficient information

China and Liechtenstein

Diplomatic precedents and tourism contacts do not sufficiently establish overall current relations with Liechtenstein. China’s relations with Switzerland are not automatically transferred. No classification does not mean neutrality or enmity.

Insufficient information

China and Monaco

Diplomatic contacts with Monaco establish that ties exist, but the information consulted does not sufficiently establish their current scope. Historical visits do not prove close relations. The relationship remains unclassified, not neutral.

Sources

Political contacts and trade combine with Chinese material aid to Cuba, including solar equipment delivered in August 2026. Assistance gives substance to cooperation. Joint plans are not presented as fully fulfilled, and government closeness does not describe the whole population.

China and Jamaica

Trade and cultural exchanges combine with health cooperation in Jamaica. Hospital ship assistance in December 2025 provides a recent result. These activities underpin cooperation, without implying a defence alliance or complete political alignment.

Sources

Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mixed relationship

China and Mexico

Trade and business and traveller links maintain important Mexico ties. Mexican tariffs prompted a Chinese investigation concluded in March 2026 identifying trade barriers. Economic cooperation and effective dispute coexist, not a general rupture.

Bilateral contacts and economic, agricultural and development agreements underpin Vanuatu cooperation. Practical channels are not only regional forums. Project lists and memoranda describe an agenda, not proof all objectives implemented.

Insufficient information

Colombia and Croatia

The bilateral information gathered on Colombia and Croatia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Colombia and Cuba

The political consultation mechanism enables dialogue and collaboration without requiring ideological agreement. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Colombia and Cyprus

The bilateral information gathered on Colombia and Cyprus is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Colombia and Djibouti

The bilateral information gathered on Colombia and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Colombia and Dominica

The agenda with Dominica includes political dialogue and scientific, technical and educational cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Colombia and Grenada

The bilateral information gathered on Colombia and Grenada is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Colombia and Guatemala

Documented political and technical mechanisms maintain long-standing bilateral dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Colombia and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Colombia and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Colombia and Paraguay

The political consultation mechanism allows bilateral affairs and cooperation to be reviewed. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Colombian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mixed relationship

Colombia and Peru

The binational cabinet and border cooperation coexist with Colombia’s 2025 protest over Santa Rosa. This position is attributed to Colombia without the atlas resolving disputed sovereignty. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; specific friction is not hostility everywhere.

Sources

Sources

Trade-access commitments and coordination channels provide economic cooperation. This differs from full customs union or defence alliance; positions concerning third parties are not automatically new bilateral agreements.

Sources

Participation in an operational climate displacement response programme coordinated from Malawi in 2026 provides a basis for technical cooperation. The assessment is moderate: it implies neither a close political alliance nor proof that every programme objective has been achieved.

Sources

Shared trade instruments maintain institutional cooperation. Sudan's internal war may hinder application; no normal trade or Comorian support for every conflict force is assumed.

Sources

Diplomatic contacts and continued bilateral representation maintain a collaboration channel with El Salvador; they do not imply sharing every political position. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Consultations and the 2025 ministerial visit address political, economic, educational, tourism and cultural collaboration with Mongolia. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Croatia

Mixed relationship

Croatia and Montenegro

Bilateral dialogue and shared European integration interests coexist with unresolved historical and political issues. Croatia’s July 2026 communiqué links these differences to Montenegro accession negotiations, so overall cooperation is not friction-free.

Sources

Government of Croatia

Cooperation

Croatia and Tajikistan

The December 2024 ministerial visit provides a political channel for developing collaboration with Tajikistan; it is not treated as a 2026 event. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Croatia

Jamaica ended the governmental medical cooperation agreement in March 2026 after new conditions were not agreed, but expressed interest in a new arrangement. This is not total diplomatic rupture. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; specific friction is not hostility everywhere.

Sources

Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Jamaica Information Service

Cooperation

Cyprus and Andorra

The July 2026 ministerial visit maintains political dialogue with Andorra and addresses bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Cyprus

Insufficient information

Cyprus and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Cyprus and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Cyprus and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Cyprus and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Cyprus and Armenia

The parliamentary visit maintains political dialogue and collaboration ties with Armenia without turning solidarity language into an automatic military alliance. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The resumption of direct flights documented in June 2026 provides a foundation for tourism and connectivity collaboration with Kuwait. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Cyprus

Cooperation

Cyprus and Kyrgyzstan

The 2026 ministerial visit reviews bilateral relations and avenues for collaboration with Kyrgyzstan. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Cyprus

Insufficient information

Cyprus and Laos

The bilateral information gathered on Cyprus and Laos is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Cyprus and Lebanon

The maritime-delimitation agreement and preliminary 2026 electricity-interconnection study provide concrete government cooperation; neither completed cable construction nor all legal stages are claimed. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Memoranda signed in September 2026 create political consultation and diplomatic collaboration mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Denmark and Estonia

The official profile documents sustained bilateral cooperation and dialogue on international priorities. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Denmark's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Denmark and Eswatini

The bilateral information gathered on Denmark and Eswatini is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Denmark and Ethiopia

The bilateral strategy combines political dialogue with development and humanitarian aid without equating aid with complete affinity with the government. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Sources

Sources

Djibouti Ministry of Foreign Affairs

ACNUR

Sources

Insufficient information

Dominica and Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Dominica and Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Dominica and Guinea-Bissau

The bilateral information gathered on Dominica and Guinea-Bissau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Dominica and Guyana

Dominica and Guyana share economic commitments and work on the governance of regional institutions in 2026. This cooperation supports a cooperative assessment. Dominica is not the Dominican Republic: the latter’s oil agreements are not attributed to this pair.

Sources

Close cooperation

Dominica and St. Lucia

Sources

Close cooperation

Dominica and St. Vincent & Grenadines

Sources

Shared trade obligations and current institutional coordination ground cooperation. Dominica is not the Dominican Republic; official meetings with that other country's authorities are not attributed here.

Sources

The June 2026 political consultations maintain dialogue and an agenda of bilateral cooperation with El Salvador. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Egypt and Central African Republic

The bilateral information gathered on Egypt and Central African Republic is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Egypt and Chad

The economic and technical agreement with Chad provides a collaboration framework despite limited trade. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Chile

Chile and Egypt maintain international collaboration and contacts on trade and investment. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Colombia

The Colombian presidential visit sets out an agenda to strengthen political and economic collaboration with Egypt. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Comoros

The April 2026 meeting with Estonia seeks to strengthen a bilateral relationship that both sides describe positively. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Eswatini

The technical energy agreement provides an institutional foundation for collaboration with Eswatini without measuring all its current activity here. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The strategic partnership with Greece maintains political coordination and an economic agenda tied to the eastern Mediterranean. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The first political consultations in 2026 with Congo-Brazzaville sustain a bilateral and international agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Romania

Contacts in September 2026 with Romania address industrial collaboration and investment. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Agreements signed in July 2026 with Tanzania expand the energy collaboration framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Thailand

Consultations and the sectoral plan provide a bilateral collaboration framework with Thailand. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Timor-Leste

July 2026 contacts with Timor-Leste maintain an agenda to expand bilateral cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Togo

June 2026 ministerial conversations with Togo continue bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Institutional contacts maintain an economic and trade collaboration agenda with Zambia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Egypt and Zimbabwe

Ministerial dialogue in 2026 with Zimbabwe maintains bilateral cooperation and work on the joint commission. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Honduras National Television

Cooperation in the cross-border Goascorán basin and Honduras’s reaffirmation of cordial relations in May 2026 provide a concrete cooperative foundation. Not every historical border difference is presumed resolved, nor is cordiality equated with a close alliance.

Sources

Honduran Secretariat of Natural Resources and Environment

Sources

Government of Estonia

Insufficient information

Estonia and Andorra

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Andorra is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Estonia and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Estonia and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Estonia and Armenia

The embassy’s opening in 2026 and the bilateral memorandum are accompanied by work on digitalisation and economic development. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Belize is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Estonia and Benin

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Benin is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Estonia and Bhutan

The bilateral profile identifies limited collaboration in digitalisation and e-government without asserting that formal diplomatic relations exist. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Estonia

Insufficient information

Estonia and Bolivia

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Bolivia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Estonia and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral profile describes modest contacts and Estonian support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s European integration; that support is not equated with completed accession. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The bilateral profile describes positive political and economic Cyprus collaboration; shared EU membership alone is not used for the highest level. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Estonia and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on Estonia and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Sources

The February and April 2026 meetings review political, economic and technological collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

December 2024 and January 2025 agreements seek restored dialogue and security cooperation after the sovereignty crisis. Technical commercial sea access negotiations are not concluded. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; specific friction is not hostility everywhere.

Sources

Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia

Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Fiji and Mauritania

The bilateral information gathered on Fiji and Mauritania is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Fiji and Micronesia

Bilateral contacts and Micronesia’s maintained diplomatic representation in Fiji provide cooperation. Funding recommended for 2026 supports institutional continuity, not proof of expenditure or a connectivity project becoming an operational service.

Sources

Office of the Prime Minister of Fiji

Congress of Micronesia

Government of Papua New Guinea

Insufficient information

Fiji and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Fiji and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Fiji and Nauru

The February 2026 ministerial visit discusses bilateral development advancement. Understanding is pursued beyond the commemorative ceremony; proposed fields are not completed projects.

Sources

Documented economic presence and educational cooperation underpin cooperation between Fiji and Papua New Guinea. Existing activities are distinguished from proposals to strengthen the business council; agreements PNG signed with Australia are not attributed to Fiji.

Sources

Parliament of Fiji

Insufficient information

Fiji and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Fiji and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Fiji and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Fiji and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Fiji and Tuvalu

Ministerial dialogue and fisheries-access talks show a cooperative agenda. Assessment assumes neither signature of the negotiated agreement nor an automatic alliance from shared climate needs.

Sources

Fiji Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Parliament of Fiji

Institutional source: mfaicet.gov.vu

Cooperation

Fiji and Vanuatu

The bilateral memorandum expands education, security, trade and other sectors. September 2025 maritime talks show cooperative management of pending delimitation. Cooperation predominates without the border resolved or all memorandum initiatives implemented.

Sources

Institutional source: pmo.gov.vu

Insufficient information

Finland and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on Finland and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Finland and Ireland

The 2022 bilateral declaration describes sustained cooperation and affinity on various European issues; it does not demonstrate unanimity. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The September 2026 communiqué documents growing defence-industry collaboration and announces a 2 October visit; verification of that visit is not claimed. Cooperation supports this indicative classification.

Sources

The 2025 declaration continues political dialogue and exchanges of visits. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Finland and Montenegro

The February 2024 ministerial meeting addresses bilateral collaboration and European security. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Finland and Morocco

The 2024 ministerial declaration confirms a cooperative framework without treating a diplomatic label as automatic closeness. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Finland and New Zealand

The October 2025 Nordic joint declaration confirms willingness for political and multilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Finland and Peru

The bilateral information gathered on Finland and Peru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Finland and Philippines

Political consultations in 2023 address cooperation, migration and international affairs. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The June 2026 ministerial contact continues dialogue and support for reforms linked to the European process. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs

The 2024 visit continues a long-standing relationship and seeks to expand economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-19

Cooperation

France and Angola

Dialogue on regional security and water and agriculture programmes complement French investment and university cooperation. Recent agreements strengthen a predominantly cooperative relationship, but contracts and new declarations are not treated as fully implemented projects.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Antigua & Barbuda

Periodic defence-force exchanges and archaeological work by the University of the Antilles provide concrete ties. This is regional and sector-specific cooperation, not a broad alliance; shared European programmes are not attributed entirely to France.

Sources

Cooperation

Police and counterterrorism cooperation combines with European political coordination, industrial investments and educational and scientific exchanges. Closeness reflects these effective ties across several areas, not merely both countries’ EU membership.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-18

Strained relationship

France and Azerbaijan

The diplomatic crisis and closure of the French lycée in Baku have materially affected relations. Renewed contacts in 2026 and university cooperation preserve useful channels but do not remove these restrictions; interference allegations are distinguished from established facts.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-14

Insufficient information

France and Bahamas

Available profiles record diplomatic contacts, occasional naval exercises and tourism opportunities, but many examples are old. They do not establish current overall relations with sufficient confidence; missing information does not mean neutrality.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Bahrain

Political dialogue and trade exchanges, particularly in industrial and aerospace sectors, provide a concrete cooperative foundation. The relationship is considered cooperative, without official meetings or future roadmaps becoming proof of an exceptional alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Bangladesh

Development programmes, scholarships and climate and maritime economy cooperation complement economic exchanges. Practical cooperation predominates, although its scope does not imply a political or security alliance comparable to France’s closest relationships.

Sources

Insufficient information

Marine conservation and environmental cooperation, French teaching and educational contacts give substance to relations. Limited but concrete cooperation predominates; neither small trade nor absence of a resident embassy alone implies political distance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-11

Cooperation

France and Benin

Development, education and health programmes and security cooperation provide practical ties. They support a cooperative assessment without historical ties or presidential visits automatically making a close alliance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-25

Insufficient information

France and Bhutan

No formal diplomatic relations does not establish hostility, but available information focuses on contacts, cultural activities and educational proposals. Announced projects do not yet provide sufficiently broad, current evidence for a confident relationship level.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-10

Cooperation

France and Bolivia

Civil protection cooperation and educational and development ties provide a foundation for joint work. Trade is relatively limited but is not the only relevant dimension: cooperative activities predominate without implying a far-reaching strategic alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Bosnia & Herzegovina

French participation in peace-monitoring mechanisms and support for reforms underpin political dialogue, complemented by economic and cultural ties. This cooperation is not confused with close bilateral integration or an automatic guarantee of domestic stability.

Sources

Cooperation

Educational exchanges, archaeological research and the presence of French businesses give substance to political cooperation. Cooperation predominates; shared EU and NATO membership helps provide an institutional framework, but does not alone determine bilateral closeness.

Sources

Strained relationship

France and Burkina Faso

The diplomatic rupture announced in June 2026 directly and substantially restricts state-to-state ties. Links between the populations do not disappear, but do not offset that rupture; diplomatic hostility does not establish a bilateral war.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-26

Government of Burkina Faso · 2026-06-26

Insufficient information

Political coordination, economic exchanges and scientific and educational cooperation form broad, sustained relations. Francophone ties strengthen them, but closeness also rests on joint work and cooperation institutions, not solely language or NATO.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-03

Cooperation

France and Cape Verde

Water and infrastructure projects and educational and cultural cooperation provide practical collaboration. Assessment is not derived from general European funding or announced security plans: these are distinguished from the bilateral activity actually described.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-30

Insufficient information

France and Central African Republic

Located sources mainly describe humanitarian aid and development frameworks from earlier years. They do not establish the current scope of state relations; Russian influence in the country also does not automatically establish hostility towards France or bilateral confrontation.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Chad

French withdrawal completed in January 2025 changed defence relations, but economic ties and civilian infrastructure support continued. Current cooperation is recognised without the old deployment being current or an agreed withdrawal being war.

Sources

Cooperation

Defence agreements and political dialogue accompany trade and civilian cooperation. A cooperative relationship predominates; security commitments and European membership are not taken as sufficient evidence of exceptional closeness across three independent areas.

Sources

Cooperation

Defence ties, investment and cultural and educational cooperation sustain substantive relations. Cooperation predominates despite political differences; arms supply and high-level visits do not imply complete alignment with Egyptian government decisions.

Sources

Cooperation

France and El Salvador

The Las Pavas water plant and French investment in solar energy are concrete examples of economic and development cooperation. Sector-specific cooperation predominates, without treating those investments as proof of a particularly close political alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

France and Equatorial Guinea

Educational ties coexist with litigation over property and the diplomatic status of the Avenue Foch building. Sources mainly describe old judicial stages; the dispute’s current status needs sufficient verification before being weighed against ongoing cooperation.

Sources

Development cooperation and economic exchanges, especially infrastructure and aviation, provide concrete cooperation. Practical ties predominate, without aircraft purchases or regional dialogue implying complete political alignment with Ethiopian authorities.

Sources

Economic and cultural ties and French support for Georgian sovereignty coexist with political deterioration over government direction and EU relations. Country support and authority assessment are distinct; neither erases the other.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2024-12-06

Cooperation

France and Ghana

Development cooperation and business ties in transport and infrastructure accompany regional security dialogue. Cooperation predominates, without commercial investment or political contacts alone establishing a particularly close alliance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-31

Close cooperation

France and Greece

Joint military exercises and delivered Rafales accompany economic and cultural ties and sustained politics. Real multisectoral cooperation grounds closeness; future naval purchases differ from incorporated equipment.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Grenada

The Alliance Française and Caribbean-linked teaching programmes provide concrete educational cooperation. This is limited cooperation, not a broad alliance; regional funds and diplomatic events are distinguished from bilateral activity itself.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-10

Cooperation

France and Guatemala

CEMCA research and the French educational and cultural network provide concrete, sustained ties. Cooperation predominates, although academic activity and trade exchanges do not imply broad political agreement or a particularly close strategic relationship.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-11

Cooperation

France and Guinea

Development programmes and business relations provide concrete joint work alongside political transition dialogue. Cooperation has limits: Guinea is not Guinea-Bissau, nor development assistance approval of every authority decision.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Guinea-Bissau

The Franco-Bissau-Guinean cultural centre and educational activities give substance to relations with limited trade. This is sector-specific cooperation, not a deep alliance; domestic fragility and low economic exchanges do not alone prove hostility towards France.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Guyana

Police training and civilian and environmental cooperation provide practical ties around French Guiana. Cooperation predominates, without assuming geographical proximity means political integration or that shared projects imply a military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Industrial exchanges and dialogue on energy and international affairs provide concrete cooperation. Cooperation predominates, without NATO membership establishing an exceptional alliance or every geothermal opportunity being presented as an implemented project.

Sources

Close cooperation

France and India

Operational defence and maritime cooperation is complemented by space and scientific programmes and industrial and educational ties. This breadth supports a close relationship; roadmaps through 2047 and future nuclear projects are distinguished from cooperation already under way.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-05-21

Cooperation

France and Indonesia

Defence cooperation and political dialogue are complemented by educational, research and development programmes. Substantive cooperation predominates, without arms contracts or formally upgrading the partnership alone establishing exceptional closeness.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-17

Strained relationship

France and Iran

The French-language centre’s closure in Tehran and incidents reported by Paris against its staff directly affect cooperation. Diplomatic talks continue but do not eliminate the crisis; Iran’s conflicts with third countries are not made into a Franco-Iranian war.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-20

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-22

Cooperation

France and Iraq

Support for Iraq’s security and sovereignty accompanies educational, cultural and reconstruction cooperation. Cooperation predominates: operations against Daesh are not attributed to the Iraqi state as confrontation with France, nor does cooperation imply complete political alignment.

Sources

Cooperation

Business presence in ports and solar energy and educational exchanges give substance to cooperation, alongside disaster assistance. This is sector-specific cooperation; a commercial concession or one-off aid does not imply a general political alliance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-07-07

Close cooperation

France and Japan

Political and security dialogue and naval cooperation combine with research and industrial and trade ties. Cooperation across these areas supports closeness, without the exceptional partner designation replacing concrete relationship mechanisms and activities.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-15

Cooperation

France and Jordan

Regional coordination and security cooperation accompany investments and civilian ties. Substantive cooperation predominates, but the September 2026 declaration does not make new proposals implemented projects or planned conferences completed meetings.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-17

Cooperation

France and Kazakhstan

Industrial and energy ties, university exchanges and development cooperation provide concrete joint work. Cooperation predominates without commercial contracts or the strategic partnership designation implying complete geopolitical alignment.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Kenya

Development programmes and business and scientific exchanges sustain practical relations. Cooperation predominates, without future infrastructure or announced meetings being considered completed or economic cooperation implying a defence alliance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-30

Insufficient information

France and Kiribati

Sources highlight climate and diplomacy but few current concrete bilateral ties. Pacific-forum convergence is insufficient for a level; sparse coverage is neither neutrality nor hostility.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Kuwait

Military training and joint exercises complement economic relations and scientific and medical exchanges. Concrete cooperation predominates; the new long-term investment declaration is distinguished from fulfilled commitments and implies no unlimited general alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Kyrgyzstan

Political consultations and cultural and research exchanges provide identifiable areas of cooperation. The relationship is assessed as cooperative but limited in scope, without using earlier Afghanistan-related deployments as evidence of a current French military presence.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-31

Cooperation

French teaching and cultural and social projects provide concrete sectoral collaboration. This is not a broad alliance; small community or modest trade alone does not prove political distance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Liberia

Political dialogue, including the presidential meeting in October 2025, accompanies civilian cooperation ties. Limited cooperation predominates, without equating an official visit with a strategic alliance or assuming it resolves every need of the country.

Sources

Insufficient information

France and Libya

Located bilateral sources mainly describe earlier stages of Libya’s crisis and do not allow a precise assessment of current relations with its various authorities. Institutional fragmentation is not automatically interpreted as hostility towards France by the whole country.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-03-31

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Food and nutrition projects and cultural and teaching ties provide concrete cooperation. Collaboration is limited; assistance to the population does not prove an especially close political alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Malaysia

Trade exchanges and French investments provide substantive economic relations, accompanied by bilateral dialogue. Cooperation predominates, without assuming industrial contracts, however important, amount to a fully integrated political or defence alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Joint cooperation mechanisms, tax and social agreements and cross-border ties underpin very intensive practical integration. Institutional coordination and civilian and economic ties justify closeness, without implying both countries share the same sovereignty.

Sources

Cooperation

European sanctions renewed in April 2026 and French opposition to the regime’s repression mark restrictive relations. Humanitarian support and support for an inclusive political process preserve population channels, but do not constitute normalisation with military authorities.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-05-05

Cooperation

France and Namibia

Cultural and development cooperation and business ties provide concrete collaboration. Cooperation predominates without new raw-material or hydrogen statements being operational production or economic opportunities implying a political alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pacific cooperation and scientific and economic ties provide predominantly cooperative relations. Security consultations and shared international initiatives reinforce ties without every new proposal being operational or an alliance without disagreements.

French recognition of Palestine in September 2025 and the joint institution-building committee complement educational and civilian cooperation. Cooperation with Palestinian institutions predominates; neither state nor population is Hamas, and governance limitations remain acknowledged.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-21

Cooperation

France and Panama

Business ties and institutional, cultural and security cooperation provide concrete joint work. Cooperation predominates without tax issues being completely resolved or an administrative disagreement being general interstate hostility.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Papua New Guinea

AFD presence and infrastructure, environment and security collaboration provide practical ties. Cooperation predominates, but new forestry initiatives and announced funds differ from projects with confirmed implementation.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Paraguay

Educational and cultural exchanges and economic ties provide limited cooperation. Alliances Françaises activity or commercial projects do not establish a particularly close alliance, while small bilateral trade does not establish political distance.

Sources

Cooperation

Education and development programmes and business presence underpin concrete cooperation with Congo-Brazzaville. It is not confused with the Democratic Republic of the Congo; budget support and political visits also do not alone imply a particularly close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Romania

Industry and economy plus education and politics give bilateral partnership substance. Collaboration predominates, not exclusively historical friendship or Europe implying highest closeness.

Sources

Mixed relationship

France and Rwanda

French cooperation in health, education and climate continues alongside substantive disagreements over Rwandan support for M23 in Congo. France supports targeted European measures and a review of the minerals agreement; no claim is made that all bilateral aid has been cancelled.

Sources

French Senate — government response · 2026-06-04

Insufficient information

France and St. Kitts & Nevis

The sources describe climate contacts and a geothermal project, but do not sufficiently establish its implementation or the current breadth of the bilateral relationship. An energy proposal is not presented as an operational supply, nor is neutrality inferred from missing data.

Sources

Cooperation

French industry and scientific and educational exchanges give substance to political cooperation. Cooperation predominates without European policy differences automatically becoming rupture or shared institutions implying maximum closeness.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Slovenia

Recent political contacts and industrial ties, especially automotive, provide substantive relations. Cooperation predominates, without EU membership or official visits alone establishing an exceptional alliance across every area.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-14

Cooperation

France and Solomon Islands

Kiwa environmental projects and scientific and heritage cooperation provide concrete ties in the Pacific. Sector-specific cooperation is recognised, without ignoring historical diplomatic differences or attributing programmes funded with other partners exclusively to France.

Sources

Insufficient information

France and Somalia

The located profile describes aid and international mechanisms mainly through old references, some reorganised. Current evidence is insufficient to classify overall ties; operations against armed groups are not French hostility towards the Somali state.

Sources

Cooperation

France and South Africa

Business ties and economic and development cooperation provide a relationship with practical substance. Cooperation predominates, without turning company counts cited in earlier years into current statistics or inferring complete political alignment from trade.

Sources

Cooperation

France and South Korea

Scientific and technological cooperation and industrial and educational exchanges give substance to political dialogue. Broad cooperation predominates, without the global partnership designation or the presence of large companies alone proving a particularly close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

France and South Sudan

Available bilateral information focuses on contacts and support for peace processes in earlier years. It does not sufficiently establish the relationship’s current character; internal crisis and limited exchanges are not automatically interpreted as hostility towards France.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Sri Lanka

Maritime cooperation and educational and cultural exchanges provide concrete ties strengthened by recent coordination mechanisms. Cooperation predominates without assistance or training being a general military alliance or complete foreign policy alignment.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-15

Insufficient information

France and Sudan

The available profiles do not allow a confident assessment of current relations amid civil war and institutional fragmentation. Humanitarian assistance is not a state alliance, and the actions of different armed forces are not simply attributed to Sudan as a whole.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Suriname

Police cooperation and border ties with French Guiana provide everyday civilian and economic cooperation. Practical relations predominate without all territorial delimitation sections being definitively settled or neighbourliness implying a military alliance.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-09

Cooperation

France and Sweden

Innovation, climate and economic cooperation accompany European political coordination. Cooperation predominates without green plans being fully implemented or shared institutions and priorities implying no disagreements or automatically maximum closeness.

Sources

Close cooperation

France and Switzerland

Cross-border mobility and transport, health and economic coordination create very intensive everyday relations. Civilian and institutional ties underpin closeness despite tax and administrative issues; the whole Swiss–European negotiation is not declared concluded.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Syria

Reopened dialogue after Assad’s fall and civilian and chemical weapons elimination cooperation mark a new cooperative relationship. Conditions and transition concerns persist; the previous regime’s classification is not automatically transferred to the new authorities.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-08-21

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-07-09

Cooperation

Energy and services business ties and civilian exchanges provide concrete cooperation. Cooperation predominates without commercial presence implying broad political alignment or every digital or infrastructure project being regarded as implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Tunisia

Economic, educational and development exchanges sustain substantive relations despite political differences. Cooperation predominates without history automatically implying maximum closeness or bilateral work endorsing every Tunisian authority decision.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Türkiye

Economic exchanges and bilateral cooperation retain substantive content despite regional disagreements. Cooperation predominates, without automatically projecting earlier crises onto the present or considering every difference between Paris and Ankara resolved.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Turkmenistan

Political dialogue and archaeological, cultural and educational ties provide concrete areas of cooperation. Limited cooperation is recognised, without confusing Turkmenistan’s neutrality principle with an absence of ties or inferring a broad alliance from official visits.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-05

Insufficient information

France and Tuvalu

The sources record climate contacts and a maritime delimitation agreement, but few current examples of sustained bilateral cooperation. They do not allow the overall relationship to be confidently classified; maritime proximity or limited trade is not interpreted as neutrality.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-04-03

Cooperation

France and Uganda

Water, sanitation and energy cooperation provide practical ties alongside institutional and military training. Cooperation predominates, without oil investments establishing complete political alignment or old contracts being presented as newly confirmed deliveries.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Ukraine

French political support accompanies humanitarian aid and economic and reconstruction programmes. Substantive cooperation with Ukraine predominates; future contracts are distinguished from delivered equipment, and support is not confused with a direct war between France and Russia.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-07-21

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-09-02

Close cooperation

University, development and disaster-response cooperation provides concrete ties in the Pacific. Cooperation predominates, without erasing differences over French territorial issues or attributing initiatives funded by several partners exclusively to France.

Sources

Cooperation

France and Vatican City

Diplomatic dialogue on international crises and cultural and heritage ties underpin a cooperative relationship. The Holy See is not treated as a commercial or military power, nor is an exceptional alliance inferred solely from shared religious history.

Sources

France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-08-24

Insufficient information

Agronomic research and educational and cultural cooperation provide concrete collaboration. Limited cooperation is recognised without old aid amounts being current figures or French teaching being a broad political alliance.

Sources

Institutional source: moin.gov.gm

Cooperation

Gabon and Gambia

The joint communiqué sets political, economic, social and technical cooperation. Planned sectors and investment opportunities are not completed projects or close alliance.

Sources

The Malagasy presidency’s working visit to Gabon in June 2026 included institutional exchanges on the transition and offers of support. It supports concrete political cooperation, without demonstrating broad economic integration or endorsing domestic processes.

Sources

Gambia and Guinea

The presidential visit in September 2026 culminated in bilateral talks and a joint communiqué to strengthen cooperation. An intergovernmental understanding agenda predominates; the meeting is not presented as a close alliance or proof every initiative was implemented.

Sources

Institutional source: www.op.gov.gm

Mixed relationship

Gambia and Guinea-Bissau

The cooperation agreements of September 2025 coexist with Gambia’s condemnation of the subsequent military coup in Guinea-Bissau. The relationship is assessed as mixed, without assuming all agreements were cancelled or that criticism of the change of government means hostility towards the population.

Sources

Presidency of The Gambia

The Gambia Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Presidency of The Gambia

The Gambia Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The 2026 diplomatic-representation dialogue documents mobility and shared-issue coordination. Moderate cooperation is not strategic partnership inferred solely from one ambassador's regional role.

Sources

Sources

Government of Georgia

Insufficient information

Georgia and Belize

The bilateral information gathered on Georgia and Belize is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Georgia and Benin

The bilateral information gathered on Georgia and Benin is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Georgia and Bhutan

The bilateral information gathered on Georgia and Bhutan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Georgia and Bolivia

The September 2026 ministerial contact reviews the bilateral relationship and ways to develop cooperation with Bolivia. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Georgia

Cooperation

Georgia and Botswana

The January 2026 meeting examines areas of bilateral cooperation with Botswana. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

UN coordination, tourism and economic agreements sustain Belize cooperation. Exchanges are modest; historical diplomatic recognition alone is not close-alliance evidence.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-13

Cooperation

Germany and Benin

Public-service, energy, water and training programmes maintain substantial development cooperation. Trade remains small, so collaboration is not described as broad economic integration.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-06-02

Cooperation

Education institutions, development programmes and trade maintain El Salvador collaboration. Practical ties are neither approval of all domestic policies nor a security alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2024-10-25

Insufficient information

Regional development programmes and institutional contacts maintain Eswatini cooperation. Trade is modest and some collaboration passes through the EU and region, not solely intergovernmental agreements.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-27

Cooperation

Germany and Ethiopia

Development channels and political dialogue maintain Ethiopia collaboration after Tigray. Resumed contacts resolve neither every human-rights issue nor attribution of Ethiopian regional disputes to Germany.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-04

Cooperation

Germany and Fiji

German climate-cooperation projects and diplomatic channels sustain Fiji ties. Some collaboration is regional, distinct from a defence alliance or especially intensive trade relationship.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-04-14

Close cooperation

Germany and Finland

Parliamentary work, economic exchanges and numerous university partnerships maintain broad Finland cooperation. Current operational ties, not only historical precedents, support the category.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-19

Germany's Federal Foreign Office

Cooperation

Germany and Gabon

Medical research and scientific and environmental exchanges maintain Gabon cooperation. No general bilateral development programme does not mean no collaboration or interstate hostility.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-02-27

Cooperation

Germany and Gambia

Police training and democratic institutional support maintain Gambia collaboration. Trade remains small; practical cooperation is not a presumed broad economic or military alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-11-03

Strained relationship

Germany and Georgia

Reduced authority cooperation and suspended projects over democratic deterioration shape Georgia ties. Germany maintains sovereignty and civil-society support, which does not remove government restrictions.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2024-10-30

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-10-02

Cooperation

Germany and Ghana

Development, university exchanges and economic and defence channels maintain broad Ghana collaboration. Concrete mechanisms and activities explain closeness, not an exclusive alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-22

Close cooperation

Germany and Greece

The bilateral action plan, economic work and cultural and youth programmes sustain broad Greece cooperation. Current activity is distinct from historical disputes, not described as current rupture.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-03-14

Cooperation

Germany and Grenada

Climate collaboration and education and development projects maintain Grenada cooperation. Trade is small; positive ties are neither a close alliance nor intensive economic integration.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-09-22

Cooperation

Germany and Guatemala

Development programmes, trade and cultural cooperation maintain practical Guatemala ties. Continuity rests on current activities, not only diplomatic history.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-11

Cooperation

Germany and Guinea

Raw-material trade and continuing education and health projects maintain Guinea channels. Gradual bilateral programme withdrawal is German reorganisation, not automatically coup sanctions.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-11-03

Cooperation

Sanctions and nuclear and human-rights disputes limit Iran relations. Diplomatic channels do not erase restrictions; regional conflicts alone do not make Germany directly at war with Iran.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-05

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-06-25

Cooperation

Germany and Iraq

Stabilisation, development and employment programmes and institutional contacts maintain Iraq collaboration. Assistance and training are distinct from exclusive alliance or endorsement of all armed actors.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-02-18

Close cooperation

Germany and Ireland

The bilateral action plan, European political coordination and economic and education ties maintain broad Ireland cooperation. Closeness rests on effective mechanisms, not just a trust declaration.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-12

Cooperation

Germany and Israel

Political, scientific and economic ties sustain Israel cooperation alongside German Gaza and settlement criticism. The export restriction announced in August 2025 was lifted in November, not a current general ban.

Berlin-led diplomacy and stabilisation programmes maintain Libya collaboration. Rival authorities mean the category implies neither alliance with all nor their fighting constituting war with Germany.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-03

Cooperation

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-29

Cooperation

Germany and Micronesia

Climate programmes and multilateral channels maintain Micronesia collaboration. Much support uses regional and European projects, not described as a bilateral security alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-19

Cooperation

Germany and Moldova

Institutional support, investment and trade maintain Moldova cooperation. Germany supports stability and European rapprochement, not a claimed achieved Transnistria-conflict solution.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-12-17

Insufficient information

Suspended new development commitments over eastern Congo conflict limit a key Rwanda cooperation channel. Health projects and cultural ties continue, not lifting of that restriction.

Sources

Economic chains, political contacts and social ties sustain substantive cooperation with Turkey. Problems involving detentions and restrictions affecting German citizens coexist with this cooperation; this significant friction prevents the overall relationship from being described as tension-free.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-03-05

Cooperation

Germany and Turkmenistan

Political consultations and economic and educational exchanges maintain cooperation with Turkmenistan. Its neutrality and domestic positions are not confused with automatic alignment with Germany or a military alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-10-08

Cooperation

Germany and Tuvalu

Climate projects, digital heritage preservation and joint sea-level-rise work maintain Tuvalu collaboration. Much support is regional; small trade does not erase concrete activity.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-05-07

Cooperation

Germany and Uganda

Energy, agriculture and water projects and development channels maintain Uganda collaboration. Refugee assistance complements ties, without approving all government policies.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-03-07

Cooperation

Germany and Ukraine

Political, military and financial support and reconstruction programmes maintain substantive Ukraine collaboration. Support means neither direct Germany–Russia war nor guaranteed implementation of every planned project.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-04-07

Government of Germany

Cooperation

Germany and United Arab Emirates

Economic exchanges and the energy and climate partnership maintain collaboration with the United Arab Emirates. Recent political contacts add continuity, without treating all expansion projects as already completed.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-03-12

Close cooperation

Germany and United Kingdom

Security collaboration, economic exchanges and education and cultural ties sustain broad UK relations. The 2025 bilateral treaty strengthens the framework; Brexit is not a cooperation rupture.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-04

Cooperation

Germany and Uruguay

Economic exchange, vocational training and agricultural and cultural ties maintain Uruguay collaboration. Provisional application of parts of EU–Mercosur is not full execution of all commitments.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-09-14

Cooperation

Germany and Uzbekistan

Economic and education channels and the mobility agreement maintain Uzbekistan collaboration. Political consultations sustain ties, without identical foreign positions or guaranteed full implementation of every commitment.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-10-08

Cooperation

Germany and Vanuatu

Climate, biodiversity and development projects maintain collaboration with Vanuatu. Some support is regional and European; the category implies neither intensive trade ties nor a defence alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2026-03-20

Cooperation

Germany and Vatican City

Engagement on peace, migration and climate maintains Holy See collaboration. This diplomatic relationship is distinguished from everyone's religious beliefs and is not a military or economic alliance.

Sources

Germany's Federal Foreign Office · 2025-03-11

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece

Insufficient information

The bilateral information gathered on Ghana and Afghanistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ghana and Andorra

The bilateral information gathered on Ghana and Andorra is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ghana and Angola

The diplomatic contact of January 2026 maintains dialogue between governments and agrees on cooperation in matters of shared interest. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The February 2026 ministerial visit seeks to strengthen the relationship between the two neighbours and expand bilateral cooperation. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Ghana

Cooperation

Ghana and Burundi

The September 2025 meeting maintains cooperation and dialogue on international affairs, including the Human Rights Council. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The 2022 consultation memorandum complements bilateral collaboration described in the official profile. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The relationship includes ship registry-related maritime cooperation and diplomatic collaboration, according to the official profile. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Greece and Libya

Diplomatic dialogue coexists with disagreements over maritime and hydrocarbon agreements with Turkey. One government’s decisions are not attributed to all Libyan factions. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; specific friction is not hostility in every area.

Sources

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Greece

Close cooperation

Grenada and St. Lucia

Sources

Close cooperation

Grenada and St. Vincent & Grenadines

Sources

Trinidad and Tobago Ministry of Finance

Grenada and Suriname share economic mechanisms and documented 2026 diplomatic coordination. This is institutional cooperation, not a close alliance or an unquantified bilateral trade volume.

Sources

Official documents record Grenada–Trinidad and Tobago energy and trade cooperation. Agreements and plans are distinct from executed projects, not all investment challenges resolved.

Sources

Government of Trinidad and Tobago

Guinea and Marshall Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Guinea and Marshall Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Guinea and Mauritania

Shared water and energy management, with joint June 2026 decisions, provides concrete cooperation. Guinea is distinguished from Guinea-Bissau; agreed projects are not all completed infrastructure.

Sources

Institutional source: www.slena.gov.sl

CARICOM Secretariat

Sources

The September 2026 diplomatic contact reaffirms regular political dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Documented agreements address tourism, the economy and the defence industry without demonstrating agreement on every European issue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Hungary and Ghana

The 2023 joint commission provides a framework for economic and technical collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The joint economic commission and bilateral agreements maintain a foundation for institutional collaboration. Historical continuity does not allow all recent initiatives to be treated as realised.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Azerbaijan

The bilateral information gathered on India and Azerbaijan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

India and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on India and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Bahrain

Political, economic and community ties sustain cooperative relations. The Indian population’s presence provides societal context without by itself demonstrating a defence alliance.

Sources

The diplomatic profile describes affinity and contacts but provides a limited, old foundation for assessing current ties. Shared Commonwealth membership is insufficient to assign close cooperation.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Benin

The available source highlights political affinity and historical UN support, with old coverage. There is no sufficiently clear basis on current practical cooperation to classify relations.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Bolivia

Diplomatic dialogue and training cooperation sustain collaborative ties. The announced credit line is distinguished from funded or completed projects.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral information gathered on India and Bosnia & Herzegovina is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Economic collaboration and political contacts continue bilateral ties. The expansion agenda in science, education and agriculture is not confused with realised projects.

Sources

Insufficient information

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Cuba

The consulted profile highlights historical affinity, but its old coverage is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. Relations are not assumed to reproduce Cuba’s ties with other countries.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Cyprus

Diplomatic support on Cyprus and institutional exchanges maintain sustained collaboration. Political affinity does not imply a military alliance or sharing every regional disagreement.

Sources

Indian business investment and economic and energy dialogue sustain practical collaboration. Political contacts do not equate to complete agreement on every European issue.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Iceland

Dialogue on geothermal energy, fishing and Arctic issues sustains sectoral collaboration. Discussed areas are distinguished from projects whose implementation was already confirmed.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Indonesia

The bilateral information gathered on India and Indonesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Iran

Economic, consular and security consultations maintain collaborative relations. International restrictions may limit projects without automatically making India Iran’s adversary.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on India and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

India and Ireland

The available source mainly provides historical and societal ties. There is no sufficiently current foundation to assess practical cooperation and possible differences across the bilateral relationship.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Israel

The strategic partnership and political contacts provide cooperation grounding. Assessment neither implies Indian support for every Israeli government action nor removes Palestinian institutional relations.

Sources

Cooperation

The consulted profile has old coverage and mainly highlights diplomatic precedents. It is insufficient to assess practical collaboration and possible tensions in current relations.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Kazakhstan

Diplomatic support expressed during a 2022 crisis provides historical context, not a sufficient assessment of current ties. Strategic closeness is not inferred from that isolated declaration.

Sources

India’s UNIFIL contribution provides institutional support for Lebanon’s stability. The peace mission is not confused with Hezbollah support or a bilateral military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Lesotho

Educational and agricultural contacts and institutional capacity collaboration sustain limited ties. Documented meetings do not guarantee implementation of every debated initiative.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Liberia

Diplomatic dialogue and joint work on environmental initiatives provide a cooperative foundation. Multilateral participation is not interpreted as a security alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Libya

Training Libyan financial personnel provides a concrete collaboration area. This is limited technical cooperation without attributing alignment to every authority or faction in the country.

Sources

Insufficient information

The bilateral information gathered on India and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Malawi

Scholarships and training for Malawian professionals and defence personnel show sustained collaboration. Capacity assistance does not imply complete agreement on international policy.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Malaysia

The consulted source records a visit and historical cultural activities but is insufficient to assess current ties. Classification needs a broader foundation than that rapprochement.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Maldives

Cooperation in development and humanitarian services predominates. The bilateral group seeks to maintain medical-evacuation platforms and implement projects; these negotiations do not mean all differences are settled or all works completed.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Mali

The bilateral information gathered on India and Mali is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Maritime security, development and training cooperation combines with diplomatic coordination and strong societal ties. Breadth sustains closeness without every new project treated as implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Mexico

Political dialogue and economic exchanges sustain collaborative ties. Working towards a strategic partnership does not mean a broad alliance already exists.

Sources

Insufficient information

The bilateral information gathered on India and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Nigeria

Sustained political contacts and South–South collaboration support institutional cooperation. Population size or political system comparisons do not determine the category or demonstrate a close alliance.

Sources

India's Asunción embassy opening and ministerial exchanges expanded diplomacy. Limited cooperation is not a new representation implying close alliance or already completed major projects.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Peru

The bilateral agenda covers trade and health and energy collaboration. Trade-treaty talks support rapprochement, but are not counted as operating free trade or completed investments.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Philippines

Defence cooperation is a documented pillar alongside political and economic dialogue. This is more than trade alone, without military alliance or agreement on every controversy assumed.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Poland

The bilateral information gathered on India and São Tomé & Príncipe is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Saudi Arabia

The Strategic Partnership Council coordinates bilateral politics and economy. Institutional cooperation is supported, but investment and security goals are not completed investment or mutual defence.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Senegal

Assistance and technical training, including Senegalese officials' language training, document practical cooperation. New offered places are distinct from completed courses, not a political or military alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Serbia

The bilateral information gathered on India and Serbia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Seychelles

The bilateral profile records Seychelles development and security cooperation. Relations are cooperative; sectoral collaboration or expansion announcements are not proof of the closest alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

India and Sierra Leone

The bilateral information gathered on India and Sierra Leone is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Singapore

Relations have a broad cooperation and dialogue agenda beyond mere trade. Strategic partnership names a bilateral framework; the designation alone is not used to assign the highest level.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Slovakia

The business forum held during the 2025 presidential visit and cultural exchanges support economic and social cooperation. Concrete activity is insufficient for a close alliance or reciprocal defence commitments.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Slovenia

Insufficient information

India and Thailand

The bilateral information gathered on India and Thailand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

India and Timor-Leste

The bilateral information gathered on India and Timor-Leste is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

India and Togo

Institutional training and a Togolese parliamentary delegation's 2024 study visit support concrete collaboration. This bilateral tie implies neither ideological affinity nor assessment of Togo's political system.

Sources

Cooperation

India and Tonga

Technical training and institutional exchanges provide limited cooperation. Historical royal-family contacts are not evidence of an especially close current alliance or defence commitments.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Argentina

The 2026 Argentine authority contacts maintain Indonesia dialogue. Relations are cooperative, though the anniversary and deepening wishes do not prove an especially intensive alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Armenia

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Armenia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Austria

The 2025 bilateral consultations maintain Indonesia–Austria collaboration. Cooperation in priority sectors supports constructive ties without assuming all objectives implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Belarus

The 2026 joint commission sustains Indonesia–Belarus collaboration. Other countries' sanctions are not automatically transferred to this relationship, and its strategic designation does not imply a close alliance.

Sources

Cultural cooperation and Bulgarian authority dialogue maintain Indonesia ties. Continuity gives substance, though expansion opportunities do not prove an exceptional political alliance.

Sources

Indonesia and Chile maintain economic cooperation and negotiate expanding their trade framework. The 2025 dialogue supports collaboration without presenting negotiations as a concluded agreement in force.

Sources

The interfaith dialogue held in 2026 provides a concrete cooperation initiative between Indonesia and Denmark. Social and institutional collaboration alone does not imply a close political or defence alliance.

Sources

The 2026 ministerial dialogue maintains Indonesia–Egypt political, trade and societal collaboration. Visits then planned are not presented as held without further confirmation.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and El Salvador

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and El Salvador is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Equatorial Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Equatorial Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Political dialogue and parliamentary and cultural collaboration sustain ties between Indonesia and Georgia. These contacts support a cooperative assessment but do not, by themselves, justify the highest level of closeness.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Ghana

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Ghana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Greece

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Greece is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Grenada

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Grenada is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Guatemala

The 2026 foreign ministry dialogue maintains the Indonesia–Guatemala cooperative agenda. Engagement is constructive without an intention to expand relations equating to a consolidated partnership.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Iceland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Iran

The 2026 ministerial contacts maintain friendly Indonesia–Iran relations and a cooperative agenda. Iran's tensions elsewhere are not automatically transferred here or proof of a military alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Indonesia and Israel

Indonesia condemns Israeli policies in Palestinian territories and demands diplomatic measures. Opposition gravely conditions Israel ties without demonstrating bilateral armed hostilities.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Côte d’Ivoire

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Jamaica

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Jamaica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Jordan

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Jordan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Kazakhstan

Political contacts in 2025 seek to expand cooperation between Indonesia and Kazakhstan. Dialogue is constructive without presenting examined economic opportunities as implemented projects.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Kenya

Political dialogue, educational exchanges and the economic agenda sustain Indonesia–Kenya collaboration. Trade and investment negotiations are distinguished from concluded agreements.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Latvia

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Latvia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Lebanon

The 2026 humanitarian dialogue gives Indonesia–Lebanon substance. It concerns institutions and assistance, not automatic closeness to every Lebanese armed group.

Sources

Institutional contacts in 2025 maintain Indonesia–Mauritius dialogue and collaboration. The orientation is cooperative without confusing expansion possibilities with implemented projects.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Micronesia

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Micronesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Moldova

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Moldova is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Mongolia

The 2026 political consultations complement Indonesia–Mongolia trade exchanges. Ties are cooperative without a diplomatic commemoration alone proving a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and North Macedonia

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and North Macedonia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Norway

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Norway is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Oman

Ministerial contacts in 2026 maintain Indonesia–Oman dialogue on bilateral and regional affairs. Cooperation predominates without establishing a close alliance or realised investments.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Pakistan

Trade and coordination in international organisations sustain Indonesia–Pakistan cooperation. These are concrete ties without automatically transferring Pakistan’s other neighbour disputes to this pair.

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Peru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Philippines

The 2026 joint commission sustains trade and energy cooperation between Indonesia and the Philippines. Ties are constructive without automatically treating new critical minerals proposals as implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Poland

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Poland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Portugal

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Portugal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Qatar

The first political consultations in 2026 create a more structured dialogue framework between Indonesia and Qatar. They support cooperation while distinguishing the new agenda from verified results.

Sources

The August 2026 investment memorandum expands Indonesia–Saudi Arabia cooperation. Signature is not realised new investment or a defence alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Senegal

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Senegal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Serbia

The 2025 political dialogue maintains Indonesia–Serbia collaboration. Willingness to increase contacts supports cooperation but does not alone demonstrate an especially close bilateral partnership.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Sudan

The 2026 humanitarian coordination provides collaboration between Indonesia and Sudanese institutions. Sudan's internal war is neither a bilateral war nor an automatic reason for a hostile classification.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Suriname

Historical ties are complemented by academic activities and institutional cooperation between Indonesia and Suriname. Current collaboration provides more grounding than cultural affinity alone.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Sweden

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Sweden is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Syria

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Syria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Tajikistan

Contacts in 2026 maintain the cooperative Indonesia–Tajikistan agenda. Plans to expand regional collaboration or open representation are not presented as implemented decisions.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Tanzania

Agricultural mechanisms and economic dialogue sustain Indonesia–Tanzania cooperation. The source combines history and planned projects; planned projects are not considered realised investments.

Sources

Cooperation

Indonesia and Thailand

The 2025 joint commission maintains an active Indonesia–Thailand collaboration mechanism. Cooperation predominates without attributing Thailand’s third-country conflicts to this relationship.

Sources

The 2026 political consultations create a cooperative agenda between Indonesia and Turkmenistan. Regional proposals reflect intent to collaborate, not agreements implemented across all areas.

Sources

United Nations · Digital Library

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Tuvalu

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Tuvalu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Uganda

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Uganda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Ukraine

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Ukraine is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and United Arab Emirates

The economic agreement signed between Indonesia and the UAE provides a concrete framework for trade cooperation. The documented signature is distinguished from entry into force and from investments or benefits not yet verified.

Sources

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Yemen

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Yemen is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Indonesia and Zambia

The bilateral information gathered on Indonesia and Zambia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Indonesia and Zimbabwe

Agriculture, scholarships and trade give substance to Indonesia–Zimbabwe ties. Collaboration predominates without a diplomatic reception being the category’s sole basis.

Sources

Insufficient information

Iran and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Iran and Israel

After the regional war, Israeli opposition to Iran and mediation to contain escalation persist. Hostility is severe, but sources do not establish active bilateral fighting on review day. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Iran and Côte d’Ivoire

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Iran and Jamaica

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Jamaica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Iran and Jordan

The UAE alleged Iranian attacks on Jordan in July 2026. The official allegation demonstrates serious security disagreement, not independent evidence of still-active hostilities. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Oman Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Iran and Kazakhstan

The January 2026 consultations follow up presidential agreements and address transport, trade and political dialogue. Pending plans are not presented as implemented results. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Government of Kazakhstan

Insufficient information

Iran and Kenya

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Kenya is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Iran and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Iran and Kuwait

The Emirati communiqué of July 2026 denounces Iranian attacks against Kuwait. The classification reflects this security friction, without claiming fighting remains active today. These differences constrain ties, without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Cooperation

Iran and Oman

Visits and joint communiqués in June and August 2026 show diplomatic cooperation and work on navigation in Hormuz; the permanent corridor remains a proposal. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sweden applies Iran restrictions under its official sanctions framework, including human rights measures. This is not a complete rupture of contacts. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Insufficient information

Iran and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on Iran and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Iran and Syria

Syria’s new government demands Iranian respect for sovereignty and reconsideration of support for Assad’s regime, according to a September 2026 official statement. The old alliance is not maintained unchanged. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Syrian Arab News Agency

Cooperation

Iran and Tajikistan

The September 2026 ministerial meeting addresses trade, economic and cultural cooperation, showing continuity in bilateral dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation in 2026 on the energy transition complements political dialogue; the future 2027 meeting is not presented as already held. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Regular political contacts complement joint governance, food security and youth programmes. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

The 2026 dialogue on European affairs complements a bilateral agreement on cooperation against crime. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Israel and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Israel and Bahrain

The July 2026 conversation with Bahrain’s king reaffirms continuing diplomatic contacts following the Abraham Accords. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The restoration of relations with Bolivia in December 2025 is accompanied by new high-level contacts in 2026. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Israel and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Bosnia & Herzegovina is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Israel and Botswana

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Israel and Brunei

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Brunei is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Israel and Bulgaria

Agreements and institutional contacts sustain bilateral collaboration with Bulgaria in civilian areas. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2023 water resources agreement provides a concrete collaboration area with the Dominican Republic. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Israel and Finland

Finland diplomatic ties coexist with September 2026 criticism of settlement expansion and West Bank violence. Cooperation and disagreement coexist; one friction is not hostility everywhere.

Sources

Cooperation

Israel and Gabon

Official contacts and the health and energy agenda provide a collaboration foundation with Gabon. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The peace treaty and dialogue with Jordan continue, but issues concerning Jerusalem and Israeli actions have prompted recent diplomatic protests. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; a specific friction is not interpreted as hostility in every area.

Sources

Jordan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Israel and Kazakhstan

Institutional contacts and the cooperation declaration maintain a bilateral agenda with Kazakhstan. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Israel and Kenya

Political dialogue and sectoral cooperation provide a collaborative foundation with Kenya. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Diplomatic dialogue with Liberia includes international support and an agenda to maintain bilateral ties. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Israel and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Israel and Mongolia

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Mongolia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Israel and Montenegro

Collaboration with Montenegro covers the economy, tourism and culture alongside diplomatic dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Israel and Morocco

Diplomatic normalisation and sectoral contacts maintain a bilateral agenda with Morocco. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Israel and Norway

Economic relations with Norway continue, but Oslo has taken measures against extremist settlers and maintains political differences concerning the Palestinian territories. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; a specific friction is not interpreted as hostility in every area.

Sources

High-level contacts in September 2026 maintain a positive diplomatic agenda with Paraguay. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Israel and Peru

The water management memorandum offers a concrete area of technical collaboration with Peru. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Israel and Philippines

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Philippines is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Israel and Poland

Polish trade, culture and education cooperation coexists with 2026 diplomatic criticism of West Bank settlements and violence. Cooperation and disagreement coexist, not hostility in every field.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Israel and Portugal

Portugal research and culture agreements coexist with recent political differences on the West Bank and two-state solution. Cooperation and disagreement coexist; specific friction is not all-field hostility.

Sources

Strained relationship

Israel and Qatar

Israel's September 2025 Qatar attack, for which it expressed regret over a Qatari victim, severely damaged diplomatic trust. Differences shape relations without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Insufficient information

Israel and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Israel and Romania

Trade, cultural and defence ties sustain bilateral collaboration with Romania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Israel and Rwanda

The joint horticultural centre provides a concrete agricultural collaboration project with Rwanda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Israel and St. Kitts & Nevis

Contacts in September 2026 and the opening of an embassy mark a new bilateral rapprochement with Slovenia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Israel and Tunisia

The bilateral information gathered on Israel and Tunisia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Israel and Turkmenistan

The investment protection agreement provides an economic collaboration framework with Turkmenistan. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Italy applies European Belarus restrictions over domestic conditions and participation in aggression against Ukraine. Sanctions shape relations, not direct military hostilities.

Sources

Close cooperation

Italy and Belgium

Italy–Belgium relations combine European and Atlantic collaboration with political, economic and cultural ties. This sustained breadth supports high closeness without presupposing agreement on every international crisis.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Congo - Kinshasa is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Italy and Ecuador

Trade and the January 2026 ministerial contact support Italy–Ecuador collaboration. Intentions to expand energy, tourism and defence do not prove every project implemented.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Italy and Egypt

Italy and Egypt maintain important economic cooperation and Mediterranean coordination. Italian diplomacy itself acknowledges Giulio Regeni's murder still burdens relations: collaboration and a serious dispute coexist.

Sources

Insufficient information

Italy and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Italy and Israel

Economic and institutional cooperation between Italy and Israel coexists with disagreements over Gaza and the protection of Italian citizens. The flotilla incidents require caution: allegations still being verified are not presented as facts proven in court.

Sources

Italy and North Korea

Italy participates in international monitoring of North Korea sanctions and denounces evasion mechanisms. Restrictions and security disagreements dominate, but do not demonstrate bilateral war.

Sources

Trade, cultural and scientific agreements provide an Italy–Panama collaboration framework. They support cooperation but do not imply all historical mechanisms remain equally active.

Sources

Italian development cooperation and Senegalese diaspora ties sustain friendly relations. The profile supports continuing collaboration without equating societal closeness with defence alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Italy and Serbia

Bilateral partnership and Italian support for Serbia's European integration maintain significant collaboration. Strategic-partner designation alone is not proof of close cooperation across all fields.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Suriname is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Close cooperation

Italy and Sweden

Italy and Sweden combine European political coordination with industrial, scientific and academic cooperation. Documented breadth and continuity support closeness beyond mere EU or NATO membership.

Sources

Insufficient information

Italy and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Italy and Syria

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Syria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Italy and Tajikistan

The 2024–2027 cultural, scientific and technological programme establishes Italy–Tajikistan collaboration. Its validity supports cooperation but does not demonstrate all planned activities implemented.

Sources

Mediterranean proximity and political, economic and cultural ties sustain Italy–Tunisia collaboration. Cooperation is significant without interpreting shared interests as no disagreements.

Sources

Insufficient information

Italy and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Italy and Tuvalu

The bilateral information gathered on Italy and Tuvalu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Italy and Uganda

Italy cooperates with Uganda on development and humanitarian response, alongside a longstanding bilateral framework. Refugee support is not confused with unconditional endorsement of Uganda's government policies.

Sources

Close cooperation

Italy and Ukraine

Italy provides political and multidimensional support to Ukraine against Russia's invasion, alongside bilateral and European cooperation. This sustained involvement supports closeness, without meaning that Italy is a direct belligerent.

Sources

The 2026 joint economic commission confirms an active trade-dialogue mechanism between Italy and Vietnam. Cooperation predominates, with a more concrete institutional foundation than a simple friendship declaration.

Sources

Cooperation

Italy and Yemen

Italy's training of Yemeni diplomats provides concrete institutional cooperation. It concerns recognised-state engagement, not closeness to Houthis or all Yemeni actors.

Sources

Cooperation

Italy and Zambia

Italy and Zambia collaborate in the economy, culture and development within Italian African priorities. Announced railway commitments are distinguished from implemented investments or verified results.

Sources

Official contacts in 2025 address bilateral cooperation and the development of energy-sector ties with Gambia. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Political dialogue and the bilateral partnership framework with Denmark sustain institutional cooperation without the title determining maximum closeness. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Djibouti

Aid and technical cooperation with Djibouti form a documented development collaboration foundation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Egypt is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and El Salvador

Assistance and technical training with El Salvador sustain development cooperation without attributing all historical results to the present. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Equatorial Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Equatorial Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Japan and Eritrea

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Eritrea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Estonia

Dialogue and collaboration in information technology and cybersecurity provide a sectoral foundation for cooperation with Estonia. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Eswatini

Recorded loans, grants and technical programmes with Eswatini show a history of cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Bilateral agreements and cultural collaboration with Greece provide a cooperative foundation alongside political contacts. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Grenada

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Grenada is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Guatemala

Collaboration with Guatemala includes technical and cultural assistance and development financing. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Ministerial contacts and the Hungarian consulate’s opening in Osaka in 2025 support institutional collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The military logistics support agreement and the 2026 economic security consultations provide collaboration with Italy. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Côte d’Ivoire

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Jamaica

Financial, technical and cultural assistance with Jamaica supports a cooperative history without attributing cumulative totals to the present. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Jordan

Technical assistance and documented bilateral agreements with Jordan support practical and diplomatic cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Kazakhstan

Financial aid and technical assistance with Kazakhstan sustain documented cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Kenya

Japan and Malawi

Financial and technical assistance with Malawi supports development collaboration beyond trade. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Nauru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Nepal

Aid and the Japanese support team responding to the September 2026 floods support cooperation with Nepal. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Netherlands

The military logistical support agreement and political and social exchanges provide collaboration with the Netherlands. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and New Zealand

Economic and security collaboration with New Zealand is accompanied by educational exchanges such as the JET programme. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Nicaragua

Aid and technical training with Nicaragua document collaboration without transferring its disputes with third countries to Japan. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Niger

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Nigeria

Financing and technical cooperation with Nigeria sustain development collaboration; this assessment does not concern Niger. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Strained relationship

Japan and North Korea

Cyber-threat measures and Japanese security coordination against North Korea show predominant tension. Threats or cooperation with other governments alone do not establish ongoing bilateral war.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and North Macedonia

The Zletovica water project and technical assistance provide a concrete foundation for collaboration with North Macedonia. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Norway

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Norway is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Oman

Documented technical collaboration with Oman complements energy and economic ties. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Pakistan

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Pakistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Palau

Financial and technical assistance with Palau forms a foundation for cooperation, although the cited amounts refer to earlier years. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Palestine

Humanitarian aid and medical evacuations from Gaza to Japan document cooperation with Palestinians without identifying them with an armed group. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Panama

Aid and technical assistance with Panama provide a cooperative foundation alongside economic ties. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Papua New Guinea

The 2025 security assistance agreement and ministerial dialogue provide a foundation for collaboration with Papua New Guinea. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Portugal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Japan and Qatar

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Qatar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Japan and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Japan and Romania

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Romania is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Rwanda

Educational and development collaboration with Rwanda provides a cooperative foundation without automatically transferring its disputes with third-party governments. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Political coordination and sectoral collaboration with Saudi Arabia complement the energy relationship; historical projects are not new investments. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Senegal

Financial and technical assistance with Senegal shows a cooperative foundation without turning cumulative totals into new contributions. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Serbia

The investment agreement’s entry into force in July 2026 provides an economic framework for cooperation with Serbia. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Seychelles

Collaboration in maritime policing and fishing ports documents practical cooperation with Seychelles. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Japan and South Sudan

Financial and technical assistance with South Sudan forms a cooperative foundation; it is not confused with Sudan. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Sri Lanka

Development finance and technical assistance with Sri Lanka document cooperation without attributing historical cumulative totals to the present. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Sudan

Dialogue with Trinidad and Tobago records cooperation in energy, disaster management and water; objectives are not treated as implemented. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Tunisia

Assistance policy and scholarships for Tunisian students provide technical and educational cooperation with Tunisia. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Türkiye

Economic partnership negotiations with Türkiye reflect a collaboration agenda without treating a treaty the source describes as under negotiation as in force. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Turkmenistan

Technical assistance with Turkmenistan provides a limited basis for bilateral collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Japan and Tuvalu

The bilateral information gathered on Japan and Tuvalu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Japan and Uganda

Aid and technical assistance with Uganda sustain development collaboration alongside economic contacts. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Emergency aid and the assessment team after the Port Vila earthquake document practical cooperation with Vanuatu. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The investment agreement’s entry into force in July 2026 provides a concrete framework for collaboration with Zambia. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Japan and Zimbabwe

Aid and technical assistance with Zimbabwe support development cooperation; third-party sanctions do not determine this pair. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The July 2026 diplomatic contact reviews the bilateral relationship and ways to develop collaboration between the governments. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The December 2025 declaration maintains political support for the federal government and Somalia’s territorial integrity; that government is not confused with armed groups. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Andorra

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Andorra is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Armenia

Ministerial consultations in 2026 identify areas of political and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Bhutan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Bolivia

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Bolivia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The December 2025 meetings review political and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Botswana

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Brunei

Political consultations maintain dialogue and seek to expand areas of collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Bulgaria

The documented economic commission and political dialogue maintain channels of cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Burkina Faso

The 2025 ministerial visit opens an agenda of bilateral dialogue; future opportunities are not treated as realised. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Cyprus

The 2026 presidential visit and ministerial contacts expand dialogue and cooperation mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Kazakhstan and Jordan

The 2026 meetings review political dialogue and concrete steps to expand collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 meeting reviews the economic and aviation agenda, distinguishing proposals from signed agreements. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Luxembourg

The 2026 consultations examine bilateral ties and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Mongolia

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Mongolia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Montenegro

The 2026 meeting seeks to expand dialogue and sectoral cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 meeting reviews collaboration with Palestinian representatives, who are not equated with armed groups. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Panama

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Panama is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Paraguay

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Paraguay is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Qatar

Contacts in 2026 follow up on a diplomatic and economic partnership; not all announced initiatives are treated as implemented. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Somalia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and South Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and South Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Sri Lanka

The second consultation round in April 2024 establishes political follow-up and sectoral cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Suriname

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Suriname is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Syria

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Syria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Tajikistan

Ministerial contacts in 2026 follow up a long-standing regional and economic partnership. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Tanzania

The March 2025 meeting addresses diplomatic and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan

Presidential contacts in 2026 review economic and political cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Tuvalu

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Tuvalu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kazakhstan and Uganda

The bilateral information gathered on Kazakhstan and Uganda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kazakhstan and Uruguay

The 2024 consultations establish mechanisms for political dialogue and collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Close cooperation

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan

The July 2026 joint commission reviews sustained industry, transport, water and culture cooperation and adds regional mechanisms. Pending projects remain commitments, not guaranteed results. Multisector cooperation supports closeness without absolute government agreement.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kenya and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kenya and Armenia

The political consultation mechanism agreed in 2026 gives bilateral dialogue a new framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kenya and Azerbaijan

The ministerial meeting and embassy opening in Nairobi in 2025 show intensified dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Insufficient information

Kenya and Costa Rica

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Costa Rica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kenya and Croatia

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Croatia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kenya and Cuba

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Cuba is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kenya and Cyprus

Contacts in 2025 address collaboration in agriculture, education and tourism. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Eritrea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kenya and Estonia

The April 2025 meeting examines cooperation in priority sectors and maintains bilateral dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kenya and Eswatini

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Eswatini is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kenya and Ethiopia

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Ethiopia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Kenya and Jordan

Contacts in 2026 examine bilateral mechanisms and pending memoranda; not all are claimed to have been signed. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Kenya and Kazakhstan

The 2026 state visit expands dialogue and the economic agenda between the two regions. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kenya and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kenya and Kuwait

The 2026 meeting addresses labour mobility, trade and development cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

The inaugural 2026 consultations establish a regular political channel and cooperative agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kenya and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on Kenya and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kenya and Rwanda

The October 2026 joint commission reviews bilateral cooperation and areas requiring further work. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Kiribati and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kiribati and Nauru

Kiribati and Nauru’s East Micronesia Cable participation provides concrete digital connectivity and resilience cooperation. The 2026 project is distinguished from full operation, not verified here; shared regional organisation alone does not determine classification.

Sources

Government of Micronesia

Insufficient information

Kiribati and Nicaragua

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and Nicaragua is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kiribati and Niger

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kiribati and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kiribati and Palau

Shared fisheries management remains active in 2026 and provides a basis for cooperation between Kiribati and Palau. The assessment is moderate: their different relations with China and Taiwan do not automatically mean mutual hostility, but strategic affinity is not presumed either.

Sources

Tongan Ministry of Revenue and Customs

Cooperation

Kiribati and Papua New Guinea

Both participate in operational tuna-resource and benefit management with documented 2026 joint work. Sectoral cooperation is not PNG's third-country agreements or unrestricted access to all waters.

Sources

Kiribati and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Kiribati and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Kiribati and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kiribati and Tuvalu

Kiribati and Tuvalu participate in active trade coordination and customs facilitation mechanisms documented in 2026. This provides a practical cooperative foundation without presuming every measure implemented or making regional frameworks a close alliance.

Sources

Institutional source: president.tj

Cooperation

Kiribati and Vanuatu

Trade cooperation rests on active 2026 instruments and implementation work. Moderate assessment is not strategic alliance; planned regional-programme investment is not achieved bilateral results.

Sources

The May 2026 declaration expresses political coordination and support for Bahrain’s security without asserting identical positions between the two governments on every issue. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Kuwait and Costa Rica

The bilateral information gathered on Kuwait and Costa Rica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Kuwait and Djibouti

The September 2026 ministerial meeting maintains bilateral political dialogue with Djibouti. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan

The March 2025 border treaty and later consultations move relations towards cooperation after years of clashes. Trade and institutional contacts feature; demarcation remained ongoing in July 2025. Rapprochement is neither a close alliance nor guaranteed no future tensions.

Sources

Leader and minister dialogue maintain political, economic and cultural collaboration. Cooperation implies neither fully integrated markets nor Turkmen neutrality obliging alliance with Kyrgyzstan.

Sources

Turkmen Ministry of Communications

Government of Turkmenistan

October 2024 presidential dialogue recognised concrete Church education and health collaboration in Liberia. This grounds Holy See social and diplomatic cooperation, not new 2026 projects or general political alliance.

Sources

Contacts in 2026 examine cooperation with Equatorial Guinea, distinguishing it from Guinea and Guinea-Bissau. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Government of Monaco

Liechtenstein public administration

Reciprocal 2025 official visits document political and institutional dialogue and cooperation intent. Moderate assessment is not strategic alliance; discussed possibilities are not implemented treaties or projects.

Sources

Institutional work in March 2026 on financial supervision and money-laundering prevention provides concrete collaboration. This is technical cooperation, not equating financial-authority relations with a close political alliance.

Sources

Vatican Supervisory and Financial Information Authority

May 2026 meetings document Armenian reform support and strategic partnership declaration. Political and technical cooperation predominates, not automatic defence alliance or highest level from declaration alone.

Sources

Cooperation

Lithuania and Azerbaijan

The 2026 bilateral consultations examine political, economic, cultural and educational collaboration alongside dialogue on regional security. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Bahrain

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Bahrain is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Lithuania and Belarus

Political disagreement, security concerns and Lithuania’s International Court of Justice case constrain ties. Its September 2026 airspace-incursion protest is an official Lithuanian allegation, not a judicial ruling or proof of bilateral war. Government tension does not describe populations.

Sources

Lithuania and Cyprus

July 2025 political consultations examine areas to develop bilateral collaboration with Cyprus. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Diplomatic contacts in 2026 address bilateral dialogue and economic and technological possibilities with El Salvador. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Equatorial Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Equatorial Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Eritrea

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Eritrea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Close cooperation

Lithuania and Estonia

Baltic cooperation is described as close and multifaceted, with sustained coordination on security, welfare and economic development. This shared regional basis supports close cooperation without assuming the three governments’ positions are identical on every issue.

Sources

The political consultation memorandum signed in September 2026 provides a mechanism for diplomatic collaboration with Guatemala. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The May 2026 ministerial visit reviews bilateral collaboration possibilities and political dialogue with Jordan. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Kuwait

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Kuwait is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan

The bilateral information gathered on Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Lithuania and Laos

The political consultation agreement signed in 2026 provides a regular mechanism for developing bilateral collaboration with Laos. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Malawian Ministry of Natural Resources

Close cooperation

Lithuania and Latvia

The bilateral profile and updated Baltic cooperation description document broad, sustained collaboration with shared security, economic development and regional coordination interests. Closeness reflects concrete mechanisms and ties, not only shared EU and NATO membership.

Sources

Government of Latvia

The 2025 bilateral commission and general cooperation agreement provide a mechanism for institutional collaboration with Benin. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Luxembourg

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Bhutan

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Bhutan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Bolivia

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Bolivia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Bosnia & Herzegovina is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Luxembourg and Botswana

The vice president and finance minister’s 2025 visit addresses political and economic collaboration with Botswana. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Luxembourg

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Brunei

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Brunei is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Chad is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Comoros

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Comoros is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Luxembourg and Costa Rica

The November 2025 visit examines bilateral collaboration with Costa Rica; planned agreements are not equated with implementation. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

The bilateral profile describes a long-standing institutional relationship and programmes agreed between governments without using aid volume alone to assess closeness. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Luxembourg and Mongolia

The bilateral information gathered on Luxembourg and Mongolia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Luxembourg and Montenegro

The Montenegrin diplomatic office’s opening and political contacts in 2026 strengthen the bilateral channel. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Formal recognition of the Palestinian state in 2025 strengthens political dialogue supporting the two-state solution; its institutions are distinguished from Hamas. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Sources

Insufficient information

Malawi and Sierra Leone

The bilateral information gathered on Malawi and Sierra Leone is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malawi and Solomon Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Malawi and Solomon Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malawi and Somalia

Ministerial contact documents cooperation willingness and Malawian support for Somalia's unity and sovereignty. Moderate diplomatic cooperation is not an executed programme or defence commitment.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Bahrain

The 2024 joint declaration examines diplomatic cooperation and sectors of bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The joint commission and the 2026 visit expand bilateral cooperation mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2025 parliamentary dialogue complements diplomatic contacts and a cooperative agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 dialogue seeks to reactivate bilateral mechanisms and collaboration programmes. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Gabon

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Gabon is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Gambia

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Gambia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Georgia

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Georgia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Ghana

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Laos

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Laos is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Latvia

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Latvia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Lebanon

The October 2026 defence visit maintains collaboration with the Lebanese government, distinct from Hezbollah. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Malaysia and Lesotho

The September 2026 meeting with the prime minister examines avenues for bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Liberia

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Liberia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Libya

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Libya is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Liechtenstein

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Liechtenstein is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Lithuania

March 2026 contacts maintain political dialogue and a collaboration agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Malaysia and Luxembourg

The 2025 visit addresses trade, finance and logistics within a bilateral diplomatic framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Malawi

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Malawi is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Maldives

Agreements on diplomatic training and consultations complement high-level political contacts. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Mali

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Mali is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Malta

Malaysia and Nauru

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Nauru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Nepal

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Nepal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and New Zealand

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and New Zealand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Nicaragua

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Nicaragua is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Niger

The July 2025 meeting examines training, agriculture and economic collaboration with Niger, not Nigeria. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Serbia

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Serbia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Seychelles

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Seychelles is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Sierra Leone

The 2026 meeting maintains diplomatic dialogue and examines economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Tanzania is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Timor-Leste

The 2025 declaration records frequent visits and technical cooperation without confusing proposed regional integration with completed accession. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Government of Turkmenistan

Insufficient information

Malaysia and Togo

The bilateral information gathered on Malaysia and Togo is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Malaysia and Tonga

The April 2024 meeting examines political and technical cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Expanded diplomatic representation and July 2026 official contacts provide cooperation. April's accreditation proposal is distinct from the later meeting; neither alone proves executed economic projects.

Sources

Maldives Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Mali and Niger coordinate defence and politics through shared AES structures and documented 2026 culture. Broad sustained governmental cooperation does not mean all confederal projects implemented.

Sources

Institutional source: www.presidencedufaso.bf

Insufficient information

Mali and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Mali and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Mali and Palau

The bilateral information gathered on Mali and Palau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Mali and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Mali and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Mali and Congo - Brazzaville

July 2026 talks revive craft cooperation and envisage a bilateral commission to renew the protocol and work plan. Sector-specific cooperation predominates; the report concerns Congo-Brazzaville, not the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and does not establish full implementation.

Sources

International Monetary Fund

Marshall Islands and Papua New Guinea

The May 2026 bilateral meeting and 2025 fisheries memorandum support fishing, ocean governance and climate resilience. Concrete governmental cooperation does not mean all commitments fully implemented.

Sources

Sources

Pacific Islands Forum Fisheries Agency

Cooperation

Marshall Islands and Vanuatu

The Marshall Islands and Vanuatu participate in coordinated fisheries surveillance, including Rai Balang in 2026. This regional maritime cooperation does not equate to a bilateral military alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Marshall Islands and Vatican City

The bilateral information gathered on Marshall Islands and Vatican City is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Marshall Islands and Yemen

The bilateral information gathered on Marshall Islands and Yemen is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Mauritania and Micronesia

The bilateral information gathered on Mauritania and Micronesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Mauritania and Monaco

Training, equipment demonstrations and exchanges between civil protection services, documented in December 2025 within a programme renewed through 2027, show sustained practical cooperation. They are not a military alliance or close relations across every area.

Sources

Insufficient information

Mauritius and Costa Rica

The bilateral information gathered on Mauritius and Costa Rica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Mauritius and Djibouti

The bilateral information gathered on Mauritius and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Mauritius and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Mauritius and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Mauritius and Dominican Republic

Contacts in 2025 examine tourism, education, trade, investment and climate collaboration with the Dominican Republic. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The 2025 diplomatic meeting maintains dialogue and a bilateral collaboration agenda with Jamaica. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Shared border and institutional networks sustain broad Mexico–Guatemala relations. Development and integration complement social ties without denying border-management frictions.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Mexico and Paraguay is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Mexico and Peru

Mexico's September 2026 announcement reports restored Peru diplomatic relations and resolution of the asylum case. Recent normalisation follows a serious dispute, not yet consolidated bilateral cooperation.

Sources

Government of Mexico

Cooperation

Mexico and Philippines

Historical ties are complemented by political dialogue, trade and cooperation between Mexico and the Philippines. The assessment rests on these fields, not just a shared past or diplomatic anniversary.

Sources

Government of Mexico

Sources

Micronesia and Samoa participated in the regional Island Chief operation in August 2026. Coordinated fisheries surveillance sustains concrete maritime cooperation without implying a close political alliance.

Sources

Sources

Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Micronesia and Vanuatu

Micronesia and Vanuatu cooperate in regional fisheries surveillance, participating in Rai Balang in 2026. This is operational maritime collaboration, not a bilateral military alliance.

Sources

Monaco and St. Lucia

The bilateral information gathered on Monaco and St. Lucia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Monaco and St. Vincent & Grenadines

The bilateral information gathered on Monaco and St. Vincent & Grenadines is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Monaco and Samoa

The bilateral information gathered on Monaco and Samoa is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Monaco and San Marino

The May 2026 dialogue addresses bilateral ties and San Marino's European integration. Assessment is moderate diplomatic cooperation, not a claim of jointly concluded EU association agreement.

Sources

Sources

Government of Montenegro

Cooperation

Montenegro and Azerbaijan

Political consultations in 2025 maintain bilateral dialogue and examine collaboration areas with Azerbaijan. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Montenegro

Insufficient information

Morocco and Ethiopia

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Ethiopia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Ministerial contacts in 2026 examine coordination and bilateral cooperation mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Morocco and Kazakhstan

The 2025 meeting and a bilateral agreement’s entry into force show continuing dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Morocco and Kenya

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Kenya is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and Kiribati

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Kiribati is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Morocco and Kuwait

The November 2025 meeting seeks to expand cooperation on matters of shared interest. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Morocco and Kyrgyzstan

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Kyrgyzstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and Laos

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Laos is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and Latvia

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Latvia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Morocco and Lebanon

The 2024 joint declaration documents an intention to revive collaboration with the Lebanese government, distinct from armed groups. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Morocco and Malawi

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Malawi is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and Malaysia

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Malaysia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and Maldives

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Maldives is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Morocco and Mali

Ministerial contacts in 2026 seek to strengthen bilateral cooperation without turning dialogue into endorsement of every Malian policy. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Morocco and Nigeria

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and Nigeria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Morocco and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Morocco and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Morocco and North Macedonia

Two memoranda signed in 2025 expand the framework for sectoral collaboration without proving implementation of every project. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2025 meeting reaffirms political, human and cultural ties that continue cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Documented cooperation centres on shared tuna-management instruments active in 2026. Assessment does not confuse either country's Australian agreements with mutual agreements or individual appointments with alliance evidence.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Armenia

Political consultations and support for public institutions and justice provide concrete cooperation with Armenia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Austria

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Austria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Azerbaijan

Agricultural and water collaboration provides a bilateral cooperation area with Azerbaijan. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Bahrain

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Bahrain is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Bangladesh

Water and food security programmes and the 2024 tax treaty sustain collaboration with Bangladesh. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Netherlands and Belarus

Sanctions applied and enforced by the Netherlands against Belarus restrict political and economic ties. These differences condition relations without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Close cooperation

Netherlands and Belgium

Benelux economic integration is accompanied by strong bilateral trade and innovation ties with Belgium. Sustained cooperation across several fields supports closeness; it does not require complete agreement between the two governments.

Sources

Netherlands and Colombia

Trade and development and investment collaboration provide a bilateral foundation with Colombia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Fiji

The May 2026 mission to Fiji opens dialogue on water, engineering and climate adaptation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Finland

Peace and security contacts maintain a bilateral collaboration agenda with Finland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Collaboration on migration management accompanies broad political and economic relations with Greece. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cultural projects and support for trade provide concrete cooperation areas with Hungary. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Iceland

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Iceland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Iraq

Institutional support for companies interested in reconstruction accompanies a bilateral agenda with the Iraqi government. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Côte d’Ivoire

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Jamaica

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Jamaica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Jordan

Political dialogue and institutional collaboration maintain active bilateral ties with Jordan. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Kazakhstan

Business contacts and trade and investment work provide a collaboration foundation with Kazakhstan. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Kenya

The state visit and business missions maintain collaboration with Kenya on agriculture and water. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The September 2026 ministerial visit and contacts with Dutch troops maintain bilateral security coordination with Lithuania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Close cooperation

Netherlands and Luxembourg

Benelux economic union and ongoing institutional coordination closely connect Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Sustained multisectoral cooperation supports closeness without absolute government agreement.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Malawi

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Malawi is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Malaysia

Collaboration with Malaysia includes agriculture, the circular economy and culture on a bilateral basis. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Maldives

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Maldives is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Mali

Maritime ties and sustainability collaboration maintain a bilateral agenda with Norway. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and South Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and South Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Sri Lanka

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Sri Lanka is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Netherlands and Suriname

Cultural exchanges and the trade agenda provide bilateral ties with Suriname. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and Sweden

Defence and security collaboration maintains a specific bilateral agenda with Sweden alongside shared international frameworks. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Syria

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Syria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Netherlands and Tajikistan

The bilateral information gathered on Netherlands and Tajikistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Cooperation

Netherlands and Uganda

The 2026–2029 bilateral strategy maintains a collaboration agenda with Uganda without considering all its objectives implemented in advance. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Netherlands and United Arab Emirates

Consultations with Emirati authorities and collaboration on water, energy and food provide a concrete bilateral foundation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

International Monetary Fund

Sources

The March 2025 ministerial meeting culminated in a memorandum to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The September 2026 technical assistance agreement expands the bilateral cooperation framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Contacts in September 2026 maintain dialogue with the Lebanese government, distinct from the country’s armed groups. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2025 high-level meeting seeks to deepen economic and diplomatic cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Nigerian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Nigeria and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on Nigeria and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Nigeria and Rwanda

The February 2026 meeting examines bilateral collaboration in areas of common interest. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Norway and Argentina

The 2026 official mission to Ushuaia maintains institutional and cultural contacts with Argentina. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Belgium

Energy supplies and cultural exchanges provide concrete ties with Belgium. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Botswana

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Brunei

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Brunei is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Bulgaria

The bilateral financing agreement offers a framework for institutional collaboration with Bulgaria. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Norwegian fishing and aquaculture companies provide concrete economic ties with Chile. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Colombia

Collaboration for peace and reduced deforestation maintains institutional ties with Colombia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Comoros

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Comoros is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Costa Rica

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Costa Rica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Croatia

Bilateral contacts and cultural exchanges provide a collaborative foundation with Croatia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Cuba

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Cuba is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Cyprus

Cultural programmes and the financing framework provide collaboration areas with Cyprus. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Czechia

The 2021–2028 framework includes funded institutional collaboration with Czechia, with objectives still awaiting implementation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Denmark

Nordic coordination with Denmark maintains an institutional agenda on security and strategic supplies. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral agreement and development programmes sustain institutional ties with Ethiopia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Fiji

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Fiji is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Finland

The 2024 defence memorandum establishes a concrete bilateral collaboration framework with Finland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Gabon

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Gabon is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Gambia

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Gambia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Georgia

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Georgia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Ghana

Bilateral agreements and development programmes continue institutional collaboration with Ghana. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Greece

The 2026 agreement and financing programmes sustain bilateral collaboration with Greece. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Trade coordination and joint European Economic Area mechanisms sustain collaboration with Iceland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Kazakhstan

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Kazakhstan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Kenya

The joint declaration and institutional contacts maintain coordination with Kenya on international cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Lebanon

The 2026 ministerial visit maintains diplomatic support and dialogue with Lebanese authorities, distinguished from armed actors. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Institutional programmes and economic ties sustain a collaborative bilateral agenda with Lithuania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Luxembourg

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Luxembourg is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Malawi

Health, education and agriculture programmes provide concrete bilateral cooperation with Malawi. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Malaysia

Political, economic and cultural ties maintain a cooperative foundation with Malaysia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Maldives

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Maldives is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Mali

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Mali is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Malta

The 2021–2028 framework includes funded institutional collaboration with Malta, with objectives still awaiting implementation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Bilateral dialogue and coordination on disarmament and rights maintain a positive agenda with Morocco. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Mozambique

Development programmes and institutional dialogue continue collaboration with Mozambique. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Myanmar (Burma)

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Myanmar (Burma) is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Namibia

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Namibia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Nauru

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Nauru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Nepal

Bilateral development programmes provide an institutional foundation for collaboration with Nepal. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Programmes and contacts with the Palestinian representation sustain cooperation without attributing that assessment to armed organisations. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Norway and Qatar

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Qatar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Norway and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on Norway and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Norway and Romania

The 2021–2028 framework includes funded institutional collaboration with Romania, with objectives still awaiting implementation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 bilateral climate agreement provides a concrete collaboration framework with Senegal. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2021–2028 framework includes funded institutional collaboration with Slovakia, with objectives still awaiting implementation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Norway and Slovenia

The 2021–2028 framework includes funded institutional collaboration with Slovenia, with objectives still awaiting implementation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Border clashes and attacks Pakistan acknowledges carrying out against Taliban positions place the relationship in armed confrontation. Islamabad also attributes attacks to groups supported from Afghanistan; that attribution is not presented as independent verification.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Albania

The memorandum on political consultations formalises diplomatic cooperation with Albania and multilateral coordination. The relationship is cooperative, but signing this mechanism does not demonstrate a strategic alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Algeria

Relations with Algeria combine historical solidarity and cooperative diplomatic dialogue. The official profile describes collaboration but does not allow it to be automatically equated with a defence alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Andorra

Cooperation

Pakistan and Bahrain

The ministerial commission, trade and parliamentary exchanges sustain cooperative Bahrain relations. Institutional and societal affinity does not imply an identical position on every regional issue.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Bangladesh

The 2025 Bangladesh-government meeting reflects trade, connectivity and social rapprochement. Assessment rests on recent cooperation without erasing complex history or claiming achieved integration.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Belarus

The joint declaration strengthens political, economic and cultural cooperation with Belarus. This bilateral relationship is assessed: Minsk’s tensions with other countries are not automatically transferred.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Belgium

The 2026 bilateral consultations maintain collaboration with Belgium in trade, education and health. Relations have a cooperative orientation without treating every announced commitment as a result.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Belize

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Belize is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Benin

Ministerial contacts and diplomatic training collaboration provide a cooperative foundation with Benin. Documentation identifies cooperation but does not measure a particularly intensive economic partnership.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Bhutan

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Bhutan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Bolivia

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Bolivia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The 2026 meeting reaffirms Bosnia and Herzegovina ties and economic collaboration. Partnership expansion objectives are not presented as a fully realised alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Botswana

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Brunei

Institutional ties and cooperation contacts sustain positive relations with Brunei. Political and societal affinity supports cooperation without by itself equating to a military alliance.

Sources

Sources

Cuban medical scholarships and bilateral contacts provide a cooperation foundation with Pakistan. Evidence supports educational and diplomatic collaboration, not mutual defence obligations.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Dominican Republic

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Dominican Republic is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Congo - Kinshasa

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Congo - Kinshasa is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Ecuador

Pakistan and Ecuador maintain trade and collaboration in international forums. The orientation is cooperative, although described trade opportunities do not prove a particularly intensive partnership.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Egypt

The 2025 ministerial visit records trade, educational, health and defence cooperation with Egypt. It is multisectoral collaboration without turning every announced initiative into a confirmed result.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and El Salvador

The first bilateral consultations, held in January 2026, structure cooperation with Ghana. The multisectoral agenda is positive, although commitment implementation requires follow-up.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Greece

The diplomatic profile describes cordial relations and political understanding with Greece. This is interpreted as bilateral cooperation, not automatic alignment with its regional positions.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Ireland

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Ireland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Pakistan and Israel

The absence of diplomatic recognition and Pakistan's opposition to Israeli actions in Palestinian territories mark a strained relationship. This political incompatibility is not automatically equated with bilateral war.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Netherlands

Trade and political contacts make the Netherlands an important Pakistani partner. Relations are cooperative without assuming full alignment on human rights or international affairs.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and New Zealand

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and New Zealand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Nicaragua

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Nicaragua is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Niger

Training, scholarships and agriculture and defence collaboration provide Niger cooperation grounding. These bilateral ties do not automatically attribute other African governments’ policies to Niger.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Nigeria

Official contacts and the defence collaboration agenda sustain cooperation with Nigeria. Documentation identifies a bilateral foundation, although expansion proposals require follow-up.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and North Macedonia

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and North Macedonia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Norway

Norwegian investment and trade accompany stable diplomatic ties with Pakistan. This concrete economic collaboration supports cooperation without equating to a military alliance.

Sources

International collaboration and trade sustain a cooperative relationship with Peru. Export expansion possibilities are distinguished from deals already concluded.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Philippines

Relations with the Philippines have sectoral agreements, training and defence exchanges, including maritime cooperation. Collaboration is concrete without interpreting those exercises as a binding alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Poland

Trade, political contacts and education agreements provide a cooperative foundation with Poland. Collaboration in several sectors does not presuppose agreement on every international issue.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Portugal

Relations with Portugal combine trade, the Pakistani community and a diplomatic consultation mechanism. This foundation supports cooperation without every identified opportunity being an implemented project.

Sources

The consultation mechanism signed with Slovenia formalises a bilateral cooperation agenda. Contacts are positive, although the memorandum does not demonstrate full implementation of its objectives.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Solomon Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Solomon Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Somalia

High-level contacts maintain Somalia trade and societal cooperation. Government relations are distinguished from domestic conflicts and armed actors.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and South Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and South Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka cooperation includes trade, military training and regular political contacts. Official evidence records recent concrete exchanges without mutual defence commitments.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Suriname

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Suriname is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Sweden

Recurring political consultations and trade and educational collaboration sustain stable ties with Sweden. This institutional foundation supports cooperation without implying agreement on every international issue.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Syria

The Syrian minister’s August 2026 visit resumes cooperation with the new government and bilateral mechanisms. Current engagement is assessed without automatically transferring former authorities’ relations.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Tajikistan

Collaboration with Tajikistan includes political dialogue, security and connectivity. The bilateral agenda is cooperative, although energy and transport projects require implementation checks.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Tanzania

Trade and officials’ technical training provide concrete Tanzania cooperation. Collaboration spans areas without training implying a military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Thailand

The November 2025 consultations sustain cooperation with Thailand in trade, education and societal contacts. Commitments to expand relations are distinguished from results already achieved.

Sources

Insufficient information

Pakistan and Timor-Leste

The bilateral information gathered on Pakistan and Timor-Leste is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Pakistan and Togo

Ministerial contacts acknowledge political cooperation and a bilateral agenda with Togo. The documentation establishes collaboration, but not a particularly intensive economic partnership.

Sources

Presidential contacts and the economic, security and social agenda maintain cooperation with the United Arab Emirates. The relationship is broad, but planned meetings are not interpreted as new agreements already concluded.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Uruguay

Economic contacts and international collaboration sustain cordial relations with Uruguay. Bilateral cooperation is acknowledged without turning trade opportunities into confirmed results.

Sources

Cooperation

Pakistan and Uzbekistan

The cooperation council and presidential contacts strengthen the bilateral agenda with Uzbekistan. Relations are cooperative, although connectivity and education commitments require follow-up.

Sources

Training and defence collaboration alongside political contacts sustain cooperation with Zimbabwe. The official profile describes continuing ties without implying total alignment.

Sources

Cooperation

Palau and Papua New Guinea

Palau and Papua New Guinea cooperate through shared tuna-management rules still active in 2026. This is a sectoral cooperative assessment, not a conclusion based on US meetings held at the same location.

Sources

Government of Solomon Islands

Palau and Tonga

Joint energy-security and regional-priority work in April 2026 provides concrete cooperation. Both leaders' participation supports assessment without supply proposals treated as executed projects.

Sources

Insufficient information

Palau and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Palau and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Palau and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Palau and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Palau and Tuvalu

Active fisheries collaboration and controls provide Palau–Tuvalu cooperation. It is neither close alliance nor confusion of Australian-funded energy initiatives with their own bilateral treaties.

Sources

Presidency of Timor-Leste

Cooperation

Palau and Vanuatu

Palau and Vanuatu participate in Rai Balang, a coordinated fisheries surveillance operation in 2026. Documented cooperation is maritime and regional, not a bilateral defence alliance.

Sources

Ministerial dialogue maintains collaboration channels with Haitian institutions; the assessment does not imply domestic stability or support for armed groups. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Panama

Cooperation

Panama and Honduras

The third meeting of the bilateral consultation mechanism in August 2026 maintains political dialogue and work on the shared agenda. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Joint tuna-resource management creates concrete PNG–Tuvalu economic commitments. Cooperation supports a moderate assessment, not extension of PNG's Australia defence agreements to Tuvalu.

Sources

Institutional source: mjcs.gov.vu

Cooperation

Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu

The memorandum between prosecutors’ offices signed in August 2026 supports bilateral cooperation in justice and institutional strengthening. This is practical intergovernmental cooperation, without treating the signature as proof of results in every investigation or as a military alliance.

Sources

The ministerial visit’s joint declaration documents an agenda of political and bilateral cooperation. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Ministerial dialogue and the political consultation memorandum provide a collaboration mechanism between Paraguay and Trinidad and Tobago. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The March 2026 contact between foreign ministers seeks to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The July 2026 communiqué initiates gradual reopening with consular services; full normalisation is not complete. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; one friction is not hostility in every field.

Sources

Contacts in 2024 continue training and technical cooperation initiatives. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2024 meeting reviews the relationship and seeks to expand collaboration between both countries. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The fifth bilateral consultation in January 2025 maintains a regular political mechanism. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Poland and Benin

Official contacts in 2025 with Benin maintain an agenda to develop trade, investment and regional security. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Official contacts in 2026 with Cameroon maintain an agenda to expand cooperation and business ties. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 consultations with Czechia address the economy, infrastructure connections and energy alongside pending issues between neighbours. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Denmark

Bilateral dialogue with Denmark includes European and security coordination on a stable political foundation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Official contacts in 2025 with Equatorial Guinea review the relationship and possibilities to expand collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Eritrea

The April 2026 visit to Eritrea reopens high-level consultations and an agenda of economic and scientific collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Estonia

Tax and investment protection agreements provide a bilateral collaboration foundation with Estonia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Poland and Hungary

Hungary’s granting of asylum to a politician sought by Poland prompted a formal protest and diplomatic friction, without erasing European ties between neighbours. Cooperation and disagreements coexist; a specific friction is not interpreted as hostility in every area.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Iceland

Economic ties and tax agreements accompany stable political dialogue with Iceland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Iraq

Security cooperation and official contacts provide a collaborative foundation with the recognised Iraqi government. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Ireland

Political dialogue and economic collaboration maintain a cooperative relationship with Ireland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

May 2026 consultations with Kyrgyzstan maintain a political, trade and consular agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cultural initiatives and training visits maintain limited collaboration with Nepal despite the absence of bilateral agreements. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and Netherlands

The Utrecht Conference maintains recurring consultations with the Netherlands on politics, the economy and defence. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Poland and New Zealand

University exchanges and international coordination sustain cooperative ties with New Zealand. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Poland and Nicaragua

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Nicaragua is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Poland and Niger

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Poland and Nigeria

Insufficient information

Poland and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Poland and Paraguay

March 2026 consultations with Paraguay review political and economic collaboration and international affairs. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Poland and Sierra Leone

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Sierra Leone is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Poland and Singapore

Visits and ministerial contacts maintain political dialogue and collaboration with Singapore. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Poland and Slovakia

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Slovakia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Poland and Slovenia

Consultations with Slovenia maintain bilateral cooperation and dialogue on European security. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Poland and Tunisia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Poland and Turkmenistan

Cooperation

Portugal and Angola

Contacts in November 2025 and the approval of civil-protection cooperation in August 2026 show political continuity and practical collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Government of Portugal

Sources

Insufficient information

Qatar and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Qatar and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Qatar and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Bahrain

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Brunei

September 2026 ministerial contacts review bilateral cooperation and areas to develop it with Brunei. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Qatar and Comoros

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Comoros is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Costa Rica

The Costa Rican official report documents bilateral development in cooperation, economic diplomacy, education and culture. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Costa Rica

Insufficient information

Qatar and Djibouti

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Qatar and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Dominican Republic

The December 2024 agreements establish bilateral mechanisms and a cooperation agenda with the Dominican Republic without treating every initiative as implemented. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Qatar and Congo - Kinshasa

The November 2025 ministerial meeting maintains dialogue with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and examines cooperation; this country is distinguished from the Republic of the Congo. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Qatar and Ecuador

Parliamentary and diplomatic contacts in Quito in 2026 examine ways to develop bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Qatar and El Salvador

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and El Salvador is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Qatar and Equatorial Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Equatorial Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Qatar and Eritrea

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Eritrea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Eswatini

Contacts with Eswatini’s government in 2026 examine cooperation and development of bilateral ties. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

The September 2026 political meeting maintains bilateral dialogue and examines cooperation with Namibia. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The fourth political consultation round in 2025 reviews bilateral collaboration areas with Tajikistan. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Qatar and Tanzania

Bilateral consultations and the 2026 memorandum create a regular mechanism for developing political and sectoral collaboration. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Afghan authorities' Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Qatar and Timor-Leste

The bilateral information gathered on Qatar and Timor-Leste is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Qatar and Togo

The first political consultation round in 2025 provides a bilateral dialogue mechanism with Togo. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The November 2025 bilateral meeting maintains political dialogue and examines cooperation opportunities with Zimbabwe. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

The August 2026 ministerial conversation addresses political dialogue, energy and economic exchanges. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Russia’s recognition of Taliban authorities and ministerial contacts in 2026 sustain political rapprochement. Cooperation refers to ties between authorities, not the consent of the entire Afghan population or a military alliance; economic plans remain distinct from their results.

Sources

Afghan authorities' Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2025-07-24

Strained relationship

Russia and Albania

Its declared alignment with European restrictions against Russian destabilising activities indicates political distancing. This is a sign of tension, not proof of a general embargo or bilateral war.

Sources

European restrictions on banks, trade and energy condition ties with Russia. Tensions over Ukraine predominate; sanctions do not equate to bilateral war.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-04-23

Insufficient information

Russia and Azerbaijan

Recent dialogue shows rapprochement, but the air-crash crisis requires checking which disagreements persist. Combined reports cannot reliably establish the current overall balance.

Sources

president.az

Insufficient information

Russia and Botswana

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Botswana. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and Brazil

The scientific and educational group’s meeting and work between public agencies maintain cooperation mechanisms with Russia. Effective cooperation is distinguished from agreements still under negotiation; shared BRICS membership does not alone turn the relationship into a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Brazil · 2026-02-06

RTB · Burkina Faso government document

Insufficient information

Russia and Brunei

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Brunei. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Strained relationship

Russia and Bulgaria

European restrictions on banks, trade and energy condition ties with Russia. Tensions over Ukraine predominate; sanctions do not equate to bilateral war.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-04-23

Cooperation

Russia and Burkina Faso

Signed bilateral agreements and continuing diplomacy maintain institutional rapprochement with Russia. Educational and economic mechanisms show cooperation, but planned projects are not considered implemented or sufficient for a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Burkina Faso · 2026-01-12

Insufficient information

Russia and Burundi

The ministerial visit demonstrates political contact and a collaborative agenda. Friendship declarations and proposed fields are insufficient to establish sustained implementation across the full relationship.

Sources

The United Nations report provides security context, but does not allow every force present to be automatically attributed to bilateral agreements with Russia. The relationship requires specific evidence of effective cooperation, not inferences drawn from a multilateral mission.

Sources

United Nations · 2026-02-13

Insufficient information

Russia and Chad

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Chad. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Europa Press

Strained relationship

Russia and Cyprus

European restrictions on banks, trade and energy condition ties with Russia. Tensions over Ukraine predominate; sanctions do not equate to bilateral war.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-04-23

Strained relationship

Russia and Czechia

European restrictions on banks, trade and energy condition ties with Russia. Tensions over Ukraine predominate; sanctions do not equate to bilateral war.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-04-23

Strained relationship

Russia and Denmark

European restrictions on banks, trade and energy condition ties with Russia. Tensions over Ukraine predominate; sanctions do not equate to bilateral war.

Sources

Sources

Strained relationship

Russia and Iceland

Its declared alignment with European restrictions against Russian destabilising activities indicates political distancing. This is a sign of tension, not proof of a general embargo or bilateral war.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-04-14

Cooperation

Russia and Indonesia

Bilateral agreement monitoring and the 2026 joint commission maintain economic and institutional cooperation channels. Indonesia retains its own diversified foreign policy; cooperation with Russia is not interpreted as bloc membership or an exclusive alliance.

Sources

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Jamaica. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Strained relationship

Russia and Japan

Japan confirmed in July that Russia sanctions remain, even after speaking with Russia's foreign minister. Diplomatic contact neither removes restrictions nor makes cooperation predominant.

Sources

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · 2026-07-24

Insufficient information

Russia and Jordan

The bilateral profile and diplomatic-document agreements provide context, but recent evidence is insufficient for a solid full assessment. Diplomat facilities are not freedom of movement for all.

Sources

www.mfa.gov.jo

Cooperation

Russia and Kazakhstan

Trade and bilateral investment maintain substantial economic cooperation with regular political contacts. Recent figures show actual activity, not promises; this is neither identical foreign policy nor Kazakhstan’s automatic support for every Russian decision.

Sources

Government of Kazakhstan

Presidency of Kazakhstan · 2025-11-11

Insufficient information

Russia and Kenya

Recruitment and repatriation documentation requires checking agreements and implementation. The problem cannot be ignored, but alone does not establish the full interstate cooperation–tension balance.

Sources

parliament.go.ke

Insufficient information

Russia and Kiribati

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Kiribati. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

European financial and energy restrictions in July maintain tense relations with Russia. This distancing is not interpreted as direct armed hostilities between the countries.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-07-23

Insufficient information

Russia and Lebanon

The diplomatic-passport visa agreement shows institutional dialogue. It is limited: not proof of broad cooperation, implementation across all fields or ordinary-passport travellers' situation.

Sources

www.mfa.gov.lb

Insufficient information

Russia and Lesotho

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Lesotho. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Liberia

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Liberia. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Libya

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Libya. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Strained relationship

Russia and Liechtenstein

Liechtenstein added Russia restrictions in August. Sanctions and Ukraine-related distancing shape ties, not direct military hostilities between states.

Sources

Government of Liechtenstein · 2026-08-25

Strained relationship

Russia and Lithuania

European financial and energy restrictions in July maintain tense relations with Russia. This distancing is not interpreted as direct armed hostilities between the countries.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-07-23

Strained relationship

Russia and Luxembourg

European financial and energy restrictions in July maintain tense relations with Russia. This distancing is not interpreted as direct armed hostilities between the countries.

Sources

Council of the European Union · 2026-07-23

Insufficient information

Russia and Madagascar

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Madagascar. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Malawi

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Malawi. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and Malaysia

Trade exchanges continued growing in early 2026 according to Malaysia’s economic ministry data. This practical link supports trade cooperation without implying a political or defence alliance or treating announced business meetings as already held.

Sources

BERNAMA · data from Malaysia's economic ministry · 2026-07-21

Insufficient information

Russia and Maldives

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Maldives. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and Mali

Political dialogue and scholarship programmes maintain concrete cooperation channels with Russia. Efforts following the April attacks reinforce rapprochement; declared support is not confused with verified military operations or complete implementation of new projects.

Sources

energie.gouv.ml

dg-enseignementsup.ml

Strained relationship

Russia and Malta

Continuing European sanctions over Ukraine limit ties with Russia. The predominant framework is political tension, not direct bilateral war.

Sources

Cooperation

Russia and Namibia

The bilateral commission and March business forum maintain institutional and economic cooperation. Following up agreements differs from complete implementation: explored energy and mining initiatives are not completed plants or investments.

Sources

The Namibian · joint ministerial statement · 2026-03-26

Insufficient information

Russia and Nauru

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Nauru. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Nepal

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Nepal. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Strained relationship

Russia and Netherlands

Continuing European sanctions over Ukraine limit ties with Russia. The predominant framework is political tension, not direct bilateral war.

Sources

Strained relationship

Russia and New Zealand

New Zealand maintains Russia sanctions and anti-evasion controls. Ukraine-linked restrictions signal sustained tension, distinct from direct military confrontation between the states.

Sources

www.mfat.govt.nz

Cooperation

Russia and Nicaragua

Approved agreements with administrations in occupied Ukrainian territories show significant political support for Russia. This institutional cooperation does not make those territories internationally recognised sovereign states or prove every agreed project implemented.

Sources

National Assembly of Nicaragua · 2025-11-26

Cooperation

Russia and Niger

Bilateral contacts and Russian political support for Niger’s authorities underpin cooperative rapprochement. Educational and economic dialogue provides other channels, without announced proposals establishing completed investments or an automatic mutual defence commitment.

Sources

www.gouv.ne

mfpte.gouv.ne

Insufficient information

Russia and Nigeria

Diplomatic-anniversary activities show continuing contacts, not current cooperation's verified intensity. Celebrations and friendship declarations do not replace evidence of actions and operating agreements.

Sources

foreignaffairs.gov.ng

Strained relationship

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Palau. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Palestine

Palestinian-authority contacts show political Russia dialogue. Full classification requires actual support and continuity checks, without automatically assigning one position to all factions or the population.

Sources

french.wafa.ps · 2026-07-06

Insufficient information

Russia and Panama

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Panama. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Papua New Guinea

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Papua New Guinea. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

September's bilateral commission and common-project follow-up sustain Russia institutional collaboration. The signed 2026–2028 plan shows continuity, not future actions as achieved material results.

Sources

Congolese News Agency · 2026-10-02

gouvernement.cg

Strained relationship

Russia and Romania

Continuing European sanctions over Ukraine limit ties with Russia. The predominant framework is political tension, not direct bilateral war.

Sources

www.rwandainrussia.gov.rw

Cooperation

Russia and Rwanda

The annual military and technical commission maintains a concrete mechanism for defence cooperation with Russia. This institutional cooperation supports a cooperative relationship, without demonstrating a mutual defence alliance or complete agreement on international political issues.

Sources

Rwanda Ministry of Defence · 2026-05-20

Singapore applies financial measures relating to Russia, also recorded in banking regulatory documentation in 2026. These restrictions constrain economic and political ties; they should not be confused with a ban on all exchanges or a direct war.

Sources

DBS · regulatory documentation published on SGX

www.mfa.gov.sg

Insufficient information

Russia and Slovakia

Slovak opposition to ending Russian gas shows energy-tie preservation interest. Full assessment requires European-restriction comparison and verification of still-operating agreements.

Sources

www.mzv.sk · 2026-01-26

Strained relationship

Russia and Slovenia

Continuing European sanctions over Ukraine limit ties with Russia. The predominant framework is political tension, not direct bilateral war.

Sources

Insufficient information

Russia and Solomon Islands

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Solomon Islands. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Somalia

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Somalia. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and South Africa

Economic and political mechanisms underpin Russian cooperation alongside consular problems, including repatriating South Africans recruited to fight. Repatriation efforts show government dialogue without erasing the problem or making a military alliance.

Sources

dirco.gov.za

www.gov.za

Strained relationship

Russia and South Korea

Russia–North Korea military cooperation concerns South Korea, which coordinates responses with Japan and the US. Security disagreement marks strained relations, not direct Russia–South Korea war.

Sources

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan · 2026-06-12

nma.mofa.go.kr

Insufficient information

Russia and South Sudan

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and South Sudan. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and Sri Lanka

Tourism cooperation and bilateral meetings in 2026 maintain a practical relationship with Russia. Participation by authorities and companies indicates cooperation in this area, without amounting to a security alliance or guaranteeing that every promotion plan has been fulfilled.

Sources

Sri Lanka Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-06-22

Insufficient information

Russia and Sudan

Russian support for a Sudanese UN position provides specific political convergence. Alone, it cannot classify all relations, verify military agreements or assign the same position to authorities and the whole population.

Sources

Sudan News Agency

Insufficient information

Russia and Suriname

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Suriname. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Strained relationship

Russia and Sweden

Continuing European sanctions over Ukraine limit ties with Russia. The predominant framework is political tension, not direct bilateral war.

Sources

Strained relationship

Russia and Switzerland

Switzerland expanded asset freezes and bans on Russia-linked people and entities in May. Swiss military neutrality neither removes restrictions nor means normalised political relations with Moscow.

Sources

Government of Switzerland · 2026-05-22

Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

Russia and Syria

New Syrian authorities' Russia contacts do not simply inherit the previous government's category. Verification is needed of still-operational security agreements and their present relationship effects.

Sources

sana.sy

Cooperation

Russia and Tajikistan

Bilateral coordination mechanisms and economic and educational ties maintain cooperation alongside recent political contacts. Assessment implies neither problem-free cooperation everywhere nor shared regional organisations alone creating a close alliance.

Sources

www.mfa.tj

Insufficient information

Russia and Tanzania

Presidential talks show engagement and economic-expansion plans. They cannot reliably distinguish operational initiatives or their overall weight, so no category is forced.

Sources

Government of Tanzania

Cooperation

Russia and Thailand

Russian tourism and the bilateral commission sustain active economic cooperation. The August meeting addressed trade obstacles, so cooperation is not absence of differences. Free trade negotiations and the forum planned for October are not completed results.

Sources

Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs · 2026-08-15

mfa.gov.tm

Insufficient information

Russia and Tuvalu

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Tuvalu. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Cooperation

Russia and Uganda

Continuing defence contacts and training ties maintain practical Russia cooperation. Expansion declarations differ from existing activities and imply neither military intervention commitment nor exclusive alliance.

Sources

Uganda Broadcasting Corporation · 2026-09-04

mofa.go.ug

Cooperation

Russia and United Arab Emirates

Political contacts and Emirati mediation that facilitated a prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine show concrete diplomatic cooperation. Maintaining that channel does not mean endorsing the war or establishing a military alliance; economic commitments are distinguished from their actual results.

Sources

Strained relationship

Russia and United Kingdom

British designations and restrictions targeting Russia maintain strong political and financial distancing over the Ukraine war. Diplomatic channels do not make cooperation predominant or imply a direct war between the two states.

Sources

Government of Vietnam

Insufficient information

Russia and Yemen

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Yemen. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Zambia

This profile does not contain sufficient recent evidence on the overall ties between Russia and Zambia. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality, friendship or hostility; the relationship therefore remains unclassified.

Insufficient information

Russia and Zimbabwe

Consular efforts and institutional contacts provide information but do not resolve the relationship's current balance. Declared closeness is insufficient for classification, and recruitment problems require specific verification.

Sources

Close cooperation

St. Kitts & Nevis and St. Vincent & Grenadines

Sources

Sources

Samoa and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Samoa and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Samoa and Turkmenistan

The bilateral information gathered on Samoa and Turkmenistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Samoa and Tuvalu

Trade-implementation work provides current Samoa–Tuvalu economic collaboration. This is moderate institutional cooperation, not attribution of their separate Australian meetings to the pair.

Sources

Cooperation

Samoa and Vanuatu

Active 2026 trade-implementation mechanisms provide cooperation. Documented economic collaboration is distinct from strategic alliance; development targets are not achieved results.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Belgium

Political exchanges and economic interests sustain Saudi Arabia–Belgium collaboration. The institutional profile supports cooperation without favourable language demonstrating a close alliance.

Sources

The general cooperation agreement and sectoral contacts provide a constructive Saudi Arabia–Bulgaria framework. History supports collaboration, not equal current activity of every historical mechanism.

Sources

Infrastructure projects and institutional contacts sustain Saudi Arabia–Comoros collaboration. Assistance gives substance to ties without a close political or defence alliance.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Ireland

The diplomatic profile describes Saudi Arabia–Ireland dialogue and cooperation. The orientation is constructive, although friendship language does not establish an exceptional alliance in every area.

Sources

Strained relationship

Saudi Arabia and Israel

Sources

Dialogue and pilgrimage-related exchanges sustain Saudi Arabia–Nigeria cooperation. Social ties add context, but alone determine neither a close alliance nor an assessment applicable to Niger.

Sources

Insufficient information

Saudi Arabia and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Saudi Arabia and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Saudi Arabia and North Macedonia

The bilateral information gathered on Saudi Arabia and North Macedonia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Norway

The 2023 climate dialogue provides a concrete Saudi Arabia–Norway cooperation area. Thematic collaboration is limited and establishes neither a broad political alliance nor recent results across all sectors.

Sources

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Oman

Political dialogue and industrial contacts in 2026 maintain Saudi Arabia–Oman cooperation. Projects discussed are distinguished from completed investments and do not imply automatic alignment on every regional issue.

Sources

Close cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Pakistan

Sustained military coordination and the defence mechanism meeting in October 2026 place Pakistan among Saudi Arabia's close partners. Institutional collaboration is distinct from unimplemented trade promises.

Sources

Insufficient information

Saudi Arabia and Palau

The bilateral information gathered on Saudi Arabia and Palau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and Palestine

Saudi Arabia supports a political solution and Palestinian institution-building. This is diplomatic cooperation, not confusing population support with a military alliance or support for all Palestinian armed groups.

Sources

Sources

The political consultation memorandum provides a Saudi Arabia–Senegal cooperation framework. Signing the instrument supports dialogue without demonstrating newly consolidated bilateral intensity.

Sources

Cooperation

Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates

The UAE supports Saudi security against Houthi threats and maintains regional coordination. That solidarity supports cooperation, but a shared position does not imply an absence of differences between the two governments.

Sources

The profile documents frequent political dialogue and economic and energy cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Serbia and Burkina Faso

The bilateral information gathered on Serbia and Burkina Faso is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Serbia and Burundi

High-level contacts and the economic framework in force enable bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Serbia and Cambodia

The profile records dialogue and cooperation between ministries without assuming a close relationship. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Serbia and Cameroon

The bilateral information gathered on Serbia and Cameroon is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Serbia and Cape Verde

The 2025 ministerial meeting maintains a diplomatic agenda of collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Serbia and Central African Republic

Political consultations in 2026 maintain dialogue and seek to expand cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Serbia and Oman

The bilateral information gathered on Serbia and Oman is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Serbia and Palau

The bilateral information gathered on Serbia and Palau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Serbia and Palestine

Political cooperation and collaboration on youth and sport are organised with representatives of the Palestinian state, not with any armed group. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Serbia and Panama

The 2026 visit examines bilateral cooperation and interregional coordination. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Serbia and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Serbia and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Serbia and Paraguay

Ministerial contacts in 2025 review political and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Serbia and Qatar

The September 2026 meeting maintains dialogue and a collaboration agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026 meeting examines bilateral dialogue and new areas of cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Serbia and Senegal

Sources

Institutional source: solomons.gov.sb

The 2025 consultations review political and bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Shared trade preferences sustain moderate economic cooperation. Sudan's crisis limits verified operations; South Sudan contacts or support for all armed actors are not attributed to Sudan.

Sources

Repeated presidential contacts, including July 2026, maintain bilateral and regional cooperation. Moderate rapprochement: conference attendance alone is not completed investment or close alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Slovakia and Andorra

Contacts in March 2026 maintain bilateral political dialogue and examine Andorra's relationship with European institutions. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Slovakia

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Angola

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Slovakia and Armenia

The September 2025 dialogue maintains political cooperation and examines trade and investment between both countries. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Slovakia

Cooperation

Slovakia and Azerbaijan

The June 2026 consultations review economic collaboration, political visits and development of the strategic partnership; its label is not equated with a military alliance. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Government of Slovakia

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Bahrain

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Bahrain is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Mixed relationship

Slovakia and Belarus

Restored Slovak ambassador-level representation and Belarus’s announcement of reopening its embassy show recovered diplomatic channels. Rapprochement coexists with previous deterioration and European restrictions; announced reopening is not completed or full normalisation.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

Slovakia and Cyprus

Political dialogue builds on Slovakia’s sustained contribution to mediation between Cypriot communities and a peaceful solution within the United Nations framework. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Slovakia and Iceland

The June 2026 visit addresses geothermal energy, health, green technologies, security and tourism with Iceland. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Slovakia and Mongolia

The bilateral information gathered on Slovakia and Mongolia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Slovakia and Montenegro

November 2025 contacts combine economic collaboration and Montenegro's European trajectory support. Collaboration predominates, though EU accession and business projects remain subject to their processes.

Sources

Ministerial contacts in February 2025 maintain dialogue with Palestinian institutions, which are not equated with Hamas. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Solomon Islands and Trinidad & Tobago

The bilateral information gathered on Solomon Islands and Trinidad & Tobago is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Solomon Islands and Turkmenistan

Cooperation

South Africa and Comoros

The general cooperation agreement with Comoros provides a bilateral political and economic framework. It supports a cooperative orientation, but signature alone does not demonstrate implementation of all programmes.

Sources

Government of South Africa

The bilateral information gathered on South Africa and Nepal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Africa and Netherlands

The 2025 joint commission records economic, agricultural and cultural collaboration with the Netherlands. The cooperative foundation is identifiable without implying alignment on every international issue.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on South Africa and Seychelles is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Africa and Sierra Leone

The ministerial agenda with Sierra Leone includes reviewing existing bilateral and economic cooperation. This supports a cooperative orientation without attributing all announced results to a planned visit.

Sources

Government of South Africa

Government of South Africa

Cooperation

South Africa and Singapore

High-level Singapore contacts strengthen trade, investment, training and governance collaboration. The agenda is broadly cooperative without discussed priorities equating to fully implemented projects.

Sources

Cooperation with Tanzania rests on a shared African political agenda and stable bilateral ties. Affinity favours collaboration without automatic agreement on every regional issue.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Angola is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Antigua & Barbuda

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Antigua & Barbuda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Argentina

Parliamentary exchanges and business contacts sustain South Korea–Argentina collaboration. The 2026 visit provides institutional continuity without proving unconditional political alignment.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Armenia

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Armenia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Austria

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Austria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Azerbaijan

Cooperation

South Korea and Bolivia

The 2026 ministerial meeting maintains South Korea–Bolivia dialogue and cooperation. It supports collaboration without one institutional meeting an exceptional partnership.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Bosnia & Herzegovina

The economic agreement signed in 2026 establishes an institutional South Korea–Bosnia and Herzegovina cooperation foundation. Signature is not proof of entry into force or already obtained trade results.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Botswana

Ministerial contacts document South Korea–Botswana political cooperation and economic opportunities. Constructive ties predominate, though the 2023 source limits recent progress precision.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Brunei

The 2025 smart-cities memorandum provides a concrete South Korea–Brunei collaboration initiative. This is a cooperative signal, not an assumption that all planned technology projects are implemented.

Sources

High-level contacts in 2024 and 2026 provide continuity to South Korea–Cameroon cooperation. The bilateral profile shows collaboration, without attributing Cameroon's activities to neighbouring countries.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and El Salvador

Institutional recognition of the Korean community in 2026 adds a social foundation to cooperation with El Salvador. This friendly connection alone does not demonstrate a broad political or defence alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Equatorial Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Equatorial Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Eritrea

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Eritrea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Estonia

Parliamentary exchanges and 2026 technology contacts sustain South Korea–Estonia collaboration. Specialised event participation is not confused with fully implemented defence agreements.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Eswatini

Ministerial dialogue considers South Korea–Eswatini agriculture, science and technology cooperation. Orientation is cooperative; 2023 opportunities are not completed projects.

Sources

Cooperation

Industrial cooperation, including electric vehicle production, accompanies South Korea–Indonesia partnership. Collaboration is concrete; the new strategic title does not automatically determine closeness.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Iran

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Iran is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Iraq

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Iraq is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Ireland

Economic, scientific and technological agreements sustain collaboration between South Korea and Ireland. There is an institutional and commercial foundation, but these instruments alone do not prove a close alliance.

Sources

Mixed relationship

South Korea and Israel

South Korea–Israel trade and technology coexist with South Korean concerns over Gaza and settlements. Ministerial communication records both cooperation and important disagreements.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Lesotho

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Lesotho is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Liberia

The 2024 development memorandum provides a cooperation framework for South Korea and Liberia. It is a cooperative signal, distinguishing the signed agreement from projects and outcomes that require confirmation.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Libya

The embassy's reopening in Tripoli in 2026 and economic dialogue boost cooperation with Libyan institutions. Libya's fragmentation limits extending this assessment to all its actors.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Liechtenstein

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Liechtenstein is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Lithuania

Bilateral dialogue and shared security concerns sustain South Korea–Lithuania cooperation. Agreement over North Korea alone does not imply a bilateral defence alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Luxembourg

South Korea and Luxembourg maintain bilateral cooperation and international forum coordination. The profile supports collaboration, though historical friendship does not demonstrate especially intensive present alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Netherlands

The 2026 dialogue on economic security, AI and semiconductors gives substance to Netherlands cooperation. Not every discussed opportunity is assumed an implemented agreement.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and New Zealand

The 2025 partnership covers security, innovation and social exchanges between South Korea and New Zealand. It is a broad cooperative foundation, but its new designation alone does not prove exceptional results.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Nicaragua

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Nicaragua is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Niger

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Niger is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Nigeria

Political contacts and maritime-security dialogue sustain South Korea–Nigeria cooperation. The 2021 source limits precision on recent progress and does not apply to Niger.

Sources

The 2025 ministerial dialogue and APEC coordination maintain South Korea–Peru cooperation. The strategic label does not replace verifying effective collaboration in each area.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Philippines

The bilateral partnership expands political and economic collaboration between South Korea and the Philippines. Continuing ties support cooperation, without treating every commitment in the communiqué as already implemented.

Sources

Close cooperation

South Korea and Poland

Defence cooperation combines with investment, trade and security coordination between South Korea and Poland. Practical content described by Korean diplomacy supports closeness beyond the strategic label.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Portugal

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Portugal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Qatar

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Qatar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Congo - Brazzaville

Ministerial contacts in September 2026 maintain development and consular protection dialogue with the Republic of the Congo. This is institutional cooperation, not attributed to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Romania

The bilateral partnership and economic agenda sustain South Korea–Romania collaboration. The communiqué’s expansion priorities are not presented as implemented results.

Sources

Cooperation

South Korea and Rwanda

Education, health, rural development and technology cooperation provides concrete Rwanda ties. Collaboration predominates without assistance endorsing every regional policy.

Sources

Insufficient information

South Korea and Thailand

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Thailand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Timor-Leste

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Timor-Leste is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

South Korea and Togo

The bilateral information gathered on South Korea and Zambia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

South Korea and Zimbabwe

Contacts in 2025 follow up on cooperation and dialogue on minerals between South Korea and Zimbabwe. The agenda is constructive, without treating the opportunities discussed as fully implemented projects.

Sources

Government of South Sudan

Mixed relationship

South Sudan and Sudan

Dialogue and economic interdependence coexist with Abyei’s dispute and difficulties activating joint mechanisms documented by the UN in 2026. Mixed relations: diplomacy does not resolve territorial status; internal wars or militia actions are not automatically attributed to the other state.

Sources

United Nations

BOE — Spain–Canada protection of classified information

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade — Spain

Cooperation

Spain and Australia

Naval cooperation, energy and infrastructure investment and educational exchanges maintain continuing practical cooperation across shared sectors, without a bilateral military alliance or agreement on every political issue.

Sources

Cooperation

Spain and India

The C295 aircraft industrial project, intergovernmental dialogue and cultural and educational exchanges give substance to cooperation. The leaders’ meeting in February 2026 strengthened this agenda. These concrete ties do not amount to a general political or military alliance.

Sources

Government of India — Modi–Sánchez meeting · 2026-02-18

La Moncloa — visit to India · 2026-02-18

AECID in Egypt — cooperation activities

Cooperation

Security and health projects with Egyptian institutions provide practical relations. Training and technical exchanges in 2026 show operational cooperation without general alliance or regional conflicts becoming bilateral disputes.

Sources

Strained relationship

Spain and Israel

Defence trade restrictions and diplomatic protests over Gaza and Palestine constrain the relationship. Although diplomatic channels remain, political friction predominates, also evident in September 2026. This is not a direct war between Spain and Israel.

Sources

BOE — measures relating to Gaza · 2025-09-24

Cadena SER / EFE — Israeli diplomatic protest · 2026-09-28

Cooperation

Spain and Palestine

Recognition of Palestinian statehood, Spanish diplomatic support and cultural cooperation with the Palestinian Authority underpin cooperation. Support for institutions and population is neither support for Hamas nor a military alliance; political fragmentation limits ties’ scope.

Sources

BOE — recognition and Spanish policy toward Palestine · 2025-09-24

La Moncloa — cultural collaboration with Palestine · 2026-01-28

Airbus — industrial cooperation in Indonesia

Cooperation

Spain and Indonesia

Aeronautical cooperation between companies connected to both countries and institutional dialogue underpin industrial and exchange-oriented relations, rather than political or military alliance. Business cooperation does not mean automatic government agreement.

Sources

Casa Asia — bilateral dialogue with Indonesia

La Moncloa. Remarks by Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez on arrival at the opening ceremony of the European Union–African Union Summit | 24/11/2025 [Prime Minister/Remarks]

Insufficient information

Spain and Afghanistan

In the material gathered, humanitarian aid and positions on Taliban authorities are insufficient to assess the overall current relationship. Afghanistan’s internal situation is not equated with bilateral confrontation with Spain.

Cooperation

Spain and Angola

Political contacts and the economic agenda sustain a favourable relationship with Angola. Spain identifies it as an important partner in its African foreign-policy engagement. Proposed areas of collaboration are distinguished from programmes whose implementation is not documented.

Sources

PART II: SPAIN IN THE WORLD

Spain and Albania strengthen bilateral relations on the 40th anniversary of establishing diplomatic relations

Cooperation

Spain and Albania

Spanish support for Albania's European integration, ministerial dialogue and growing tourism exchanges sustain a cooperative relationship. Investment and Spanish-language teaching projects broaden that agenda, although announced initiatives do not yet amount to implemented results.

Sources

Andorra and Spain strengthen bilateral cooperation with the official visit of Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares - Government of Andorra

Close cooperation

Spain and Andorra

Education, social security and police cooperation connect the two countries on a sustained basis. Being neighbours translates into services and everyday ties, not just diplomatic declarations. The 2026 agreements expand already extensive collaboration.

Sources

The United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Spain issue a joint declaration

Cooperation

Spain and United Arab Emirates

Political dialogue and economic ties sustain a cooperative relationship with the United Arab Emirates. The joint declaration in January 2026 seeks to broaden that agenda. Announced commitments are not presented as proof of implemented projects or general political affinity.

Sources

Political consultations held between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Armenia and Spain - Embassy of the Republic of Armenia to the Kingdom of Spain

Cooperation

Spain and Armenia

Political consultations and government contacts maintain a cooperative agenda seeking expanded economic exchanges. Spain also participates in European support for Armenia. This favourable framework does not automatically create a bilateral defence alliance.

Sources

Nikol Pashinyan, Pedro Sánchez discuss prospects for developing Armenia-Spain cooperation - Press releases - Updates - The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia

BOE-A-1976-20125 Spain's Instrument of Ratification of the Cultural and Scientific Cooperation Agreement between Spain and Austria, signed in Vienna on 17 September 1975.

Insufficient information

Spain and Antigua & Barbuda

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Antigua & Barbuda does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Austria

Economic, educational and cultural exchanges underpin cooperation between Spain and Austria. Differences over European migration management generate political friction, but a warning about border controls does not alone demonstrate a rupture of bilateral channels.

Sources

'We're ready to close our borders if the crisis in Spain puts pressure': Austria - Politics - Ansa.it

Republic of Azerbaijan Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Spain and Azerbaijan

Ministerial dialogue and proposed coordination to protect Spanish citizens during the regional crisis show practical cooperation. Consular contact is not interpreted as a military alliance or Spanish support for every Azerbaijani position.

Sources

News :: MFA

Felipe VI calls the King of Bahrain to convey his support after Iran's attack on his territory

Cooperation

Spain and Bahrain

Diplomatic channels and defence framework remain. Spanish support for Bahrain after 2026 attacks reinforces political collaboration, not general domestic-policy agreement.

Sources

BOE-A-2017-11282 Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and the Government of the Kingdom of Bahrain on defense cooperation, concluded in Manama on 1 May 2014.

Insufficient information

Spain and Bahamas

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Bahamas does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Bosnia & Herzegovina

Support for Bosnia and Herzegovina’s stability and continuing Barcelona–Sarajevo cooperation give substance to relations. Diplomatic and municipal contacts maintain ties. Spain’s former military presence is not evidence of a current bilateral deployment.

Sources

Visit by the Mayor of Barcelona, Mr. Jaume Collboni, to Sarajevo

Albares reaffirms Spain's commitment to Bosnia and Herzegovina's stability and territorial integrity

EU sanctions against Belarus - Consilium

Strained relationship

Spain and Belarus

European sanctions applicable in Spain restrict economic relations and official contacts with Belarus. Domestic repression and Belarusian support for Russia’s war against Ukraine constrain ties. These restrictions do not mean direct war between Spain and Belarus.

Sources

First Deputy Prime Minister's Office. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business - Belarus

Bolivia and Spain reaffirm their willingness to continue strengthening a relationship based on dialogue and cooperation – MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS :: BOLIVIA

Insufficient information

Spain and Belize

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Belize does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Bolivia

Diplomatic dialogue and cooperation sustain favourable Spain–Bolivia relations. Investment litigation is part of complex economic ties, not automatically a government-to-government crisis.

Sources

State Attorney General's Office - Home

Albares welcomes his Botswana counterpart to deepen the potential of economic and trade relations

Insufficient information

Spain and Barbados

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Barbados does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Brunei

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Brunei does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Bhutan

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Bhutan does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Botswana

The 2026 presidential and ministerial contacts boost Botswana economy and cooperation. Collaboration predominates, but commercial opportunities and announced commitments alone do not prove executed investment.

Sources

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez and Botswana's president advocate strengthening bilateral relations within the Spain-Africa Strategy 2025-2028 | 10/04/2026 [President/Activities]

BOE-A-2022-4358 Minutes of the V Meeting of the Joint Cooperation Commission between Spain and Cabo Verde, approving the Spain–Cabo Verde Advanced Cooperation Agreement 2022-2030, drawn up in Praia on December 20, 2021.

Insufficient information

Spain and Central African Republic

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship

Cooperation

Spain and Costa Rica

Joint development projects and exchanges of good policing practices show effective cooperation. Diplomatic affinity favours collaboration, but the classification rests on activities and results, not only shared history or language.

Sources

Costa Rica, the European Union and Spain present results from 11 triangular cooperation projects | EEAS

La Moncloa. José Manuel Albares receives Cuban Foreign Minister in Madrid | 16/02/2026 [News]

Cooperation

Spain and Cuba

Diplomatic dialogue, economic ties and humanitarian cooperation maintain cooperative relations with Cuba. Population assistance and government contacts do not imply support for Cuba’s political system. Human rights disagreements remain part of the context.

Sources

The government uses the debt conversion program with Cuba to donate food to the local population

Reply by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Νikos Christodoulides, on the occasion of the presentation of credentials by the new Ambassador of the Κingdom of Spain to the Republic of Cyprus, Ms Mercedes Alonso Frayle - Gov.cy

Cooperation

Spain and Cyprus

Spanish support for Cypriot sovereignty and security collaboration sustain cooperation. A frigate's dispatch in 2026 is concrete beyond EU membership, not agreement on every regional matter.

Sources

EU.- AM-Sánchez defends sending the frigate to Cyprus with the “same determination” as 'no to war', in support of an EU country

Spain–Czech Republic relations at their best in three decades – Diplomacy News

Cooperation

Spain and Czechia

Business and cultural exchanges and institutional contacts underpin cooperation. Cultural activities in 2026 maintain societal ties. Shared EU and NATO membership provides context, not sufficient evidence alone for the highest level.

Sources

Insufficient information

Spain and Djibouti

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Djibouti does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Dominica

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Dominica does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Denmark

Spanish solidarity with Danish sovereignty and diplomatic coordination show favourable relations. Business contacts complement cooperation. Recent innovation agreements are distinguished from realised projects.

Sources

Albares defends Europe's sovereignty in Davos

The Design Institute of Spain (D!OS) and the Spanish-Danish Chamber of Commerce partner to promote design and business innovation — Design Institute of Spain

BOE-A-2025-12417 Dominican Republic–Spain Sustainable Development Partnership Framework 2025-2029, approved at the X Meeting of the Spanish-Dominican Joint Cooperation Commission, drawn up in Santo Domingo on May 14, 2025.

Cooperation

Spain and Dominican Republic

Development and police cooperation maintain concrete ties between the two countries. Security contacts and agreements in 2026 strengthen this agenda. Classification does not depend solely on cultural affinity or imply every new commitment has been implemented.

Sources

The Dominican Republic and Spain strengthen cooperation on security, youth gangs and gender-based violence | Presidency of the Dominican Republic

The Dominican Republic signs a treaty with Spain to strengthen organized crime prevention and detection | Presidency of the Dominican Republic

Spain and Ecuador target cocaine smuggling ring and make 44 arrests

Cooperation

Spain and Ecuador

Anti-drug police cooperation and 2026 parliamentary dialogue show effective collaboration, complemented by societal ties. Ecuador's security problems are not confused with Spain–Ecuador disputes.

Sources

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Fiji does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Micronesia

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Micronesia does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Gabon

Ministerial dialogue and economic and cultural agenda maintain Gabon cooperation. July 2026 contacts seek energy, infrastructure and Spanish-teaching expansion; opportunities are not executed projects.

Sources

Albares discusses bilateral relations with his Gabonese counterpart

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Responsible for Integration and the Diaspora - DIPLOMACY: Gabon and Spain strengthen their strategic partnership - Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation, Responsible for Integration and the Diaspora

On January 28, 2026, a new round of political consultations between the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Georgia and the Kingdom of Spain was held in Madrid | Embassy of Georgia in the Kingdom of Spain

Mixed relationship

Spain and Georgia

Political consultations between Spain and Georgia continue, but European visa restrictions on certain passports and differences over Georgia’s political direction constrain ties. Dialogue coexists with specific restrictions, without a complete rupture.

Sources

BOE.es - DOUE-L-2026-80337 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) 2026/496 of 6 March 2026 on the temporary suspension of the visa exemption for Georgian nationals holding diplomatic passports and service or official passports.

GHANA ENHANCES RELATIONS WITH SPAIN – Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

Spain and Ghana

Labour-mobility dialogue and maritime cooperation sustain a favourable Spain–Ghana agenda. The 2026 contacts seek depth; existing work differs from proposed unsigned or unimplemented agreements.

Sources

Gambia, Spain Reaffirm Commitment to Strengthening Bilateral Relations

Insufficient information

Spain and Guinea

European restrictions on certain visas and earlier bilateral agreements provide different signals. Assembled material does not sufficiently clarify their current effect on overall Spain ties.

Cooperation

Spain and Gambia

Mobility and security cooperation and diplomatic dialogue underpin a cooperative relationship with Gambia. Contacts in August 2026 continue this agenda. Agreements provide a working framework without alone demonstrating implementation of every planned activity.

Sources

BOE.es - CE-D-2024-1527

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez highlights the good relationship between Spain and Greece and the progress towards a 360º vision of Europe that also looks to the south | 12/01/2026 [News]

Insufficient information

Spain and Guinea-Bissau

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Guinea-Bissau does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Equatorial Guinea

Historical and cultural ties alone do not resolve current political-dialogue assessment. They must be distinguished from human-rights disputes before assigning an overall category.

Cooperation

Spain and Greece

Economic cooperation and Greek support during fires in Spain give practical substance to the relationship. Dialogue in 2026 strengthens this agenda. Regional differences, including Spanish cooperation with Turkey, are not alone equated with a current bilateral crisis.

Sources

Greece–Spain relations

Spanish MFA strengthens partnership for sustainable development with Guatemala through new Partnership Framework for 2026–2030

Insufficient information

Spain and Grenada

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Grenada does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Guatemala

Development cooperation, labour mobility and security sustain cooperative relations. The 2026 programmes and meetings show institutional continuity, distinguishing new commitments from completed activity.

Sources

The Spanish Verification Unit conducts a reconnaissance visit to the Republic of Guatemala - EMAD

MINEX and MINTRAB participate in the II Meeting of the Guatemala–Spain Joint Coordination Committee

BOE-A-2025-19340 Spain–Honduras Sustainable Development Partnership Framework 2025-2029, approved at the IX Meeting of the Spanish-Honduran Joint Cooperation Commission, drawn up in Seville on July 1, 2025.

Insufficient information

Spain and Guyana

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Guyana does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Honduras

The development cooperation framework and agri-food technical contacts underpin favourable relations with Honduras. Multiyear programmes accompany recent institutional dialogue, without signing a budget framework meaning all planned aid has been implemented.

Sources

Honduras-Spain alliance: Promoting cooperation to strengthen agri-food production – SAG / Press Room / Government of the Republic

La Moncloa. Spain and Croatia sign a political consultations agreement to strengthen bilateral relations | 19/02/2026 [Press/News/Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation]

Cooperation

Spain and Croatia

Economic and scientific-technological collaboration and regular politics sustain cooperation. The 2026 consultation agreement structures dialogue; signature is not all new planned initiatives executed.

Sources

Home - OCE - Haiti - aecid.es

Cooperation

Spain and Haiti

Spanish development cooperation and humanitarian aid maintain practical ties with Haiti. Institutional dialogue seeks to coordinate these activities. Haiti’s severe insecurity limits work on the ground, but is not interpreted as Haitian hostility towards Spain.

Sources

Towards a strengthening of cooperation ties with Spain - iciHaiti.com : All the news in brief 7/7

BOE-A-2026-7438 Extradition Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, concluded in Madrid on 5 June 2025.

Cooperation

Spain and Hungary

Trade, education and culture maintain Hungary cooperation. Ministers continue despite European differences, which alone are not bilateral collaboration rupture.

Political dialogue and judicial cooperation underpin a favourable relationship with Jordan. The strategic partnership provides a broader framework, and the extradition agreement published in 2026 gives concrete form to part of the agenda. This relationship does not entail a general military alliance.

Sources

La Moncloa. Spain and Jordan elevate bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership | 05/06/2025 [President/Activities]

Luis Planas meets with Kazakhstan's ambassador to strengthen bilateral agrifood relations

Cooperation

Spain and Kazakhstan

Contacts on agri-food trade and institutional cooperation underpin a cooperative relationship with Kazakhstan. The 2026 agenda seeks to expand exchanges. Interest in new projects is not counted as investment already implemented or a comprehensive political alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Spain and Kenya

Maritime cooperation and institutional contacts during Spanish port calls in 2026 provide practical substance to the relationship with Kenya. Sector-specific cooperation predominates. The international operation in the area does not alone imply a bilateral military alliance.

Sources

The frigate ‘Victoria’ conducts diplomatic and military cooperation activities during its port call in Mombasa - EMAD

The frigate ‘Canarias’ conducts operational, diplomatic and social cooperation activities during its port call in Mombasa - EMAD

COUNTRY PROFILE KYRGYZSTAN

Insufficient information

Spain and Kyrgyzstan

Descriptions of cordiality and logistical precedents do not alone establish the relationship’s current substance. The assembled material does not allow a substantiated classification.

Sources

Insufficient information

Spain and Cambodia

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Cambodia does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Kiribati

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Kiribati does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and St. Kitts & Nevis

The material gathered on ties between Spain and St. Kitts & Nevis does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Kuwait

Ministerial dialogue and economic collaboration sustain favourable Kuwait ties. May 2026 contacts reinforced regional-instability coordination; diplomatic support is not overall government agreement.

Sources

Albares welcomes his Kuwaiti counterpart to strengthen bilateral relations

Albares initiates round of meetings with Middle Eastern counterparts in Madrid

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez reaffirms Spain's commitment to Lebanon's stability and highlights the strength of bilateral relations | 02/02/2026 [President/Activities]

Insufficient information

Spain and Laos

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Laos does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Lebanon

Spanish peacekeeping deployment and Lebanese institutional dialogue provide cooperation. Stability support is not Hezbollah endorsement or attribution of armed-group actions to the whole country.

Sources

Message from Minister José Manuel Albares on the critical situation in Lebanon

Robles highlights the need for Spanish troops in Lebanon and the Horn of Africa amid international instability - Spain Ministry of Defense

Support for Lithuanian security and parliamentary contacts in 2026 maintain cooperation. Spanish solidarity against regional threats strengthens dialogue. Shared organisations are not automatic proof of close bilateral cooperation in every area.

Sources

Spanish Government expresses solidarity with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in the face of Russian disinformation campaign and drone attacks

K. Budrys discussed strengthening bilateral relations, European security and support for Ukraine with Spanish parliamentarians | Ministry of Foreign Affairs

La Moncloa. Robles meets Moldova's defense minister, who thanks Spain for assistance concerning the Ukraine war | 23/04/2026 [Press/News/Defense]

Cooperation

Security collaboration and Spanish support for Moldovan stability sustain favourable relations. The April 2026 defence meeting confirms bilateral dialogue; support is not an unlimited military guarantee.

Sources

The frigate ‘Canarias’ calls at Antsiranana port as part of Operation ‘Atalanta’ - EMAD

Cooperation

Spain and Madagascar

Diplomatic and cooperative activities during the Spanish naval port call in April 2026 provide a cooperative foundation for relations with Madagascar. This is sector-specific; it is not interpreted as a general alliance or an assessment of domestic problems.

Sources

PRESS RELEASE BY THE MINISTRY FOR HOME AFFAIRS AND SECURITY Minister Bedingfield reaffirms support for Spain and calls for a tough response to irregular migration and its root causes

Insufficient information

Spain and Maldives

Tourism and trade promotion provide contacts with Spain, but the assembled material is insufficient to assess political and economic relations as a whole.

Parliamentary dialogue and cultural, tourism and trade exchanges underpin a cooperative relationship with Malta. Its support for Spain during the 2026 migration crisis strengthens political coordination, without alone turning the relationship into the closest level of alliance.

Sources

PRESS RELEASE BY THE OFFICE OF THE SPEAKER Speaker of the House of Representatives meets new Ambassador of Spain to Malta

Sanctions against Myanmar - Consilium

Strained relationship

Spain and Myanmar (Burma)

Restrictions targeting the military regime and opposition to repression constrain official ties with Myanmar. Spain applies the European sanctions framework extended in 2026. Pressure on the authorities is not equated with hostility towards the population or interstate war.

Sources

Decision - CFSP - 2026/927 - EN - EUR-Lex

Cooperation

Spain and Montenegro

Political dialogue and the economic agreements of June 2026 maintain a cooperative agenda with Montenegro. Spain supports its rapprochement with Europe. Signed instruments are distinguished from future results and do not alone establish completed economic integration.

Sources

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez and Milojko Spajić sign two agreements to strengthen economic relations between Spain and Montenegro | 05/06/2026 [Prime Minister/Activity]

AECID in Mozambique - aecid.es

Insufficient information

Spain and Mongolia

The tourist visa exemption for Spaniards provides a concrete measure but is insufficient by itself to assess the whole relationship with Mongolia.

Cooperation

Spain and Mozambique

Health cooperation, including support for the Manhiça research centre, and development programmes underpin a cooperative relationship with Mozambique. These ties provide concrete activity, without confusing the country’s internal conflicts with a bilateral dispute with Spain.

Sources

La Moncloa. Albares strengthens political dialogue with his Mauritanian counterpart | 27/10/2025 [News]

Cooperation

Spain and Mauritania

Military training, development cooperation and dialogue on mobility and fisheries give practical substance to relations with Mauritania. Activities implemented in 2026 show continuity. Migration management is one part of the relationship, not a measure of affinity between populations.

Sources

BOE-A-2024-6715 Minutes of the VIII Meeting of the Spanish-Mauritanian Joint Cooperation Commission approving the Mauritania-Spain Country Partnership Framework 2024-2027, drawn up in Nouakchott on 8 February 2024.

The Amphibious Ship ‘Galicia’ returns to her home base after an intense training and cooperation programme in Nouakchott - EMAD

Spanish Air and Space Force's Stopover in Malaysia

Insufficient information

Spain and Mauritius

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Mauritius does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Malawi

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Malawi does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Malaysia

Trade and industry complement security contacts and diplomacy. The 2026 exchanges maintain a favourable Malaysia agenda; technical collaboration does not imply agreement on every political matter.

Sources

Ambassador

DEPUTY SECRETARY-GENERAL (DEVELOPMENT) RECEIVES COURTESY CALL FROM THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR DEFENCE INDUSTRY STRATEGY AND INNOVATION OF SPAIN

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez reaffirms Spain's commitment to the WHO Pandemic Agreement during a meeting with Namibia's president | 22/09/2026 [Prime Minister/Activity]

Cooperation

Spain and Namibia

Fisheries and trade ties underpin practical cooperation with Namibia alongside political dialogue. The presidential meeting in September 2026 strengthens coordination on international health. Earlier aid programmes are not automatically considered active today.

Sources

Galicia and Namibia interested in renewing their memorandum of understanding on research, cooperation and fishing

Nepal-Spain Relations | Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Trade, tourism and societal contacts underpin favourable relations with Nepal. Humanitarian assistance forms part of the bilateral history. Diplomatic accreditation is not the category’s only basis and does not turn the relationship into a general alliance.

Sources

Good political relations with New Zealand were relaunched following the signing of the bilateral Political Declaration in 2019 and the Strategic Partnership in 2020, culminating in Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern's visit to Spain in 2022. There is a political consultation mechanism at secretary of state level, with its latest edition held in Madrid in 2024. In the coming years, Spain will seek to hold political consultations every two years and develop the Spain–New Zealand Joint Declaration through an Action Plan. Progress will also be made toward signing a Social Security Convention, and the agreements signed on Seabird Protection (2021) and Educational Cooperation (2024) will be implemented.

Insufficient information

Spain and Nauru

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Nauru does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and New Zealand

Trade, science, education and political consultations sustain New Zealand cooperation, with an additional European trade framework. Future social-security plans are not agreements already in force.

Sources

COUNTRY PROFILE NEW ZEALAND

First Deputy Prime Minister's Office. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business - New Zealand

BOE-A-2026-12519 Agreement between the Kingdom of Spain and the Sultanate of Oman on reciprocal visa exemption for diplomatic, special and service passports, drawn up in Madrid on 5 November 2025.

Cooperation

Spain and Oman

Political dialogue and bilateral agreements maintain favourable relations with Oman. Visa exemption for certain passports entered into force in 2026, giving concrete form to some cooperation. Other memoranda are not considered implemented programmes merely because they were signed.

Sources

La Moncloa. Spain and Oman strengthen their relationship through a Joint Declaration, an international treaty and six Memoranda of Understanding | 05/11/2025 [Prime Minister/Activity]

Albares speaks with his Pakistani counterpart and Middle Eastern foreign ministers

Cooperation

Spain and Pakistan

Diplomatic dialogue and agriculture and trade contacts sustain Pakistan cooperation. The 2026 collaboration includes regional-crisis coordination; Pakistani neighbour disputes are not transferred here.

Sources

PID

HH The Amir Receives Phone Call from King of Spain

Cooperation

Spain and Panama

Institutional and development cooperation plus 2026 presidential contacts maintain favourable Panama relations. Agreements expand the agenda, not already executed results or general defence alliance.

Sources

Diplomatic dialogue and Spanish support for Qatar security sustain favourable relations. March 2026 contacts seek regional de-escalation; solidarity is not every-policy support or unlimited military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

Spain and Romania

Societal ties and institutional cooperation underpin cooperative relations with Romania. Joint activities against gender-based violence in 2026 provide a concrete example. Shared EU membership supplies a framework, not automatic justification of the highest level.

Sources

Partnerships that protect: Spain and Romania against gender-based violence

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez receives Senegal's president and elevates bilateral relations to a Strategic Partnership | 26/03/2026 [President/Activities]

Insufficient information

Spain and Rwanda

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Rwanda does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Sudan

Sudan's war and humanitarian assistance are not treated as a bilateral war with Spain. Institutional fragmentation and available coverage prevent a well-founded classification of the relationship as a whole.

Cooperation

Spain and Senegal

Labour mobility, political dialogue and development sustain favourable Senegal relations. The 2026 strategic partnership expands the framework; ongoing collaboration differs from new commitments not yet proven implemented.

Sources

Spain and Senegal sign a Memorandum of Understanding to strengthen bilateral cooperation

First Deputy Prime Minister's Office. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business - Singapore

Cooperation

Spain and Singapore

EU–Singapore trade and economic agreements provide collaboration applicable to Spain. Bilateral culture and education complement it; this is not a general political or military alliance.

Sources

BOE-A-2011-16746 Cultural, Educational and Scientific Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Spain and the Government of the Republic of Singapore, drawn up in Singapore on April 13, 2011.

Albares advocates "strong" relations with Slovakia and highlights Spanish troop deployments in the country

Insufficient information

Spain and Solomon Islands

Insufficient information

Spain and South Sudan

Assistance to the population and South Sudan's security situation are separate from government-to-government ties. The material gathered does not permit an overall category for its relationship with Spain.

Insufficient information

Spain and São Tomé & Príncipe

The material gathered on ties between Spain and São Tomé & Príncipe does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Suriname

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Suriname does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Slovakia

Spain’s security deployment and political contacts maintain a cooperative relationship with Slovakia. The 2026 bilateral agenda also includes academic cooperation and tourism. Differences over European issues are not confused with withdrawal of this concrete cooperation.

Sources

Albares visits Slovakia at a time of strengthening bilateral relations

PressReleaseDetail | Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Madrid

Bilateral relations | GOV.SI

Cooperation

Spain and Slovenia

Economic, educational and cultural cooperation underpin a cooperative relationship with Slovenia. Contacts between the culture ministries in 2026 continue this agenda. Shared membership of European organisations complements these activities rather than replacing them as evidence.

Sources

Spain and Slovenia's culture ministries strengthen cultural relations | Ministry of Culture

STATEMENT BY THE FOREIGN MINISTERS OF SPAIN, CANADA, DENMARK, FINLAND, FRANCE, IRELAND, ICELAND, NORWAY, POLAND, PORTUGAL, THE UNITED KINGDOM AND SWEDEN ON THE TWO-STATE SOLUTION

Cooperation

Spain and Sweden

Swedish diplomatic coordination includes shared two-state positions and European action. This favours cooperation, not all-policy agreement or unlimited bilateral alliance.

Sources

The new fisheries protocol between the European Union and Seychelles, crucial for the Spanish tuna fleet

Insufficient information

Spain and Eswatini

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Eswatini does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Seychelles

Fisheries provide concrete cooperation with Seychelles, with regulated access important to Spain’s fleet. The European protocol provisionally applied in 2026 continues this activity. Its European framework is identified rather than presented as an exclusively Spanish bilateral treaty.

Sources

Seychelles and EU sign new fisheries agreement – Seychelles Fisheries Authority

EU and Seychelles holds Joint Committee Meetings of the Sustainable Fisheries Partnership Agreement - Ministry of Fisheries, Agriculture and Blue Economy

Syrian–Spanish discussions to revive agreement with the EU

Cooperation

Spain and Syria

Dialogue with transitional authorities and support for inclusive transition orient relations towards cooperation. Contacts in 2026 rebuild institutional channels. Transition conditions ties: neither unconditional support nor automatic continuity with the former regime.

Sources

Spanish Government welcomes ceasefire agreement reached in Syria to end fighting in Aleppo

Ambassador met with Director-General for North America, Eastern Europe and Asia-Pacific at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Spain - Royal Thai Embassy, Madrid, Spain

Insufficient information

Spain and Chad

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Chad does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Togo

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Togo does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Thailand

Diplomatic and economic exchanges sustain Thailand cooperation, which the 2026 agenda seeks to expand. Thailand–Cambodia disputes are not attributed to Spain or evidence of Spain–Thailand crisis.

Sources

Minister of Foreign Affairs meets with Ambassador of Spain to Thailand - Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Talks between the Director-General and H.E. Mr. Felipe de la Morena Casado, Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to Thailand - Department of International Economic Affairs

First Deputy Prime Minister's Office. Ministry of Economy, Trade and Business - Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements (APPRI)

Cooperation

Spain and Tunisia

Diplomacy and economic and social exchange maintain Tunisia cooperation, aided by Mediterranean proximity. Collaboration is neither all Tunisian policy endorsement nor bilateral military guarantee.

Sources

Ambassador

Presidents Orsi and Sánchez held a bilateral meeting in Barcelona

Insufficient information

Spain and Tuvalu

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Tuvalu does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Tanzania

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Tanzania does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Insufficient information

Spain and Uganda

The material gathered on ties between Spain and Uganda does not support assigning a category. Diplomatic contacts, old agreements or membership of shared organisations are not, on their own, treated as evidence of current cooperation or a strained relationship.

Cooperation

Spain and Uruguay

Presidential dialogue and economic exchange maintain favourable Uruguay relations. The 2026 contacts strengthen political coordination; cultural and historical closeness is not alone the justification.

Sources

Minister Luis Planas meets with the new Uruguayan ambassador to Spain, Bernardo Greiver

Albares meets Uzbek counterpart to boost Spain’s presence in Central Asia

Cooperation

Spain and Uzbekistan

The 2026 diplomatic and agrifood contacts maintain a favourable Uzbekistan agenda. Agreements facilitate and expand collaboration; signature is not all project implementation or military alliance.

Sources

Luis Planas meets his Uzbek counterpart, Ibrokhim Abdurakhmonov, to strengthen agrifood cooperation

La Moncloa. Pedro Sánchez highlights alignment with Pope Leo XIV on global challenges such as wars, migration and Artificial Intelligence | 27/05/2026 [President/Activities]

Cooperation

Spain and Vatican City

Spain–Holy See dialogue addresses social issues, international peace and bilateral matters including redress for abuse victims. Meetings in 2026 show active cooperation. Diplomacy is with the Holy See, represented here as Vatican City, not Spanish population beliefs.

Sources

Holy See Press Office statement: Audience with the Prime Minister of Spain

Political and business contacts in 2026 maintain favourable South Africa relations, combining economic exchanges and international coordination. Interest in investment is distinguished from completed investment; specific differences are not general hostility.

Sources

South Africa's president calls for stronger cooperation with Spain to diversify trade and attract investment | Spanish Chamber of Commerce

President Cyril Ramaphosa on working visit to Kingdom of Spain | South African Government

Sources

Insufficient information

Sweden and Barbados

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Barbados is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Sweden and Belarus

Swedish sanctions and the 2026 diplomatic position condition relations with Belarusian authorities. These differences shape ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Belgium

The embassy’s reopening in 2025 strengthens political and trade contacts with Belgium. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The 2026–2030 strategy maintains an institutional framework for cooperation with Bosnia and Herzegovina. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Botswana

Institutional contacts and the trade agenda offer collaboration with Botswana. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Nordic coordination with Denmark covers security, resilience and strategic supplies. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sweden and Gabon

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Gabon is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Sweden and Gambia

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Gambia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Sweden and Georgia

Suspended direct Georgian government-agency cooperation shows political deterioration, distinct from civil-society support. Differences shape ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Political dialogue and the defence cooperation framework sustain an agenda with Hungary. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Iceland

The bilateral fund sustains concrete cultural and social exchanges with Iceland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Iraq

The 2025 memorandum on organised crime reactivates collaboration with the Iraqi government. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Ireland

Political, trade and cultural contacts maintain an agenda with Ireland. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Bilateral defence and security collaboration provides a specific tie with Latvia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Bilateral defence and security collaboration sustains cooperation with Lithuania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Luxembourg

The trade agenda and contacts handled from Brussels maintain cooperation with Luxembourg. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Reform programmes and defence contacts provide cooperation with Moldova. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Sweden and Monaco

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Monaco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Sweden and Mongolia

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Mongolia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Sweden and Montenegro

The bilateral information gathered on Sweden and Montenegro is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Sweden and Morocco

The November 2025 declaration opens judicial cooperation with Morocco against organised crime. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Sweden and Mozambique

Reduced aid to Mozambique coexists with new political consultations, not a diplomatic rupture. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Sources

Insufficient information

Switzerland and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Switzerland and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Switzerland and Bahrain

The 2026 profile documents expanding dialogue and scientific and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Ties continue beyond the development programme’s closure in 2016; that historical programme is not presented as still open. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Switzerland and Bolivia

The bilateral information gathered on Switzerland and Bolivia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Switzerland and Bosnia & Herzegovina

Documented collaboration addresses governance, the economy and migration, with regular political contacts. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Switzerland and Chad is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Switzerland and Chile

The relationship brings together trade agreements, research and work on climate and water; it is not based solely on trade volume. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Switzerland and Colombia

Economic agreements are complemented by humanitarian cooperation, peace promotion and cultural collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Economic agreements are complemented by a bilateral climate change mitigation framework. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The relationship combines economic exchanges with research and innovation collaboration, according to the bilateral profile. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Switzerland and Côte d’Ivoire

The 2026 profile documents economic, scientific, cultural and migration cooperation with Côte d’Ivoire. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Switzerland and Monaco

The 2026 profile documents joint work on the environment, financial crimes and cultural affairs. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Switzerland and Mongolia

Political consultations and bilateral programmes continue the relationship without assuming all historical cooperation remains funded. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Switzerland and Montenegro

Trade, tax and investment agreements provide a stable foundation for bilateral dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Switzerland and Morocco

The bilateral information gathered on Switzerland and Morocco is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Switzerland and Mozambique

The 2026 profile documents long-standing development collaboration and diplomatic contacts, not an automatic defence alliance. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Trade, investment and technical cooperation agreements provide a bilateral framework for limited collaboration, not a close relationship. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Institutional source: www.mfa.tj

The strategic partnership framework and August 2025 talks underpin political dialogue and economic cooperation. Cooperation predominates; the 2026–2028 roadmap was proposed, not already implemented, and the strategic label is insufficient for close cooperation.

Sources

Institutional source: mfa.tj

The 2025 dialogue seeks to strengthen development programmes and complete outstanding bilateral mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Strained relationship

Thailand and Cambodia

Cooperation

Thailand and Cyprus

The 2026 meeting addresses education, cybersecurity and life sciences. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Thailand and Luxembourg

The first consultations in 2026 establish a channel to examine political and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Thailand and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Thailand and Malawi

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Malawi is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Thailand and Malaysia

The 2026 meeting maintains dialogue between neighbouring governments and collaboration mechanisms. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Thailand and North Macedonia

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and North Macedonia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Thailand and Oman

The 2025 meeting examines health collaboration, tourism and political contacts. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Thailand and Palau

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Palau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Thailand and Palestine

The 2025 meeting addresses technical cooperation and dialogue with Palestinian representatives, not with any armed group. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Senegal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Thailand and Serbia

The 2024 meeting maintains dialogue and seeks to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

Thailand and Seychelles

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Seychelles is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Thailand and Sierra Leone

The bilateral information gathered on Thailand and Sierra Leone is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Thailand and Singapore

The 2026 prime ministers’ meeting reviews political and economic collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Thailand and Slovakia

Contacts in 2025 address investment, political cooperation and international coordination. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

Thailand and Slovenia

The 2025 meeting maintains a bilateral channel to examine collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The September 2026 Yemeni study mission learning Timorese reconciliation and reconstruction shows peacebuilding cooperation. Limited relations imply neither all Yemeni factions supported nor strategic alliance.

Sources

Documented trade coordination provides concrete Tonga–Tuvalu instruments. Moderate cooperation assumes neither defence commitments nor their separate Australian relations as agreements between the two.

Sources

Tongan Ministry of Revenue and Customs

Cooperation

Tonga and Vanuatu

Trade cooperation rests on a customs facilitation programme and joint institutional work documented in 2026. These are concrete economic cooperation mechanisms, not merely regional affinity; the whole reform is not considered complete, nor is a close political alliance inferred.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Fiji

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Fiji is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Finland

Recent political dialogue with Finland and the security coordination framework support institutional cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cultural and protocol agreements with Guatemala provide institutional channels for cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Guinea

The joint economic commission and technical assistance mechanisms with Guinea support institutional cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Political channels and neighbourly ties coexist with serious security friction. In March 2026 Turkey reported a missile intercepted as it entered its airspace and urged Iran to exercise restraint, while maintaining dialogue; this does not establish a continuing bilateral war.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Iraq

Cooperation

Türkiye and Kenya

Health, food, agriculture and education projects with Kenya provide concrete development cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Kiribati

Aid for the project against gender-based violence in Kiribati provides a concrete technical precedent, not new funding in 2026. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Education and diplomatic training agreements with Liberia provide bilateral collaboration channels. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Libya

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Libya is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Liechtenstein

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Liechtenstein is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Lithuania

The joint commission meeting in Istanbul in May 2026 provides institutional economic collaboration with Lithuania. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Luxembourg

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Luxembourg is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Madagascar

Technical and humanitarian assistance to Madagascar documents practical collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Malawi

Economic and technical agreements and the business mechanism with Malawi provide an institutional cooperative foundation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Malaysia

The operational trade treaty with Malaysia and bilateral collaboration mechanisms provide an institutional foundation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Economic and investment agreements with Montenegro provide a bilateral cooperation framework. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Morocco

The trade framework with Morocco and bilateral coordination mechanisms sustain institutional cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Mozambique

April 2024 bilateral political consultations in Maputo provide institutional coordination with Mozambique. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Myanmar (Burma)

Health and humanitarian assistance through TİKA in Myanmar provides practical cooperation without assuming approval of its domestic policies. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Namibia

The joint economic commission with Namibia provides an institutional cooperation mechanism. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Nigeria

Political mechanisms and business meetings with Nigeria provide institutional collaboration, not to be confused with Niger. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and North Korea

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and North Korea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and North Macedonia

Business activity and institutional mechanisms with North Macedonia support economic collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Norway

Political dialogue in 2025 and security coordination provide institutional cooperation with Norway. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Oman

The January 2026 dialogue with Oman and sectoral agreements provide institutional cooperation; new trade targets are not achieved results. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Pakistan

The strategic cooperation council that met in February 2025 provides political coordination with Pakistan; fraternity language alone does not determine the level. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Portugal is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Qatar

The bilateral committee and economic agreement in force since August 2025 provide institutional cooperation with Qatar. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Congo - Brazzaville

Technical assistance and the economic commission with the Republic of the Congo provide collaboration without confusing it with the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Serbia

Agreements with Serbia on fires, investment and technological cooperation provide a bilateral institutional foundation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Seychelles

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Seychelles is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Sierra Leone

Technical assistance in various sectors with Sierra Leone documents development collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Singapore

University research, scholarship and teaching exchange mechanisms with Singapore provide educational cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Slovakia

The economic commission created in 2024 with Slovakia provides a bilateral collaboration mechanism. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Syria

The September 2026 foreign and interior affairs meetings in Damascus support political coordination with the current Syrian authorities without automatically transferring the former relations with Assad. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Tajikistan

TİKA’s office and the Turkish teaching centre in Dushanbe provide technical and educational cooperation with Tajikistan. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Tanzania

Education and investment agreements signed in 2024 with Tanzania provide institutional collaboration channels. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Thailand

The economic commission and technical assistance mechanisms with Thailand provide bilateral cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Tuvalu

Support for Tuvalu’s community service buildings project provides limited development cooperation. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and Uganda

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and Uganda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Ukraine

The July 2026 dialogue with Ukraine provides political and economic coordination; expected benefits from new agreements are not counted as achieved. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Türkiye and United Arab Emirates

The bilateral information gathered on Türkiye and United Arab Emirates is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Türkiye and Uruguay

Economic and cooperation agreements in force since 2011 with Uruguay provide an institutional framework. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Uzbekistan

The bilateral foreign affairs and security mechanism and January 2026 meeting provide cooperation with Uzbekistan. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Cooperation

Türkiye and Vanuatu

The donation of an X-ray device for biosecurity in Vanuatu provides a concrete precedent for technical collaboration. The category provides an indicative summary of these bilateral ties; it does not imply a military alliance or that all announced initiatives have been implemented.

Sources

Economic collaboration rests on active trade mechanisms and 2026 implementation planning. Cooperation is assessed without assuming completed reforms or full political affinity.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Austria is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Azerbaijan

Diplomatic contacts with Azerbaijan include mutual sovereignty support and bilateral collaboration. This favours cooperation without a military alliance or agreement on all regional positions.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Bahamas

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Bahamas is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Bahrain

The foreign ministries’ memorandum and high-level contacts formalise collaboration with Bahrain. Relations are cooperative without signing the instrument demonstrating all its results.

Sources

The bilateral agenda with Bulgaria includes energy, infrastructure and recent ministerial contacts. The relationship is cooperative; discussed projects are not presented as implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Burkina Faso

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Burkina Faso is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Burundi

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Burundi is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Cambodia

Cambodia has trained Ukrainian specialists in humanitarian demining and maintains diplomatic support. This concrete aid supports cooperation without implying a military alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Cameroon

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Cameroon is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Cape Verde

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Cape Verde is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Central African Republic

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Central African Republic is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Djibouti is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Dominica

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Dominica is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Dominican Republic

Dominican Republic contacts seek to restore war-affected trade and maintain bilateral cooperation. This collaborative orientation does not claim economic recovery completed.

Sources

Sources

Mixed relationship

Ukraine and Hungary

Cooperation

Ukraine and Kenya

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Luxembourg is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Madagascar

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Madagascar is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Malawi

The political consultation memorandum establishes a cooperation channel with Malawi. The agenda is collaborative, although the instrument does not demonstrate all new programmes are operational.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Malaysia

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Malaysia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Maldives

Diplomatic contacts with Maldives seek to expand bilateral and multilateral cooperation. The orientation is cooperative without treating the conversation as an already consolidated strategic partnership.

Sources

Strained relationship

Ukraine and Mali

Mali's announced severance of relations in 2024 marks significant diplomatic tension. Ukraine rejected the allegations behind it; these are presented neither as proven facts nor as interstate war.

Sources

Cooperation

Ukraine and Malta

Dialogue in 2026 with Malta addresses bilateral collaboration and maritime security. Relations are cooperative without turning Ukrainian requests for support into Maltese measures already implemented.

Sources

The Netherlands provides military, energy, financial and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and maintains high-level dialogue. This sustained multisectoral support underpins close relations.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and New Zealand

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and New Zealand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

Ukraine and Nicaragua

The severing of diplomatic relations between Ukraine and Nicaragua reflects serious political deterioration. The rupture is not confused with direct armed confrontation between the countries.

Sources

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Oman is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Palau

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Palau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Palestine

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Palestine is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Panama

The March 2026 joint declaration strengthens engagement and cooperation with Panama. The bilateral agenda is positive, although new objectives require implementation checks.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Papua New Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Papua New Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Paraguay

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Paraguay is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Peru

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Peru is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Philippines

The 2026 consultations with the Philippines maintain political dialogue and explore collaboration between security institutions. Relations are cooperative without treating these possibilities as implemented military agreements.

Sources

Mixed relationship

Ukraine and Slovakia

Differences over energy supplies and policy towards Russia have prompted Ukrainian protests against Slovakia. At the same time, bilateral contacts and practical cooperation between neighbours continue.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Slovenia

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Slovenia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Solomon Islands

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Solomon Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Somalia

Establishing relations in 2025 is accompanied by humanitarian food collaboration with Somalia. A cooperative foundation exists without interpreting Somalia’s domestic crisis as hostility between the states.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and South Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and South Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Sri Lanka

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Sri Lanka is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Sudan

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Sudan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Uzbekistan

The April 2026 consultations seek to revive trade and economic dynamism with Uzbekistan. Institutional collaboration exists, although the goal of expanding exchanges does not establish all results.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Vanuatu

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Vanuatu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Vatican City

Holy See dialogue includes humanitarian support and efforts to return prisoners, civilians and children. Cooperation is supported without confusing mediation initiatives with guaranteed results.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Venezuela

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Venezuela is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Vietnam

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Vietnam is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Yemen

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Yemen is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

Ukraine and Zambia

The consultation memorandum and ministerial contacts sustain a Zambia cooperative agenda. Signing provides a framework but does not demonstrate all bilateral programmes launched.

Sources

Insufficient information

Ukraine and Zimbabwe

The bilateral information gathered on Ukraine and Zimbabwe is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Afghanistan

Official contacts with Afghanistan’s de facto authorities maintain dialogue and a bilateral agenda, without implying approval of all their policies. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Albania

High-level contacts with Albania maintain an agenda of collaboration and transfer of administrative knowledge. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Strained relationship

United Arab Emirates and Algeria

The Emirati statement in September 2026 acknowledges Algeria's decision to sever relations and expresses a wish that it be temporary. These differences affect ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Ministerial contacts with Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain bilateral dialogue on cooperation. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Botswana

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Botswana is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Brunei

The joint commission with Brunei provides an institutional mechanism for collaboration and dialogue. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Bulgaria

High-level contacts with Bulgaria maintain a bilateral economic collaboration agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Burkina Faso

The investment forum and ministerial contacts in 2025 maintain economic collaboration with Burkina Faso. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Presidential and trade contacts in 2026 maintain a collaborative agenda with Chile. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Colombia

Ministerial dialogue in September 2026 maintains an economic agenda with Colombia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Presidential contacts in 2026 maintain cooperation with Finland in education, technology and the economy. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

United Arab Emirates and Guatemala

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Guatemala is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Guinea

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Guinea is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Guinea-Bissau

Ministerial dialogue with Guinea-Bissau maintains an economic and development agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Guyana

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Liberia

Ministerial contacts with Liberia maintain an agenda to expand bilateral collaboration. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Libya

Dialogue with Libyan authorities maintains a bilateral agenda; it does not represent the positions of every faction in the country. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Liechtenstein

Parliamentary contacts in 2025 maintain dialogue and institutional collaboration with Liechtenstein. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Official contacts in 2025 with Mauritius maintain an economic and investment agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Micronesia

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Micronesia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Moldova

High-level contacts with Palau maintain an economic and sectoral collaboration agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Ministerial contacts in 2026 maintain an agenda of bilateral cooperation with Slovakia. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Somali Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Slovenia

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Slovenia is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Solomon Islands

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Solomon Islands is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

United Arab Emirates and Somalia

Somalia’s federal government cancelled UAE port, economic and defence agreements in January 2026, alleging sovereignty violations; allegations are not independent verification. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Government of Somalia

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and South Sudan

July 2026 contacts with the South Sudanese government maintain an economic and development agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Sri Lanka

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Sri Lanka is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Strained relationship

United Arab Emirates and Sudan

Port Sudan authorities announced a rupture in 2025, which the UAE refused to recognise. Emirati support for a civilian end to war does not establish normalisation with those authorities. Differences constrain ties without automatically turning diplomatic tension into armed confrontation.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Suriname

The 2026 official visit to Suriname strengthens contacts on trade, tourism and training. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Switzerland

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Switzerland is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Syria

Dialogue in 2026 with the current Syrian authorities maintains an economic and development agenda. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Tajikistan

February 2026 contacts with Tajikistan review sectoral collaboration and renewable energy. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Tanzania

Political consultations in 2024 maintain an institutional cooperation mechanism with Tanzania. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Thailand

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Thailand is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Timor-Leste

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Uganda

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Uganda is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Uruguay

Political consultations in 2024 establish an institutional collaboration mechanism with Uruguay. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Uzbekistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Vanuatu

The 2026 official visit to Vanuatu maintains cooperation on climate and development. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Vatican City

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Vatican City is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Insufficient information

United Arab Emirates and Venezuela

The bilateral information gathered on United Arab Emirates and Venezuela is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not demonstrate neutrality or hostility.

Cooperation

United Arab Emirates and Vietnam

The joint commission and economic agreement’s entry into force maintain concrete cooperation with Vietnam. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

The double-taxation convention entered into force in December 2025 and has tax effects in 2026. It facilitates bilateral economic activity without implying a strategic alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Angola

Trade and business missions sustain the relationship, with interest in infrastructure and investment. Opportunities under negotiation are not treated as investments already implemented or a security alliance.

Sources

Insufficient information

Bilateral trade is recorded, but there is insufficient grounding on political cooperation and current friction to classify the whole relationship. Modest trade volume proves neither hostility nor neutrality.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Bhutan

British coverage identifies contacts and limited trade without showing broad bilateral collaboration. On that basis, neither closeness nor tension is assigned to the overall relationship.

Sources

Insufficient information

Trade records do not establish the balance of bilateral political cooperation and friction. Burkina Faso’s disputes with other European governments are not transferred to London.

Sources

Insufficient information

Trade and tourism connect the countries, but assembled information is insufficient to classify overall diplomatic relations. Travellers’ health advisories are not government tensions.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Central African Republic

Remote diplomatic coverage and British interventions on peace and rights are insufficient to assess bilateral ties. Domestic insecurity is not confused with hostility towards London.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Chad

Sources gathered provide insufficient bilateral grounding to distinguish cooperation, friction and mere dialogue. Chad's internal crises or regional policy alone do not determine London relations.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Chile

Climate, sustainable mining and digital rights collaboration complements trade exchanges. These are concrete joint areas without regional agreement participation implying a military alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Colombia

The Andean trade framework and British cooperation with the peace process provide a collaborative foundation. Historical peace support is distinguished from a success guarantee or an assessment of all current disputes.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Comoros

Economic exchanges are recorded, but there is barely a basis to assess bilateral political cooperation. Their small scale does not establish poor relations or allow neutrality to be assigned.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Costa Rica

Services and investment sustain economic relations both governments seek to expand. Announced CPTPP accession is distinguished from ratification and effective new benefits.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Croatia

Political and security collaboration and the European trade framework sustain cooperative relations. The declaration sets work areas without demonstrating every announced initiative completed.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Cuba

Trade information identifies exchanges but cannot sufficiently weigh political cooperation and disagreements. British relations are not assumed to reproduce Cuba’s United States conflict.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Cyprus

Exercises, military training, police collaboration and education sustain cooperative relations. Engagement on Cypriot reunification and British bases still requires political sensitivity.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Ecuador

Political dialogue addresses trade cooperation, maritime security, organised crime and training. This shared agenda sustains collaboration without treating future measures as already established.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Egypt

Existing economic, migration and regional security collaboration sustains relations. Elevation to a strategic partnership announces a more organised agenda, not proof of every planned result.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and El Salvador

Biodiversity and community-development work complements Central American trade dialogue. Human-rights criticisms are neither presented as bilateral rupture nor ignored when assessing this limited cooperation.

Sources

Insufficient information

Joint work on defence financing and procurement shows political coordination. The proposed new mechanism remains under study, not described as an operational financial institution.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Guinea-Bissau

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Guinea-Bissau is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

Mixed relationship

United Kingdom and Israel

Bilateral trade continues while Gaza and settlement disputes worsen political relations. The announced ban on settlement goods is not described as an already implemented general embargo.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Italy

GCAP defence industry collaboration and institutional contacts sustain cooperation. Developing the future aircraft does not mean the capability is already delivered to armed forces.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Côte d’Ivoire

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Côte d’Ivoire is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Jamaica

Strategic dialogue and joint resilience work sustain active collaboration. Societal and historical ties help explain it, but Commonwealth membership alone does not determine classification.

Sources

Close cooperation

United Kingdom and Japan

Defence collaboration and GCAP industrial development accompany an operating trade agreement and sustained political coordination. Future aircraft delivery is distinguished from existing research and cooperation.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Jordan

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Jordan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Kazakhstan

Economic ties and the partnership agreement sustain a cooperative agenda. Parliamentary presentation is not proof every measure applied.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Kenya

Economic, academic and security ties sustain the bilateral partnership. Future business figures and announced opportunities are distinguished from existing activity and results.

Sources

Institutional and cultural collaboration, including the Creative DNA programme, gives substance to the relationship. Future growth priorities are distinguished from activities already observed.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Malaysia

Existing trade and the opening of digital negotiations show active economic collaboration. Negotiating the new agreement is distinguished from its rules and benefits being in force.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Morocco

The partnership agreement applied since 2021 and strategic dialogue sustain economic and political cooperation. Negotiated market access progress is distinguished from implemented measures.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and New Zealand

The trade treaty is being implemented, with joint monitoring of its results. This framework supports verifiable economic cooperation; historical kinship is not the sole reason for the classification.

Sources

Strained relationship

United Kingdom and Nicaragua

Sanctions targeting those responsible for repression and political deterioration shape the relationship. Trade does not erase these frictions, and the restrictions are not described as a war between states.

Sources

Education and fiscal support and trade dialogue show concrete cooperation. Social connections complement it, without assuming London shares Islamabad's position on every regional dispute.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Portugal

The tax convention in force strengthens institutionalised economic collaboration. Cooperation rests on practical instruments, not only the alliance’s historical age.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Qatar

Strategic dialogue, security coordination and joint heritage digitalisation sustain collaboration. New memoranda and planned meetings are not automatically considered implemented.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Congo - Brazzaville

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Congo - Brazzaville is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Romania

Police and defence collaboration and business support give substance to ties. Cooperation is practical without inferring maximum closeness solely from shared NATO membership.

Sources

Strained relationship

United Kingdom and Rwanda

British measures over Rwanda's Congo intervention limited contacts and government assistance. The air agreement presented in 2026 shows channels remain, not that all restrictions were lifted.

Sources

Support for institutional security and flood resilience sustains collaboration. Armed-group violence is not attributed as hostility by the Somali state towards the United Kingdom.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and South Africa

The bilateral forum maintains joint economic, political and environmental work. Cooperation does not require identical positions on every international conflict or turn new objectives into realised results.

Sources

Financial services and strong economic ties sustain cooperation. The newly announced agreement expands opportunities, but signature alone does not demonstrate that all its benefits are already in effect.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Syria

Reopened diplomatic relations and recovery support show emerging cooperation with the new authorities. The rupture classification from the Assad period is not automatically retained.

Sources

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Tajikistan

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Tajikistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Tanzania

Evaluated growth and investment programmes provide development cooperation grounding. Evaluation does not imply every objective succeeded or a full political alliance.

Sources

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Thailand

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

United Kingdom and Uruguay

The reciprocal youth mobility programme provides practical cooperation and societal ties. It is limited collaboration, not a strategic defence alliance.

Sources

US European Command — United States European Command

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Uzbekistan

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Uzbekistan is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Insufficient information

United Kingdom and Vanuatu

The bilateral information gathered on United Kingdom and Vanuatu is insufficient to assess current cooperation and tensions. A lack of coverage does not imply neutrality, closeness or hostility.

Cooperation

The May 2026 communiqué maintains political support and willingness for bilateral cooperation with Bolivia without treating its domestic problems as conflict between the countries. Documented collaboration predominates, without treating announcements or pending projects as actual results or a close alliance.

Sources

Sources

Cooperation

United States and Montenegro

Defence coordination and regional cooperation favour cooperative relations. Montenegro joined the September 2026 Adriatic Charter meeting. An operational framework exists, but evidence does not justify a particularly deep bilateral partnership.

Sources

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations - EveryCRSReport.com

Cooperation

Baltic security, work with the United States within NATO and economic and political ties are central. Cooperation predominates. Alliance membership alone is not regarded as sufficient evidence of exceptional bilateral closeness.

Sources

Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania: Background and U.S.-Baltic Relations - EveryCRSReport.com

Cooperation

United States and Lithuania

Defence cooperation and Baltic security coordination weigh heavily in relations. Bilateral military contacts and the political and economic framework support cooperation. Effective work is distinguished from presumed permanent agreement on every international issue.

Sources

US European Command — United States European Command

Foreign policy address to the Storting 2026 - regjeringen.no

Cooperation

United States and Norway

Defence remains important and operational with established economic ties. Norway also acknowledges disagreements and concerns over US decisions including trade. Cooperation predominates overall, not tension-free relations or unconditional friendship.

Sources

Closer US–Norwegian military cooperation to boost NATO readiness - Norwegian Armed Forces

The US introduces a new tariff rate on goods from Norway - regjeringen.no

Statement of Foreign Policy 2026 - Government.se

Cooperation

United States and Sweden

Economic, technology and defence ties sustain broad cooperation. Sweden expressed concerns over US policies affecting transatlantic trust without abandoning work. Classification reflects practical continuity, not full government agreement or friction-free relations.

Sources

USA - Regeringen.se

Finland–U.S. relations - Finland abroad: United States of America

Cooperation

United States and Finland

Defence, research and economic exchanges combine with operational military integration to support cooperation. Effective work is distinguished from merely announced visits; full agreement with US trade or political decisions is not presumed.

Sources

Finland, Sweden and Denmark to be transferred to Joint Force Command Norfolk - Finnish Government

US State Department — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Iceland - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Iceland

The bilateral defence agreement and North Atlantic operations provide durable cooperation including economics. Concrete frameworks underpin classification without Iceland sharing every US political statement or no future disagreements.

Sources

Finland, Sweden and Denmark to be transferred to Joint Force Command Norfolk - Finnish Government

White House — AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF DENMARK TOGETHER WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF GREENLAND – The White House

Cooperation

United States and Denmark

Military cooperation and economic ties remain relevant. Greenland’s dispute caused a serious crisis, but September 2026 statements describe an agreement opening cooperation. This change is recognised without erasing previous tension or every outstanding issue.

Sources

Agreement between Greenland, Denmark and the USA - Prime Minister's Office

The new US–Denmark–Greenland agreement - House of Commons Library

Office of the United States Trade Representative — Dominican Republic-Central America FTA (CAFTA-DR) | United States Trade Representative

Cooperation

United States and Hungary

Sources

US Southern Command — Multinational Exercise CENTAM Guardian 26 Strengthens Regional Security Cooperation > Joint Task Force-Bravo > Display

US Southern Command — Panama to host multinational PANAMAX exercise Aug. 3-13 > U.S. Southern Command > Press Releases

Cooperation

United States and Panama

Military coordination and joint infrastructure protection and crisis preparedness provide cooperation. PANAMAX features in the 2026 agenda. The category acknowledges canal disagreements and does not treat exercise announcements alone as proof every planned activity concluded.

Sources

U.S. Department of State (via Public) / A Statement on U.S.-Venezuela Relations

Cooperation

January 2026 US military intervention and oil-sector pressure weigh heavily on relations. In March, diplomatic and consular restoration with interim authorities was agreed. Coercion and cooperation coexist; continuous direct war is not presumed, nor private agreement a government pact.

Sources

THE WHITE HOUSE,

White House — President Trump Secures the Biggest Oil Deal in World History – The White House

US State Department — historical archive — U.S. Relations with The Bahamas - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Bahamas

Economic, maritime and security ties underpin practical shared interests beyond geographical proximity. Cooperation is neither complete foreign policy agreement nor regional commitments new confirmed bilateral disbursements.

Sources

Cooperation

United States and Jamaica

Economic and social ties and security institutions underpin bilateral cooperation. Population links are not complete government affinity; regional cooperation is neither a military alliance nor absence of migration disagreements.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Jamaica - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Suriname

Bilateral strategic dialogue, security institutions and economics provide shared interests. Cooperation predominates without diplomatic friendship language alone exceptional closeness or complete agreement with Washington’s international decisions.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Suriname - United States Department of State

US State Department — historical archive — Joint Statement on Third U.S.-Suriname Strategic Dialogue - United States Department of State

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Guyana - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Guyana

Security cooperation and energy agenda underpin cooperation through concrete bilateral shared interests. Ties are neither automatic military guarantees over territorial disputes nor broad endorsement of either government’s policies.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — Secretary Antony J. Blinken And Guyana President Irfaan Ali At a Joint Press Availability - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Belize

Regional anti-crime cooperation and disaster preparedness provide practical ties. Belize has sustained United States cooperation. This supports cooperation, not a general political alliance or every activity announced for 2026 being completed.

April 2026 sanctions against regime-linked authorities and networks reflect political disputes and operational restrictions. Trade has not removed friction. The category distinguishes economic and diplomatic pressure from direct United States–Nicaragua war.

Sources

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Government Officials, Nicaraguan Regime-Linked Gold Firms, and Individuals Involved in Seizing U.S.-Owned Property | U.S. Department of the Treasury

About Singapore-US Relations | Embassy of the Republic of Singapore in Washington DC

Close cooperation

United States and Singapore

Sustained defence, trade, technology and institutional and population contacts provide broad cooperation. Military facilities and trade agreement operate, with digital work also present. Breadth supports close cooperation without complete Washington agreement on China or other international issues.

Sources

United States | Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US Pacific Command — Philippines, US conclude Balikatan 2026 > U.S. Pacific Command > News

Close cooperation

United States and Philippines

The defence alliance accompanies actual joint exercises and economic and technological ties. Balikatan in 2026 confirms operational military cooperation; civilian nuclear work expands the agenda. Closeness is not solely the treaty or absence of political or trade disagreements.

Sources

US Pacific Command — USINDOPACOM Strengthens Alliance, Regional Cooperation During Philippines Visit > U.S. Pacific Command > Press Releases and Readouts

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S.-Philippines Relations - United States Department of State

US Pacific Command — Sixteen Indo-Pacific maritime forces commence 25th SEACAT Exercise > U.S. Pacific Command > News

Cooperation

United States and Indonesia

The February 2026 trade signing and joint maritime work provide cooperative relations through concrete Indonesia–United States channels. This is neither a military alliance nor general Indonesian alignment with US positions towards China.

Joint maritime work in 2026 gives substance to United States ties. Institutional cooperation implies neither military alliance nor general alignment against others. Trade exchanges are also not presumed free from restrictions or disagreements.

Sources

US Pacific Command — Sixteen Indo-Pacific maritime forces commence 25th SEACAT Exercise > U.S. Pacific Command > News

Cooperation

United States and Timor-Leste

Maritime cooperation with the United States in 2026 provides practical, limited cooperation, not a general military alliance. It does not establish complete foreign policy agreement or exceptional closeness across every area.

Sources

Deputy Prime Minister/Foreign Minister Meets U.S. Secretary of State and National Security Advisor in Washington D.C., on 29 May 2026

Cooperation

United States and Pakistan

High-level contacts and counterterrorism dialogue in 2026 show active institutional cooperation despite historical mistrust and disagreements. Armed group cooperation is not a guarantee of support for Pakistan’s regional disputes.

Sources

Joint Statement on the Fourth Round of Pakistan -U.S. Counterterrorism Dialogue

Nepal-US Relations | Ministry Of Foreign Affairs

Cooperation

United States and Nepal

Consultation mechanisms, development and institutions provide cooperation. Historical aid documentation is not guaranteed current disbursements. Nepal retaining other partners is autonomy, not adversarial United States relations.

Sources

Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Republic of Maldives

Cooperation

United States and Maldives

US search and rescue assistance in August 2026 shows practical Maldives cooperation supporting a limited cooperative assessment. It is neither a military alliance nor exceptional proximity or complete Indian Ocean regional competition agreement.

Sources

US State Department — historical archive — C5+1 Diplomatic Platform - United States Department of State

Cooperation

Regional contacts and institutions provide United States work; Turkmenistan’s neutrality is not adversarial relations. Relaxed specific entry restrictions distinguish concrete progress from pending migration issues without all limitations removed.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — Integrated Country Strategy Turkmenistan

White House — Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States – The White House

US State Department — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Afghanistan - United States Department of State

Strained relationship

United States and Afghanistan

Non-recognition of the Taliban government and entry restrictions shape the relationship. Limited channels exist for practical matters, but there is no diplomatic normalisation. The category refers to ties with the de facto authorities and distinguishes that tension from a continuing U.S. war against Afghanistan or its population.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

White House — Fact Sheet: President Donald J. Trump Secures $200 Billion in New U.S.-UAE Deals and Accelerates Previously Committed $1.4 Trillion UAE Investment – The White House

Security cooperation and trade and technology ties underpin cooperation. Agreements announced in 2025 expand the agenda but investment commitments are not completed disbursements. Partnership is not complete agreement on every Middle Eastern conflict.

Sources

CENTCOM Leads Regional Security Dialogue with 12 Nations in Bahrain > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Bahrain, UK, U.S. Hold Annual Defence Working Group Meeting > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Cooperation

United States and Bahrain

Security institutions accompany economic and cultural dialogue. Bilateral security integration agreement follow-up provides operational substance. Cooperation predominates without unconditional guarantees for all Bahraini government policies or absence of disagreements.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — Joint Statement of the Fourth U.S.-Bahrain Strategic Dialogue - United States Department of State

U.S., Regional Partners Open New Air Defense Operations Cell in Qatar > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Cooperation

United States and Qatar

Operational military cooperation including Al Udeid air defence coordination underpins cooperation, expanded by political and economic ties. Joint work is neither full agreement on regional actors nor all announced investments completed.

Sources

White House — President Trump Participates in a Bilateral Meeting with the Emir of the State of Qatar – The White House

White House — WHAT THEY ARE SAYING: Trillions in Great Deals Secured for America Thanks to President Trump – The White House

CENTCOM Hosts Jordan for Exercise Eager Lion in Colorado > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Cooperation

United States and Jordan

Practical military cooperation and trade provide cooperation. Eager Lion in September 2026 shows an active bilateral agenda. This is neither automatic support for every US Israel and Palestine position nor a general military guarantee.

Sources

White House — Actions by the United States in the Investigations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974 of the Acts, Policies, and Practices of 60 Economies Related to the Failure of Each Economy to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor – The White House

CENTCOM Leads Regional Security Dialogue with 12 Nations in Bahrain > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Cooperation

United States and Kuwait

Joint defence contacts in 2026 show institutional regional security cooperation. Kuwait maintains United States work without full agreement on neighbouring conflicts. Assessment is cooperative, not exceptional closeness across every area.

Sources

CENTCOM Leads Regional Security Dialogue with 12 Nations in Bahrain > U.S. Central Command > U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Official Public Releases

Cooperation

United States and Egypt

Government participation in defence coordination in 2026 provides concrete United States cooperation. This institutional work predominates without complete Middle East agreement. The category endorses neither Egyptian domestic policy nor unconditional alliance.

Sources

US Treasury — Belarus Sanctions | Office of Foreign Assets Control

Cooperation

Sanctions and political restrictions continue to constrain relations. Licences and easing published in September 2026 show contacts and adjustments, not complete normalisation. The category distinguishes tense relations from direct war and restrictions from a uniform exception-free embargo.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — Joint Statement on the U.S.-Greece Strategic Dialogue - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Greece

Strategic dialogue combines security, energy, economics and science. Signing the Artemis Accords in 2024 adds concrete joint work. This supports cooperation without all projects implemented or shared NATO membership alone exceptional closeness.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — The United States and Greece: United by Democratic Values, Advancing Shared Goals for Peace and Prosperity - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Angola

Follow-up on the defence agreement and bilateral meetings in August 2026 show growing collaboration. The new institutional partnership adds a practical channel of work. US entry restrictions are acknowledged, but are not automatically interpreted as general hostility between the two governments.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Army — Historic African Lion 26 concludes | Article | The United States Army

Defence cooperation with the United States is operational, including African Lion concluded in May 2026. It favours cooperation. One exercise proves neither full foreign policy agreement nor automatic support in every regional controversy.

Sources

Cooperation

Security institutional partnership and regional work in 2026 maintain practical United States cooperation. Cooperation implies neither full government agreement nor exceptional closeness everywhere. Security work does not endorse Togolese domestic policy.

Sources

Cooperation

United States and Côte d’Ivoire

An institutional partnership formalised in June 2026 and regional security work provide cooperation. US entry restrictions add friction. Migration limits are not general hostility, nor the new framework’s commitments all implemented.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Cooperation

United States and Gabon

Institutional partnership and joint September 2026 security activities show cooperation alongside US entry restrictions. Assessment distinguishes friction from practical institutions and not unconditional support for Gabonese authorities.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Cooperation

United States and Kenya

Work against armed groups and defence contacts in 2026 underpin practical cooperation between institutions and forces. Cooperation is neither complete political agreement nor a favourable judgment of all security or government decisions.

Sources

US Africa Command — U.S. Africa Command 2026 Posture Statement

Cooperation

United States and Djibouti

US presence at Camp Lemonnier and institutional coordination in 2026 provide operational security cooperation. Presence is neither identical interests in all regional affairs nor sufficient evidence of close cooperation everywhere.

Sources

Cooperation

United States and Ethiopia

July 2026 bilateral contacts and armed-group countermeasures underpin practical institutional cooperation despite possible political differences. The category neither endorses Ethiopian domestic policy nor makes every regional conflict military dispute with the United States.

Sources

US Africa Command — U.S. Africa Command 2026 Posture Statement

Cooperation

United States and Somalia

Work with Somali authorities and local partners against Islamic State and Al Shabaab provides cooperation. Contacts in 2026 confirm continuity. Operations are not war against Somalia; territorial fragmentation and entry restrictions limit scope.

Sources

US Africa Command — U.S. Africa Command 2026 Posture Statement

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Africa Command — U.S. Africa Command 2026 Posture Statement

Cooperation

United States and Uganda

Counter-Al Shabaab cooperation provides operational work with the United States described in the 2026 military assessment. Security cooperation predominates. It endorses neither Ugandan domestic policies nor complete agreement on all regional affairs.

Sources

Cooperation

United States and Tanzania

Regional security cooperation including Justified Accord’s 2026 agenda provides concrete work. US entry restrictions are friction, not political rupture. Cooperation is recognised without general military alliance or exceptional closeness.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US State Department — historical archive — The United States and Nigeria: Partnering for Prosperity - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Nigeria

Economic and health ties and institutional security work provide cooperation. Regional contacts in 2026 show continuity. Entry restrictions add friction; historical assistance programmes are not guaranteed current financing.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Department of State — historical archive — Liberia - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Liberia

Trade and health institutional ties and regional security work favour cooperation. The 2026 agenda confirms channels. Historical health assistance documentation guarantees neither current disbursements nor every programme continuing under identical conditions.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Democratic Republic of the Congo - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Congo - Kinshasa

Congolese institutional cooperation and regional stability support provide cooperation. US sanctions in 2026 against actors accused of destabilisation are not hostility to the government. State is distinct from armed groups and sanctioned former authorities.

Sources

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Former Democratic Republic of the Congo President for Ties to Armed Conflict | U.S. Department of the Treasury

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Rebel Commanders Driving Conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo | U.S. Department of the Treasury

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Rwanda Officials, Condemns Blatant Violations of Washington Peace Accords | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Strained relationship

United States and Rwanda

March 2026 sanctions targeting Rwanda’s army and senior commanders over actions in Congo constrain relations. Earlier peace agreement participation does not remove this operational friction. Tension is political and economic, not direct US–Rwanda war.

Sources

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Media Statement: Portfolio Committee on International Relations and Cooperation Concerned by United States Ambassador’s Third Demarche - Parliament of South Africa

Mixed relationship

United States and South Africa

Trade and investment remain important, while October 2026 diplomatic protests reflect significant political friction. South Africa calls the United States an economic partner while disagreeing over diplomatic actions. Cooperation and tension coexist without either completely replacing the other.

Sources

Bilateral Relations - DIRCO

Strained relationship

United States and Niger

US forces’ withdrawal in 2024 and later entry restrictions constrain ties. Coordinated withdrawal substantially reduced prior military cooperation. The category is institutional tension, not direct war or hostility to Niger’s population.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Zambia - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Zambia

Institutional health and trade ties provide cooperation. US entry restrictions add acknowledged friction. Historical health programmes are not guaranteed present financing, and cooperation is not complete government agreement.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US State Department — historical archive — Mozambique - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Mozambique

Health and security institutions provide United States cooperation. This does not imply every historical programme retains financing. Work against armed groups is distinct from war against Mozambique and general government agreement.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Seychelles - United States Department of State

Cooperation

United States and Seychelles

The US embassy reopening in 2023 and maritime cooperation provide ties beyond formal diplomatic recognition. A general military alliance is not asserted, nor every historical activity presumed unchanged.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relationship with the Indian Ocean Rim Association and Commitment to the Indian Ocean Region - United States Department of State

Community cooperation and maritime coordination in 2026 give practical substance. A school construction opening distinguishes an actual result from an announcement. Cooperation predominates without Fiji sharing every US position on its other regional partners.

Sources

US Pacific Command — Pacific Partnership 2026 holds ribbon cutting ceremony for construction project in Fiji > U.S. Pacific Command > News Articles

US Pacific Command — Sixteen Indo-Pacific maritime forces commence 25th SEACAT Exercise > U.S. Pacific Command > News

US Pacific Command — Pacific Partnership 2025 End of Mission Overview > U.S. Pacific Command > News

Cooperation

United States and Tonga

Joint community work and emergency preparedness accompany maritime cooperation in 2026. These are practical cooperation channels. US entry restrictions add friction but are neither a rupture nor a general political alliance.

Sources

US Pacific Command — Sixteen Indo-Pacific maritime forces commence 25th SEACAT Exercise > U.S. Pacific Command > News

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Andorra - United States Department of State

Cooperation

Available documents establish diplomatic contacts and a limited framework for exchange, but are mainly historical. They do not sufficiently support a current bilateral category. Low documented intensity is not automatically interpreted as neutrality or a poor relationship.

Sources

US State Department — historical archive — Andorra - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

United States and Bhutan

No formal diplomatic ties does not describe the entire United States relationship. Current practical cooperation and friction evidence is insufficient for the five levels. Relations remain unclassified, not automatically adversarial or neutral.

Insufficient information

United States and Burkina Faso

Entry restrictions coexist with regional security contacts. Isolated elements do not determine what predominates with current authorities. Government political orientation is not a bad relationship, nor regional activity general cooperation.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

US entry restrictions are concrete friction but do not alone describe relations with Chad. Current bilateral cooperation and disagreements lack sufficient information. The relationship remains unclassified without presuming neutrality or confrontation.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — Chad - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

Regional documents show maritime security contacts but insufficient evidence for current overall bilateral assessment. Planned participation does not establish sustained cooperation elsewhere. Relations remain unclassified, not neutral by default.

Sources

Insufficient information

United States and Guinea-Bissau

Regional security documentation provides context but insufficient current bilateral evidence. Planned exercise participation is not general closeness. Missing solid information also means neither neutrality nor a bad relationship.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Haiti - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

United States and Haiti

Assistance documentation and entry restrictions show different aspects. Haiti’s institutional crisis complicates sufficiently supported current assessment. Domestic violence is not war with the United States; historical programmes are not guaranteed current aid.

Sources

US Department of State — Haiti Travel Advisory | Travel.State.gov

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Insufficient information

United States and Iraq

The military mission transition plan is important background but included conditional phases through September 2026. Without sufficient verification of implementation and subsequent bilateral arrangements, no current category is assigned. Withdrawal or transformation announcements are not completed results.

Sources

US State Department — historical archive — Senior Administration Official and Senior Defense Official on a Transition Plan for Combined Joint Task Force – Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

United States and Laos

Entry restrictions provide friction but cannot alone assess overall relations with Laos. Current bilateral evidence on practical cooperation and differences is insufficient. Migration measures are not general hostility, nor uncertainty neutrality.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Insufficient information

United States and Lesotho

Earlier health cooperation provides context but does not confirm current programme scope or economic conditions. Evidence is insufficiently current for a category. Historical assistance is not guaranteed present financing.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Lesotho - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

United States and Libya

Regional maritime cooperation provides concrete contact, but fragmented Libyan authorities limit overall assessment. Sanctions on specific actors are not hostility towards all Libya. Relations remain unclassified; civil war is not bilateral confrontation.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Mauritius - United States Department of State

Historical sources provide economic and diplomatic ties, but Diego Garcia’s importance requires verification of the current framework before an overall assessment. Earlier territorial agreements or announcements are not presumed to resolve every issue. Relations remain unclassified.

Sources

Insufficient information

United States and Monaco

Historical documentation describes diplomatic contacts and limited economic exchanges. It does not sufficiently support a current assessment of the overall bilateral relationship. Documented low-intensity relations are confused with neither neutrality nor adversarial relations.

Sources

US Department of State — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Monaco - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

United States and Namibia

Historical accounts describe political, economic and social ties but the principal source does not confirm current cooperation scope. Diplomatic wording alone does not determine a category. The relationship remains unclassified; lack of updates is not neutrality.

Sources

US State Department — historical archive — U.S. Relations With Namibia - United States Department of State

Insufficient information

Regional maritime security documentation provides a contact precedent, not sufficiently current bilateral evidence. A planned activity does not establish sustained cooperation overall. Relations remain unclassified, without default neutrality or general closeness.

Sources

Insufficient information

United States and Sierra Leone

Regional security contacts and entry restrictions provide different signals. Current bilateral evidence is insufficient to assess overall predominance. Planned activity does not become general cooperation, nor a migration restriction confrontation.

Sources

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Insufficient information

United States and South Sudan

Sanctions programmes and entry restrictions require distinguishing authorities, individuals and population. Current overall bilateral evidence is insufficient to establish what predominates. Domestic crisis is not a South Sudan–United States war.

Sources

US Treasury — Sanctions Programs and Country Information | Office of Foreign Assets Control

US Department of State — Suspension of Visa Issuance to Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Insufficient information

United States and Sudan

Sanctions against Sudanese war actors in 2026 are relevant facts but do not describe uniform relations with the whole state. Fragmented authorities limit overall bilateral classification. Domestic conflict is not direct military confrontation with the United States.

Sources

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan’s Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis | U.S. Department of the Treasury

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Recruitment Network Enabling War in Sudan, Calls for Humanitarian Truce | U.S. Department of the Treasury

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Sudanese Paramilitary Commanders for Atrocities in El-Fasher | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Insufficient information

United States and Zimbabwe

The specific sanctions programme was removed in 2024 and replaced with measures against specific actors. This is not a current general embargo on the country. The measures’ current scope and overall ties need sufficient confirmation before a bilateral category can be assigned.

Sources

US Treasury — Treasury Sanctions Zimbabwe’s President and Key Actors for Corruption and Serious Human Rights Abuse | U.S. Department of the Treasury

Ministerial contacts in 2024 and trade provide a cooperative foundation with Ghana. Documented collaboration supports a cooperative relationship, without equating announced projects with results already delivered.

Sources

Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs